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 i 
Abstract 
  
This thesis investigates the implementation of performance-based budgeting through a 
case-study of Indonesia. It examines the use by government officials/practitioners of 
performance information in the planning and budget-making process at the national 
level within Indonesia. In particular, the thesis assesses the impact that performance 
results have on budget allocations vis-a-vis other factors affecting budget allocation 
decisions.  It also identifies the key challenges for government officials in seeking to 
implement a performance-based budgeting regime, especially, the challenge of 
moving the actual practice of budgetmaking model further away from a traditional 
incremental approach.   
 
The research for the thesis has involved a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis, with three different data collection methods deployed. Interviews were 
conducted with fifty three government officials from the Ministry of Planning, the 
Ministry of Finance, seven other ministries/agencies and Parliament.  A questionnaire 
was also designed and administered with seventy nine line ministry/agency officials.  
Finally, statistical analysis of performance scores and budget data was undertaken for 
435 spending programmes covering 86 line ministries/agencies over the period 2011-
2014.  
 
A key conclusion from the study is that Indonesia has made significant efforts in the 
direction of using performance information in its budgetary planning processes. The 
Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and line ministries/agencies have been 
particularly active in leading change in this respect. That said, the evidence gathered 
 ii 
from the interviews, questionnaire responses and statistical analysis clearly show that, 
as elsewhere around the world, the impact of performance information on resource 
allocation decisions has, so far, been quite limited, and that incrementalism continues 
to dominate budgetary decision-making. While performance information is becoming 
increasingly important for managerial purposes within line ministries/agencies, the 
more challenging goal of breaking well-established budget-setting practices and 
instituting a more performance-driven allocation model is largely still to be achieved.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
The last two decades have witnessed a wave of enthusiasm for performance-based 
budgeting reforms both in advanced and developing countries (Shah and Shen, 2007, 
p.137). The motives for budget reforms vary across countries, and include: financial 
crisis, pressure to reduce public expenditures, and change in political administration 
(OECD, 2007, p. 24). Performance budgeting is considered by Hawkesworth, 
Melchor, and Robinson (2013, p. 2) to offer two potential benefits for governments: 
the forging of a clear link between public funding allocations and government 
priorities and the possibility of making savings in baseline expenditure through 
enhanced efficiency. Although there is no standard definition of performance-based 
budgeting, definitions generally include a concern with the use of performance 
information in budget processes and budget allocations (OECD, 2007, p. 20). A 
number of research studies have provided insights into the use of performance 
information in budgeting. Behn (2003, p. 588) proposes that performance information 
can be used for eight managerial purposes one of which is budgeting, the other seven 
being evaluating, controlling, motivating, promoting, celebrating, learning, and 
improving. Hatry (2008, p. 232) suggests that performance information is used in the 
budgeting process for three reasons: preparation of the budget, justification of the 
budget proposal, and fulfilment of the requirements of senior officials. Robinson 
(2014a, pp. 8-9) similarly argues that performance information can contribute to 
budgeting in three main ways: helping to improve expenditure prioritisation; putting 
increased pressure on ministries/agencies to improve the effectiveness of their 
 2 
programmes; and ensuring that the budget promotes the efficiency within 
ministries/agencies.  
 
It has been remarked that performance budgeting is easy to explain but has been hard 
to implement (Schick, 2007, p. 122). The challenge faced by governments is to use 
performance information in the budget processes and budget allocations. Schick 
(2007, p. 123) argues that if performance-based budgeting is defined as a budget 
system that formally links increases in spending to increases in results, only a few 
governments would qualify as having systems that conform with this definition. The 
OECD survey showed that although 79% of respondents from the OECD countries 
indicated that performance results are used as part of budget discussions between their 
Ministries of Finance and line ministries, two-thirds also indicated that they did not 
directly link performance results to allocations (Curristine, 2005, pp. 103-105). The 
most recent OECD Performance Budgeting Survey in 2011/2012 also provided 
similar evidence. Performance budgeting frameworks in the OECD countries are 
generally flexible and not linked with budget decisions (OECD, 2014). In fact, with a 
few exceptions, in certain areas such as education and health, no OECD countries 
were found directly to link public expenditures to performance information. While 
performance information was being used to inform the budget, it was not determining 
it (Hawkesworth and Klepsvik, 2013, p. 120).   
 
The literature shows that despite the potential use of performance information for 
budgeting purposes and the aspirations towards performance-based budgeting, the 
actual use of performance information in determining budgets has to date been 
minimal. In the USA, Gilmour and Lewis (2006) conducted a regression analysis of 
the PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool) scores on changes in the President’s 
3 
proposed budget, and found a modest but significant positive correlation. Their 
findings were in line with the result of a qualitative study by White (2012) who found 
that the influence of the PART on budget allocations to be marginal. Another 
qualitative study of performance-based budgeting (PBB) in eleven states of the USA 
by Hou and Lunsford et al (2011) found that performance budgeting was not 
necessarily useful for budgetary decision-making during times of financial hardship. 
Zaltsman (2009) used qualitative analysis to investigate the use of performance 
information in budget allocations by Chile’s budget bureau. He found that 
performance information did not affect budget allocation decisions. Melkers and 
Willoughby (2005) examined the effects of performance information on budgetary 
decision-making and other operations from a survey data of administrators and 
budgeters from nearly 300 local governments in USA. They found that respondents 
doubted the effectiveness of performance information for budgetary purposes such as 
changing the appropriation level, reducing ineffective programmes, or reducing 
duplicative services. In contrast with other studies, Ho (2011) examined the 
implications of performance information at the sub-departmental programme levels in 
the city of Indianapolis in USA and found that performance measurement was 
positively related to intra-departmental programme budget changes. Joyce (2011) has 
argued that the availability of performance information does not automatically affect 
allocations as the budgeting process involves a political process.   
While the impact of performance information on budget allocations has thus far been 
seemingly quite limited, Shah and Shen (2007, pp. 151-153) summarised four 
important advantages of the implementation of performance budgeting. Firstly, they 
suggest, it enhances communication between budget actors and with the public. In 
this respect, performance budgeting clarifies programme goals and objectives and 
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identifies performance targets and line ministries/agencies and government officials 
develop a better understanding about their performance. Secondly, performance 
budgeting improves management within ministries/agencies. Performance budgeting 
reforms can help programme managers to specify clear organisational goals, monitor 
programme performance more carefully, maintain better knowledge of problems, plan 
more creatively for the future, improve internal control, and communicate programme 
results more effectively. Thirdly, performance budgeting may play a role in informing 
budget allocation decisions. Performance budgeting adds value to budget discussions 
because performance information may be used to justify the reallocation of resources, 
to change the orientation of discussion from line items to performance, to influence 
decisions about new programmes, and to influence the increases and decreases of 
funding.  Fourthly, it enhances transparency and accountability. The budget document 
can serve as a major tool of transparency and accountability for the legislative body 
and public. Performance budgeting classifies resources by programmes and enables 
better presentation of performance information for the public so that they can gain a 
better sense of major government activities and their achievements.  
 
Other than performance information, there are several other aspects of budgeting in 
the public sector that may affect not only the budgetary decision-making but also 
budgeting reforms. Budgeting in the public sector is a complex process and 
fundamentally different from budgeting in the private sector (Folscher, 2007, p. 109). 
Folscher (2007, p. 110) argues that the aim of public sector budgeting is not to make 
money or profit by spending money. The goals of spending through the public budget 
are complex, difficult to measure and they may not be directly associated with the 
activities and money allocated to them. Public budgeting exists in a political 
environment where different goals compete for a restricted source of funding. Line 
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ministries have a tendency to maximise their budget requests without considering the 
needs of other line ministries and the effects of their actions on what is available for 
other ministries. The practice of budget maximisation (i.e. seeking the highest 
possible allocations) occurs between line ministries and central budget authorities as 
much as it happens between different spending divisions and budget divisions within 
line ministries. A single tool or a single methodology to decide between budget needs 
or budget proposals does not exist. In extreme situations, budgeting is inherently 
political rather than rational; it means that purpose supposed process budget 
prioritisation may be illusory (Robinson and Brumby, 2005, p. 15). 
 
Budgetary decision-making is rarely made in a single office by a single individual 
(Folscher, 2007, p. 111). Budget processes involve complex institutional 
arrangements for sequenced and often collective decision making. An important 
feature of public budgeting is that those who hold the best information about the 
performance of programmes are rarely those who make the funding decisions. Line 
ministries generally have better information on how best to allocate resources to 
achieve the objectives of programmes. Considering the fact that budgetary decision-
making involves many institutions and officials and creates principal-agent 
relationships, there is much potential for agency problems within the budget process. 
As Hou et al (2011) suggest, the government can be seen as being the agent that 
prepares the budget, while the legislators are the principals that examine and authorise 
it. Folscher (2007, p. 111) also highlights various principal-agent relational issues that 
are potentially problematical. The relationship between finance ministries and line 
ministries, for example, is typically problematical in this respect, with hidden 
information and hidden actions often persisting. Other principal-agent problems in the 
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budget process are frequently found between heads of line ministries and officials, 
and between the centre of a line ministry and other divisions within the same ministry.   
 
Despite the emergence of performance-based budgeting, the traditional budgeting 
model, i.e. incremental budgeting, arguably still dominates the budgetary system as it 
operates in practice. Folscher (2007, pp. 123-124) argues that “many of the modern 
approaches to budgeting are located on a spectrum between incrementalism and pure 
comprehensive rationality.” However, Schick (2003) has argued that budgeting is 
permanently incremental, not only for allocation purposes but also for the adjustments 
of its operating rules and procedures. The incrementalist approach is still used by 
budget officials for budgetary decision-making. Schick (2014, p. 28) argues that one 
of the real obstacles to performance-based allocation is the persistence of incremental 
norms and behaviour. For example, Good (2011, p. 45) argues that the budgeting 
process in Canada is largely incremental. The two distinctions of the incremental 
method are that it is both incremental as a method of budget calculation and 
incremental as a process. According to Wildavsky, the incremental method of budget 
calculation focuses on small increments to an existing base. “Budgeting is 
incremental: the largest determining factor of the size and content of this year’s 
budget is last year’s budget. Most of the budget is a product of previous decisions” 
(Wildavsky 1964, p. 13). Incrementalism as a process describes the nature of the 
relationship between budget actors. “An incremental process is one in which the 
relationships between actors are regular over a period of years, and a non-incremental 
process is one in which this relationship is irregular. By regular we mean that similar 
patterns of interactions between the participants is followed from one year to the next. 
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By irregular we mean that the pattern of interactions is changed or broken at a point in 
time” (Dempster and Wildavsky, 1979, p. 375). 
 
White (1994, p. 115) argues that, “incrementalism is necessary, and reforms like 
[Planning-Programming-Budgeting] PPB and [Zero Based Budgeting] ZBB are 
doomed to failure, because the burden of calculation necessary to make a 
government’s budget is enormous”. The theory of incrementalism remains a widely 
accepted explanation of the public budgeting process where it is argued that final 
budget allocations are a combination of past and present political bargaining and 
agreement (Willoughby, 2002, p. 104).  
 
The use of performance information in budgeting also cannot be separated from the 
challenges and problems of implementing budget reforms. From the literature of 
policy implementation studies, Barrett (2004, p. 252) has argued that there are four 
key factors that contribute to the failure of implementation. Firstly, a lack of clear 
policy objectives leaves room for differential interpretation and discretion in action. 
Secondly, various actors and agencies involved in the implementation can create 
problems of communication and co-ordination between the ‘links in the chain’. 
Thirdly, inter-and intra-organisational values and interest differences between actors 
and agencies hinder implementation. Fourthly, the relative autonomy of implementing 
agencies limits administrative control. Most OECD countries have some common 
challenges that include problems with performance measurement and data integration, 
facing resistance from public servants of many levels within the Ministry of Finance 
(as central budget authorities) and line ministries, and lacking institutional capacity in 
the Ministry of Finance and line ministries officials (OECD, 2007). 
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Although the impacts of performance-based budgeting in various countries seem 
rather disappointing with regard to the linking of performance with budget 
allocations, the arguments for making this link remain convincing (Robinson 2007, 
cited in Schick, 2014, p. 8) and it is understandable that most countries, including 
Indonesia, would aim to reform their budget processes in this direction.  
 
The evolution of performance-based budgeting implementation in Indonesia began 
with the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the political transition in the country that 
commenced in 1998. Indonesia labels its budgeting approach “Performance-Based 
Budgeting” and this approach is used to justify the relationship between funds 
allocated and performance of programmes or activities (Government of Indonesia 
(GoI), 2010a). The government has indicated that the implementation of PBB is 
intended to improve the quality of public services, to improve the effectiveness and 
the accountability of ministries/agencies, and to combat corruption (GoI, 2010b).  
 
Many studies have been undertaken to examine PBB reform in various countries, but 
studies that explore the use in practice of performance information within the budget 
process are scarce (Raudla, 2012, p. 1000). This thesis addresses this deficiency 
within the Indonesian central government context by examining the use of 
performance information by government officials/practitioners in the planning and 
budgeting process. It examines the extent and manner to which government officials 
use performance information in budgetary decision-making and in the different stages 
of the budgeting process. Furthermore, the thesis examines how different government 
practitioners from line ministries/agencies use performance information in the 
planning and budgeting discussions within their organisations. In addition, it 
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investigates the use of performance information for managerial purposes within line 
ministries/agencies.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
Drawing on literature that examines the actual use of performance information in the 
budget process, the thesis is mindful of past findings that show performance 
information rarely has a direct impact on budget allocations. Countries that are in the 
early stages of developing performance-based budgeting tend to use performance 
information for background information only (Curristine, 2005, p. 102). The thesis 
has commenced from a cautious position about the influence of incremental budgeting 
practices, despite Indonesia’s avowed commitment to implementing performance-
based budgeting.   
 
As well as being the author’s home country, Indonesia was considered a suitable 
country for such a study because there has been limited research on performance-
based budgeting there. A huge effort has been made there to reform the planning and 
budgeting process over the past eighteen years and Indonesia is an especially 
interesting case to study because there are two key central ministries, namely the 
Ministry of Planning (Bappenas) and the Ministry of Finance, each playing an 
important role in the planning and budgeting process (Blondal, Hawkesworth, Choi, 
2009). Moreover, as Blondal, Hawkesworth, Choi, et al. (2009, p. 12) have argued 
that the Indonesian planning system is different from a typical central planning model. 
In most OECD countries, the planning function is integrated in a single budget office, 
rather than separately as in Indonesia. Conducting the research in Indonesia, this 
opened up the possibility of studying the interaction in the budget making process 
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between the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance, as well as their 
respective interactions with line ministries/agencies in allocating budgets and 
reviewing the various work plans and budget documents (RKAKLs).  
 
As elsewhere, Indonesia is likely to have inherited incremental budgeting practices 
from its past. In the 1970s, Caiden and Wildavsky conducted research into planning 
and budgeting in various developing countries in Africa, South America, and Asia, 
including Indonesia, and they found much commonality of viewpoints among budget 
officials from such countries, and particularly that: “the budget of the next year will 
replicate to an extraordinary degree the budget of this year, which was extremely like 
last year’s budget“ (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974, pp. 105-106). Caiden (1985, p. 27) 
argued that budgeting methods in ASEAN countries often encouraged incrementalism 
and stable outcomes. She found that in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the policy 
from the government was primarily to satisfy the needs of the operating budget. 
Blondal, Hawkesworth, Choi, et al. (2009, p. 13) found that there were budget 
rigidities in the Indonesian budget formulation system that limited flexibility. Such 
budget rigidities could perhaps have served to maintain the practice of incremental 
budgeting in Indonesia to the present time, and despite the ambition to implement 
performance-based budgeting. 
 
This thesis explores the implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia 
during the period of 2011-2014 with the following objectives: 
• To examine the impact of performance information on budget allocations.  
• To explore factors affecting budget allocations.  
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• To explore the extent of incremental budgeting practices, despite the fact that 
performance-based budgeting has been introduced. 
• To explore the use of performance information by government 
officials/practitioners in the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and 
line ministries/agencies in the various stages of the planning and budgeting 
process. 
• To explore the use of performance information by government practitioners in 
line ministries/agencies for managerial purposes.   
• To explore the problems encountered by government officials/practitioners in 
the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and line ministries/agencies 
in implementing performance-based budgeting.   
 
These research objectives are addressed through the following four research questions: 
(1) Is there evidence that performance results/scores are used in determining 
budget allocations? 
(2) Is there evidence that incremental budgeting practices still exist in the 
planning and budgeting process? 
(3) How, in practice, do government practitioners use performance information in 
the planning and budgeting process?   
(4) What challenges have government practitioners encountered in seeking to 
implement performance-based budgeting? 
 
1.3 Research Methods 
The research for this thesis employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis with three different data collection methods. This study involved interviews 
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with 53 government officials from ten institutions/ministries/agencies – with  
interviewees having been chosen to represent four different budget actors in the 
planning and budgeting process: the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, 
line ministries/agencies and the Parliament. It also involved a questionnaire that was 
distributed to 79 line ministries/agencies and the collection and analysis of 
performance and budget data for 435 programmes and 86 line ministries/agencies for 
the period of 2011 to 2014 from the Directorate General of Budget, the Ministry of 
Finance. In addition, a range of governmental publications and other documents were 
also analysed.  
 
The qualitative data were combined, analysed, and triangulated to explore the use of 
performance information in the various activities in the planning and budgeting 
process, to identify factors affecting budget decisions, to reveal the presence of 
incremental budgeting practices, and to reveal challenges encountered by government 
officials/practitioners in implementing performance-based budgeting. The results of 
questionnaire have been analysed using descriptive statistics and the budget and 
performance data were analysed in order to examine the relationship between 
performance scores and budget allocations and to explore the extent of 
incrementalism in the planning and budgeting process.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. This first chapter has provided an 
introduction to the study, to its objectives and to the key research questions.  
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Chapter 2 reviews the literature that is relevant to an analysis of performance-based 
budgeting in Indonesia. The chapter begins with a critical overview of performance 
budgeting and other budgeting techniques.  It then continues with a brief overview of 
the range of theories of public budgeting that have thus far been proffered. It then 
explores problems faced by public budgeting with regard to funding decisions. 
Because incremental budgeting has been found to be the dominant established form of 
budgeting around the world, the chapter also specifically reviews the incremental 
budgeting literature, although the largest part of the chapter focuses on performance-
based budgeting and the potential use of performance information in this context. It 
then discusses the benefits and limitations of performance-based budgeting. Because 
the use of performance information in the budgeting process is very much associated 
with the performance-based budgeting reform, the chapter also discusses the reform 
process, including the problems of implementing performance-based budgeting. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of analytical frameworks or theories that can be 
useful for this study. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the evolution of performance-based budgeting implementation 
in Indonesia, describing these arrangements in detail and providing the necessary 
background for the empirical research reported in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The chapter 
starts by discussing the context of public management reforms in Indonesia that began 
to be implemented after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The key laws and 
regulations that have guided the planning and budgeting process in Indonesia and that 
have affected the implementation of performance-based budgeting are also discussed. 
The significant phases of the reforms are then described. The features of Indonesian 
performance-based budgeting, including the introduction of performance 
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measurement and evaluation (RKAKL performance scores), are also presented. The 
chapter then continues with a discussion of the four key actors involved in the 
planning and budgeting process, and the three budgetary decision stages of the 
Indonesian process. The chapter concludes with an identification of the potential uses 
of performance information in the planning and budgeting process. 
 
In Chapter 4, an overview is presented of the research design underpinning the 
thesis. It begins with a discussion of the choice of a case study design for this study. 
The chapter then describes the use of a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods as the research methods for the study. As the research has involved 
interviewing and surveying a large sample of Indonesian central government officials 
or practitioners with different ranks and roles in the planning and budgeting process, 
the chapter explains the two-stage sampling procedure that was used to select 
government officials/practitioners for interview from ten government 
institutions/ministries/agencies. The chapter then describes in more detail the three 
different data collection procedures employed: collecting performance scores and 
budget data; conducting interviews; and administering the questionnaire. Next the 
chapter discusses the methods of analysis used in examining and interpreting the data. 
In addition, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the reflexivity of the research.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present the findings of the research.  
Chapter 5 reports the findings that relate to research questions one and two. Research 
Question Number One asking ‘Is there evidence that performance results/scores are 
used in determining budget allocations?’ while Research Question Number Two 
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asked ‘Is there evidence that incremental budgeting practices still exist in the planning 
and budgeting process?   
 
The chapter begins with the discussion of the importance of the indicative budget 
ceilings stage compared with the other two budgetary decision stages, namely: the 
budget ceilings and the budget allocations. Then, the discussion continues by 
exploring the use of performance information by government officials from the 
Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance 
in preparing the indicative budget ceilings. The third section of the chapter discusses 
factors affecting budget allocations. The discussion continues by presenting the 
results of the statistical analysis of the relationship between performance scores and 
budget allocations and the existence of incremental budgeting practice.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the findings related to Research Question Number Three ‘How, 
in practice, do government practitioners use performance information in the 
Indonesian planning and budgeting process?’ The extent of the use of performance 
information is a key issue that arises from the experience of performance budgeting in 
other countries. The chapter is divided into three sections - each section presenting 
findings on the use of performance information from four different Indonesian 
institutions involved in the planning and budgeting process. The first section presents 
findings on how government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning and the 
Directorate General of Budget within the Ministry of Finance use performance 
information in the planning and budgeting process. The second section presents 
findings on the use of performance information by Members of Parliament. The third 
section reports findings on how government practitioners from line 
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ministries/agencies use performance information in the planning and budgeting 
process and for other managerial purposes, such as for accountability, mobilisation, 
and improvement. Although each section focuses on reporting the use of performance 
information by the respective institutions, the views of practitioners from other 
institutions, were also gathered, are similarly presented and compared.   
 
Chapter 7 then reports the findings relating to the Research Question Number Four, 
‘What challenges have government practitioners encountered in seeking to implement 
performance-based budgeting?’ The findings here are organised into three major 
themes.  The first section reports the findings relating to the problems with the 
measurement system. The second section reports findings relating to support for 
managing performance in all institutions involved in the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting while the third section reports findings relating to 
personnel and the technical capacity to implement performance-based budgeting.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 8, the main conclusions from the research are summarised, and 
the contribution to knowledge that they represent as a whole is considered. The 
chapter finishes by proffering four recommendations for policy and practice in 
Indonesia for the further development of performance-based budgeting. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature that is relevant to an analysis of performance-based 
budgeting in Indonesia. The review begins with an overview of the range of existing 
theories of public budgeting. It then explores problems faced by public budgeting 
with regard to funding decisions. Although this thesis is focussed on performance-
based budgeting, it devotes considerable space to examining the incremental 
budgeting literature, as incremental budgeting can still be considered to be the  the 
dominant established form of budgeting around the world.   
 
The largest part of the chapter focuses on performance-based budgeting and the 
potential use of performance information in performance-based budgeting. It then 
discusses the benefits and limitations of performance-based budgeting. It also 
discusses issues associated with the performance-based budgeting reforms and the 
problems of implementing performance-based budgeting. It concludes with a 
discussion of analytical frameworks or theories that can be useful for this study. The 
chapter begins with a critical overview of performance budgeting and other budgeting 
techniques.   
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2.2 Overview of the Literature on Performance Budgeting and other Budgeting 
Techniques 
This section provides an overview of the literature on performance budgeting set in 
the context of the development of budgeting theory and practice over the last three-
quarters of a century. 
 
We can distinguish broadly between the economists’ comprehensive rational 
approach to budgeting and a less ambitious perspective closer in touch with actual 
practice best exemplified by incremental budgeting theories.  
 
The economists’ comprehensive approach to budgeting aims at the maximisation of 
social welfare by allocating scarce resources between competing ends. Vernon Key 
called this ‘the basic budgeting problem (on the expenditure side), namely: On what 
basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?’ (Key, 
1940, p.1138) Key notes that the basic conceptual problem was solved long ago,, 
citing Pigou (1928) but points out that the clear principles do not take one very far in 
practice because of the information required. 
As regards the distribution, as distinct from the aggregate cost, of optional 
government expenditure, it is clear that, just as an individual will get more 
satisfaction out of his income by maintaining a certain balance between 
different sorts of expenditure, so also will a community through its 
government. The principle of balance in both cases is provided by the 
postulate that resources should be so distributed among different uses that the 
marginal return on satisfaction is the same for all of them...Expenditure should 
be distributed between battleships and poor relief in such wise that the last 
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shilling devoted to each of them yields the same real return (Pigou, 1928, 
p.50) cited in (Key, 1940). 
In the methodologically individualistic approach of neoclassical economics, 
equalising “marginal return on satisfaction” or marginal utility” per unit of the 
currency across public spending and also the private sector would maximise total 
utility.  If the distribution of utility between individuals rather than just the total is 
also to be taken into account that can be expressed in the form of a Bergsonian social 
welfare function, where social welfare W to be maximised is some function of 
individual utilities U of the S members of society. W=W(U1, U2, ..US), (Bergson, 
1938, Samuelson, 1947, Brown and Jackson, 2009, pp. 87-89, Mueller, 2003, pp. 563-
5). 
 
The ultimate standard of performance from budgeting in this framework would be the 
maximisation of social welfare achieved by considering what utilities could result 
from alternative budget decisions. In practice, in terms of real budget processes 
“the doctrine of marginal utility, developed most finely in the analysis of the 
market economy, has a ring of unreality when applied to public expenditure… 
For the working budget official, the implications of the discussion rest 
primariliy on a point of view in the consideration of estimates in terms of 
alternatives – decisions which are always made, but not always consciously”. 
(Key, 1940, p. 1143-44).  
How could this comprehensive rational approach, as suggested by welfare economics 
with its overwhelming informational requirements be translated into budgeting 
practice? As discussed below, initial attempts to do this did not get very far, but Lewis 
(1952, p. 49) suggested that administrative officials be required to present not only a 
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basic budget request, but also alternatives which “might represent respectively, 80, 
90, 110 and 120 per cent of that amount.” Such proposals would facilitate 
comparisons at the margin. Smithies (1955, cited in Schick, 1971, pp.33-34) argued 
that “expenditure proposals should be considered in the light of the objectives they are 
intended to further, and in general final expenditure decisions should not be made 
until all claims on the budget can be considered.” Taking these ideas forward would 
require formidable tasks of information processing but possibilities for undertaking 
such tasks were greatly expanded by the continually falling costs of information 
technology – a process that has continued to this day. 
 
These early rational economics ideas led to the inception of program budgeting and 
performance budgeting. What is the difference between the two?  According to 
Schick programme budgeting’s  core idea 
“is that expenditures should be grouped and decided in terms of governmental 
objectives, not according to the organisations spending the money. All 
activities contributing to the same objective should be placed in the same 
programme, regardless of the organisational entity to which they are assigned” 
(Schick, 2007, p. 115). 
Program budgeting is thus to be distinguished from line-item budgeting which 
focusses on control over a listing of line-items of expenditure: 
“such as salary, overtime pay, postage, gasoline, office supplies and so forth. 
These objects of expenditure could be collapsed into broad categories such as 
personnel, operating and capital expenses (Tyer and Willand , 1997, pp. 194-
195). 
In an early discussion of terminology, Schick argues that  
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“throughout the performance budgeting era, there was persistent confusion 
over the meaning of performance budgeting and program budgeting and their 
relation to each other”.(Schick, 1971, p. 8).  
Schick associates program budgeting with a consideration of “objectives and 
benefits” of expenditure programs whereas he associates performance budgeting with 
the Hoover Commission’s view of ‘the work or service to be accomplished as “the 
all-important thing in budgeting”’ (Schick, 1971, p. 8). 
 
As discussed below, program budgeting, in the form of the Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) had failed by 1971, but since then “new performance 
budgeting” has become established worldwide  (Mikesell, 1995, Diamond, 2003). 
 
Overall, the early attempts to introduce ideas of comprehensive rational resource 
allocation from economics and data processing (Schick, 1971, pp. 32-39) did not find 
great favour with administrators and politicians actually practising budgeting. These 
ideas were seen as over-ambitious and unrealistic by those who pointed out that the 
reality of budgeting practice was characterised by an incremental process. The classic 
statement of the case that budgeting is an incremental process is to be found in 
Wildavsky (1964).  
 
Wildavsky argues that,  
The largest determining factor of the size and content of this year’s budget is 
last year’s budget. Most of the budget is the product of previous year’s 
decisions” (Wildavsky, 1964, p.13). 
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In developing his argument, Wildavsky notes the immense complexity of budgetary 
decision making, and the difficulty of making, “comparisons among different 
programs that have different values for different people” (Wildavsky, 1964, p. 10), In 
the face of such complexity, Wildavsky argues that those involved in the process 
inevitably need to simplify and such simplification takes the form of “satisficing” 
rather than a process of overall optimisation (Simon, 1957). 
These ideas, developed by Wildavsky and others from the 1960s to the late 1980s 
(Lindblom, 1959, Davis et al, 1966, Sharkansky and Turnbull, 1969, Danziger, 1976, 
Cowart et al, 1975) “would remain the dominant paradigm in budgeting theory 
throughout the rest of the century (Kelly, 2005, p. 98). Since their development, 
incremental budgeting models have stood in opposition to the classic performance 
budgeting models - at that time labelled “comprehensive-rational” models (Robinson 
and Brumby, 2005, p. 24).  
 
Incremental budgeting theory was relatively modest in its approach, aiming to 
describe budgeting in terms of a few simple concepts such as the base, the increment 
and fair shares (Good, 2011, p. 45). The approach could be seen as the antithesis of 
performance budgeting (Robinson and Brumby, 2005, p. 24).  
 
Andrew and Hill (2003, p. 145) for example, argue that: 
 Organisational systems…may measure outputs or outcomes but cannot use 
such information within an established incremental budgeting process, 
because the emphasis on process has undermined the development of a 
decision-making process in which performance information could be 
considered.  
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A strong form of incremental budgeting implies that budget allocations are so 
strongly determined by past year allocations so that the budget is extremely inflexible. 
As performance budgeting is meant to improve spending prioritisation, it can be seen 
to be largely incompatible with strong incrementalism (Robinson and Brumby, 2005, 
p. 24).  
We now consider in more detail public budgeting and approaches to budgetary 
decision-making. 
 
2.3 Public Budgeting and Approaches on Budgetary Decision-Making 
The Oxford Dictionary (2012) defines ‘budget’ in at least two ways: (1) “the amount 
of money needed or available for a purpose”; (2) “a regular estimate of national 
income and spending put forward by a finance minister”.  It is common that different 
countries have different understandings of the term. The term ‘budget’ can be a plan 
of intent or government statement. In some countries it refers to a set of statements 
attached to a formal appropriation bill. In other countries, the budget is a proposed 
law that has a legal status for all its components once approved like other laws 
(Wanna, 2010, p. 4). The Indonesian Government (GoI, 2003) defines ‘budget’ as the 
annual financial plan of the government authorized by the Parliament. Schick (2004, 
p. 95) explains that budgeting is a process for allocating resources among competing 
demands for public money. Budgeting is also a process for systematically relating the 
expenditures of funds to the accomplishment of intended objectives (Schick, 1966, p. 
244). 
 
Public or government budgets are different from those of the private sector with 
regard to resource availability and profit motive (Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, 2013). 
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Private sector organisations cannot spend more money or resources than they are able 
to obtain through sales, borrowing or donations (Willoughby, 2014, p. 8). In contrast, 
government has the power through compulsory taxation and regulation to determine 
how much of the nation’s total resources are to be used for public purposes (Lee, 
Johnson, and Joyce, 2013, p. 3). However, whereas the government budgeting process 
results in legislative appropriations that set the legal limits on spending for a future 
fiscal year or years, private budgets are financial plans that are open to change more 
frequently, and certainly can be changed more quickly, than government budgets 
(Willoughby, 2014, p. 9). Regarding the profit motive, the private sector aims to 
generate profit in its business (Willoughby, 2014, p. 9), whereas governments provide 
goods and services for public that do not necessarily produce profits (Lee, Johnson, 
and Joyce, 2013, p. 3). Rubin (2010) explains the major distinction between 
government budgets and private budgets is that government budgets are public or 
open to scrutiny, they engage public money, and involve many stakeholders, such as 
government officials, politicians, taxpayers, the media, clients, and citizens generally 
and numerous institutions such as budget laws, rules, protocols, and processes. 
 
Decisions about budgets are seldom made in a single office by a single person and 
budget processes involve complex institutional arrangements and often the decision 
making is made collectively (Folscher, 2007, p. 111). Budgetary decision-making 
includes the action of executive officials, legislative officials, other interest groups or 
organisations, and other stakeholders (Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, 2013, pp. 16-17). 
There is no general consensus among authors regarding the classification of 
perspectives, approach, or theory developed with regard to budgetary decision-
making. For example, Kraan (1996, pp. 1-8) categorised theory on budgetary decision 
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making into four perspectives: the normative perspective, political systems theory, the 
organisational process perspective, and public choice theory. Lee, Johnson, and Joyce 
(2013, pp. 18-21) divided theories of decision making into three basic approaches: 
pure rationality, incrementalism, and limited rationality. Reddick (2003, pp. 257-262) 
divided internal change approaches in budgeting into three approaches: budgetary 
incrementalism, rational or scientific budgeting, and garbage-can budgeting. Because 
this study focuses on examining the implementation of performance-based budgeting 
and the extent of incremental budgeting practices in Indonesia, the next sections 
provide first a detailed review of incremental budgeting theory and research and then 
a detailed review of performance budgeting theory and research. 
 
2.4. Incremental Budgeting  
The first part of this section reviews the literature about the various concepts of 
incremental budgeting. The second part of the section reviews the variety of methods 
used to study the incremental budgeting.  
2.4.1 Concepts of Incremental Budgeting 
The concept of incrementalism is easy to hold but it is difficult to understand (Good, 
2011, p. 41). During the 1950as and early 1960s, Charles Lindblom, Aaron 
Wildavsky, and other authors developed theories to explain decision-making process 
in government and budgeting (Berry, 1990, p.167). In general, Lindblom (1959, pp. 
41-42) described incrementalism is a ‘successive limited comparisons’ or a ‘branch 
method’. He contrasted the branch method with a ‘rational-comprehensive’ or a ‘root 
method’. The branch method is decision-making process of ‘building out from the 
current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees’ (Lindblom, 1959, p. 42). In 
contrast, the root method is decision-making process, ‘starting from fundamentals 
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anew each time, building on the past only as experience is embodied in a theory, and 
always prepared to start completely from the ground up’ (Lindblom, 1959, p. 42). The 
characteristics of the two methods as explained by Lindblom can be seen in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 The Characteristics of the Root Method and the Branch Method  
Rational-comprehensive (Root) Successive Limited Comparison (Branch) 
1. Clarification of values or objectives 
distinct from and usually 
prerequisites to empirical analysis of 
alternatives policies. 
2. Policy-formulation is therefore 
approached through means-end 
analysis: First the ends are isolated; 
the means to achieve them are 
sought. 
3. The test of a “good” policy is that it 
can be shown to the most appropriate 
means to be desired ends. 
4. Analysis is comprehensive; every 
important relevant factor is taken 
into account. 
5. Theory is often heavily relied upon.  
1. Selection of value goals and 
empirical analysis of the need action 
are not distinct from one another but 
are closely intertwined. 
2. Since means and ends are not 
distinct, means-end analysis is often 
inappropriate or limited. 
3. The test of a “good” policy is 
typically that various analysts find 
themselves directly agreeing on a 
policy (without their agreeing that it 
is the most appropriate means to an 
agreed objective). 
4. Analysis is drastically limited: 
a. Important possible outcomes are 
neglected. 
b. Important alternative potential 
policies are neglected. 
c. Important affected values are 
neglected. 
5. A succession of comparisons greatly 
reduces or eliminates reliance on 
theory. 
(Lindblom, 1959, p. 81) 
 
The concept of incrementalism then travelled from general decision-making to the 
analysis of budget making introduced by Aaron Wildavsky in 1964 (Good, 2001, p. 
43). According to Wildavsky, ‘Budgeting is complex, largely because of the 
complexity of modern life’ (Wildavsky, 1984, p. 8). In budgeting, members of 
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Parliament and budget officials from budget authorities, such as the Ministry of 
Planning or the Ministry of Finance, faced difficulty in deciding how much money 
should be given to various activities within a programme or how much money should 
be given to different programmes or different line ministries/agencies. Wildavsky 
argues that budget officials are human and have limited ability to predict, they only 
have limited time to think and decide, and they have limited ability to calculate and 
determine budgets (Wildavsky, 1984, p 10). Therefore according to Wildavsky, 
budget officials develop mechanisms, though imperfect, that can help them making 
decisions in a complicated world (1984, p. 11). Incremental budgeting aids budget 
officials in making budgetary decisions.  
 
Wildavsky explained strategies used by budget officials in dealing with a problem of 
the complexity in budgeting by making budgeting ‘experiential’, ‘simplified’, and 
“satisficing”. According to him, budgeting is experiential. This means that budget 
officials are to make only the roughest guesses in determining budgets for the first 
years. Afterward they will use their experience in making budgets for the following 
years. His idea that budgeting is simplified indicates that in budgeting process, budget 
officials are to focus on simpler items/activities in a programme which can be used as 
indicators of more complicated items. Budgeting officials “satisfice” in making 
budget decisions. They do not try to make the best decisions. As long as the line 
ministries/agencies that receive the budgets are also satisfied enough has been done 
(Wildavsky, 1984, pp. 11-13).  
 
As Berry (1990) argues that there are various meanings of incrementalism. The next 
paragraphs discuss several conceptions of incremental budgeting.   
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Base and Increment 
The base and the increment are probably the most basic and continuing concepts in 
budgeting and used by most countries as components in the budget system (Good, 
2011, p. 45). The base is “commonly held expectations among participants in 
budgeting that programmes will be carried out at close to the going level of 
expenditures” (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1966, p. 530).  Wildavsky (1984, p.  
17) stated that “the word “base” is part of common jargon of budget officials, 
meaning that they would not expect wide fluctuations from year to year rather than 
additions to or subtractions from relatively stable point.”  
 
According to Wildavsky “budgeting is incremental. The largest determining factor of 
the size and content of this year’s budget is last year’s budget. Most of the budget is a 
product of previous decisions” (Wildavsky, 1984, p. 13). Moreover, according to 
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966, p. 530), “incremental calculations proceed 
from an existing base”.  
 
The budget base is of key importance in incremental budgeting. According to 
Wildavsky (1984, p. 15) the incremental approach works as follows:  
Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. The beginning of wisdom about 
an agency budget is that it is almost never actively reviewed as a whole every 
year in the sense of considering the value of all existing programmes as 
compared to all possible alternatives. Instead, it is based on last year’s budget 
with special attention given to a narrow range of increases or decreases. Thus 
men who make the budget are concerned with small increments to an existing 
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base. Their attention is focused on a small number of items over which the 
budget is fought. 
 
This is what Berry called (1990, p. 170) lack of attention to the base. Robinson 
(2014b, p. 6) argues a widespread problem in the budget preparation process is that 
the central budget office only focuses on the consideration of new budget proposals, 
with little or no review of baseline expenditure.     
 
Fair Share 
The concept of base is also related to the concept of “fair share”. Fair share reflects 
the expectation of a ministry/agency to receive its budget in comparison to other 
ministries/agencies (Wildavsky, 1984, p. 17). “Fair share” means not only the base an 
ministry/agency has established but also the expectation that it will receive some 
proportion of funds, if any, which are to be increased or decreased below the base of 
the various line ministries/agencies. “Fair share” reflects a convergence of 
expectations on roughly how much the agency is to receive in comparison to others. 
(Wildavsky, 1984, p. 17).  
 
Negotiation Among Budget Actors with Narrow Roles.  
Negotiations over the budget are assumed to be carried by different actors in the 
budgeting process that have distinct roles, and the result of bargaining among these 
actors leads to incrementalism (Berry, 1990, p. 171). Wildavsky (1984) argues that 
government practitioners from line ministries/agencies are expected to try to secure 
the largest budgets they can, while the central budget office try to cut their requests. 
Budgets are made in fragments and decided by many actors in specialised roles. 
Therefore, the budget decisions are made in narrow orientations: historical, repetitive, 
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and sequential. These orientations reduce the information, time, and analytical 
abilities required for public budgeting and make the budgets incremental (Wildavsky, 
1984). 
 
Regularity of Relationships.  
The incremental approach as a process describes the nature of the relationship among 
budget actors in budgetary process (Good, 2011, p. 44). As Dempster and Wildavsky 
(1979, p. 375) explain “an incremental process is one in which the relationships 
between actors are regular over a period of years, and non-incremental process is one 
in which this relationship is irregular. By regular we mean that similar patterns of 
interactions between the participants are followed one year to the next. By irregular 
we mean that pattern of interactions is changed or broken at a point in time.”  
 
Ibrahim and Proctor (1992, pp. 15-16) summarised incremental budgeting with the 
following concepts: complexity, roles, constraints, aids to calculation, process, and 
dominant inference patterns.  First, complexity is the most serious constraint in policy 
making so that decision making has to be simplified. Second, there are three major 
participants in the budget process with different roles: ministries/agencies try to 
expand their budget; the budget committee in the parliament tries to cut the ministry’s 
request; and the central budget office acts as adviser. Third, the budget actors have 
human and political constraints. Human constraints include limited time and ability to 
calculate, limited ability to undertake systematic analysis, limited ability to predict the 
consequences of change, and limited ability to specify goals. Political constraints limit 
the ability to capture opportunities or remove disabilities. Fourth, as far as aids to 
calculation concerned, the budget process is perceived as experiential, simplified, 
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satisficing, and incremental. Fifth, the budget process can be described as specialised, 
historical, non-programmatic, and sequential. Sixth, government policy develops over 
time. Policy this year is only slightly different from policy last year. Changes are the 
results of a process of interaction and compromise among many individuals, budget 
officials and politicians.  
 
2.4.2 Methods Used to Study the Incremental Budgeting  
This section presents two basic methods used in the previous literature to study 
incremental budgeting. We use these models in examining incremental budgeting in 
Indonesia.  
 
The Magnitude of Change Model 
This model calculates the percentage change between a budget allocation in one year 
and a budget allocation in the previous year for each year in a certain period. The 
model then examines characteristics of the frequency distribution of the percentage 
change (Berry, 1990, p. 184). Danziger (1976, p. 338) describes an incremental 
budget as occurring if the percentage changes are between 5% and 15%. Bailey and 
Connor (1975) use the criteria of 0-10% change to define incremental budget, 11-30% 
is intermediate, and more than 31% non-incremental. Wildavsky determines the 
percentage changes of budget allocations as incremental is, in a majority cases, the 
budget allocation varies within a range of ±10% of the previous year’s allocation 
(LeLoup, 1978).   
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The Stability/Incremental Trend Model 
The stability model (Ibrahim and Proctor, 1992) or incremental trend model 
(Danziger, 1976) focuses on evaluating the pattern of budget allocations over time 
using a linear regression. To assess whether the budgetary process of each 
ministry/agency is incremental, the model uses the statistical fit of the data to the 
regression line, the R2 value. A low R2 value indicates a low degree of stability of 
budget allocations. In contrast, a high R2 indicates a high level of allocations stability 
(Ibrahim and Proctor, 1992, p. 21).  In a bivariate model an equivalent procedure 
which we use in this research is to examine the Pearson correlation coefficient r 
which is the square root of R2. 
 
2.4.3. Why Incremental Budgeting Lasts 
There are arguments about the failure of incremental approach. For example, Rubin 
(1988) argues that the incremental approach was both too global and too narrow. 
According to Rubin (1988, p. 3):  
the incremental approach was too global because it was derived from perceived 
characteristics of human nature. It was too narrow because it focused only on 
the part of the budget process annually and on the agency’s request, executive 
review, and congressional approval. It ignored the differences between 
budgeting at different levels of hierarchy, and the effects of environment on 
budgetary processes. 
Robinson and Brumby (2005, p. 26) argue that the literature on incremental budgeting 
had a methodological problem. They argue that the literature focuses on budget 
allocations at a broad aggregated level of  functions of government because there was 
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a problem with data availability of using a less aggregated level. Potentially, budget 
allocations are always incremental at a broad aggregated level.  
 
Despite some criticisms about the relevance of a too incremental approach in the 
budgeting processes, other scholars argue that the incremental approach is still 
important in public budgeting. White (1994: 115) argues as follows: 
incrementalism is necessary, and reforms like PPB and ZBB are doomed to 
failure, because the burden of calculation necessary to make a government’s 
budget is enormous. PPB assumes an ability to compare programmes and 
agencies in terms of their very different values and outputs. Even if it were 
rational, Congress would not allow PPB to displace its own policy-making 
processes. But PBB’s claim to “rationality” is vitiated by the difficulty of 
measuring any programme’s output, graver difficulty of comparing diverse 
programmes’ diverse outputs, and the impossibility of measuring interpersonal 
utilities of different items.  
 
Although Wildavsky (1978, p. 508) accepted every criticism of incremental 
budgeting: that it is incremental, that it does fragment decisions, that it is strongly 
determined by past decisions, and that it is not concerned about objectives, he argued 
that incremental budgeting has the benefit of its weaknesses. Because it is not 
comprehensive, incremental budgeting makes calculations easy. Instead of depending 
on the future that cannot be known, the past decision provides a strong base to 
calculate the budget needs. Alternatives that might cause conflict are fragmented so 
that budget officials do not face all problems at one time. Because incremental 
budgeting is unconcerned or neutral about objectives, budget officials can change 
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objectives without affecting the budget. Wildavsky (1978, p. 508) concluded that 
incremental budgeting survives because “it is simpler, easier, more controllable, more 
flexible than modern budgeting like PPBS and ZBB.” 
Schick (2014, p. 28) argues that one of the real problems to performance-based 
budget decisions, besides budget rigidities and political pressure, is the persistence of 
incremental norms and behaviour. Budgeting is inherently incremental (Schick, 2009, 
p. 356). Budgeting in many OECD member countries, “has settled into a process of 
snipping existing programmes at the margins to make room for targeted 
enhancements” (Schick, 2009, p. 350). At times when limited resources are available 
to finance all demands, governments may also continue to make incremental policy 
adjustments to finance marginal reallocations from lower to higher priorities (Schick, 
2009, p. 356). He goes on to argue that anyone who has been involved in budgeting 
knows that a process of allocating resources among competing demands for public 
money is not a fair competition. Old programmes/activities on the budget have an 
advantage over new programmes/activities. The budgeting decisions are “anchored in 
the past, varying usually only in small increments from one year to the next” (Schick, 
2009, p. 356).  
 
Budgeting continues to be incremental because public expenditures are sticky, 
meaning that public expenditures, “do not readily respond to changes in political 
conditions or national priorities” (Schick, 2009, p. 435). Schick explains that a 
decision to allocate a budget for a programme in one year usually is a decision to 
provide budget in following years. Incremental budgeting protects old 
programmes/activities, stabilises government, gives citizens clear expectation on the 
continuity of the services, and reduces conflict (Schick, 2009, p. 436).  
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Although it varies within and between systems, White (1994) hypothesizes that 
incremental budgeting should apply under five conditions. Firstly, incremental 
policies more likely to occur among governments that have separation of power 
systems. An absolute power government does not need incremental policies. It can 
allow large budget changes. Secondly, incremental budgeting tends to occur when 
governments have abundant resources so that there is no reason for them to think 
about the base. If governments have financial hardship, they would pay attention to 
the base. Thirdly, incremental budgeting is more likely to happen during a shorter 
budget cycles. Budget officials do not have enough time to learn more about 
programmes in question and change their opinions. Fourthly, the fair share concept in 
incremental budgeting is more likely to occur if there is only one pot of money or one 
revenue source to all expenditures. If there is a type of expenditure that has a special 
revenue source then the fair share is unlikely to occur. Fifthly, the growth of 
entitlements makes more budgeting more incremental. An entitlement is a programme 
as a right and it is difficult to be changed.  
 
2.5 Rational Budgeting and Performance Budgeting 
We now return in more detail to “rational” budgeting and performance budgeting. 
Rational is placed in inverted commas here because this usage of the term rational 
implicitly ignores the enormous opportunity costs of working out the full implications 
of every possible budgetary choice (Smith, 2003, p. 468). 
 
This rational approach which involves setting targets and allocating resources to 
achieve them has produced different forms of rationalism (Kelly and Rivenbark, 
2008, pp.  457-458). The varying approaches of performance budgeting in the USA 
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started with the “performance budget” in 1949, the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1965, Management by Objectives (MBO) in 1973, and 
Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) in 1977 (GAO, 1997). Each approach has different 
procedures for linking resources with results (GAO, 1997).  We discuss these three 
early attempts to bring rationality to the budgeting process below. 
 
Rational budgeting was a growing paradigm in the USA during the first half of the 
twentieth century.  The Taft Commission (1912) outlined what the administrator of 
the budget needed to know with an early statement of the need to look at 
performance: 
In order that he may think intelligently about the subject of his responsibility, 
he must have before him regularly statements which will reflect results in 
terms of quality and quantity; he must be able to measure quality and quantity 
of results by units of cost and units of efficiency (Taft Commission, 1912, p. 
164). 
Performance budgeting was first introduced in the Department of Agriculture in 1934 
with a requirement to link inputs to outputs. The 1949 Hoover Commission promoted 
a performance budgeting approach (Diamond, 2003) arguing that,  
“the whole budget should be refashioned by the adoption of a budget based 
upon functions, activities and projects: this we designate a ‘performance 
budget’” (Hoover, 1950, p. 8) 
Diamond (2003, p. 4) notes that the Hoover Commission “”used the terms program 
budgeting and performance budgeting almost synonymously” The Hoover 
Commission “performance budget’ was aimed to change the input orientation in 
budget process to a focus on government functions, activities, costs, and 
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achievements. A performance budget was used to describe the expected outputs of a 
specific function or activity rather than to describe items of expenditure (GAO, 1997, 
p. 5). Such a budget places emphasis on government activities such as construction 
projects, training, or research rather than expenditures such as salaries, rent, or 
supplies. 
 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) (PPBS) followed in the 1960s, 
designed by the Rand Corporation and initially implemented in the Department of 
Defense and then then extended to all agencies (Reddick, 2003, pp. 257-258, Van 
Nispen and Posseth, 2007). In this approach to budgeting, planning first identified 
objectives, then programming set out how achieving the objectives would be 
integrated into the hierarchy of political approvals and budgeting would translate the 
multi-year program into annual spending. (Diamond, 2003, p. 6). The intellectual 
framework was that of utility maximising in the neoclassical economics paradigm. In 
the view of one commentator PPBS represented  
“the onslaught of a certain style of intellectualism upon public decision 
making. In general the style is that of economics, or a certain brand of 
economics, heavily flavoured with mathematics, and spiced with a bit of what 
is called management engineering or management science” (Mosher, 1969, p. 
161).  
The PPBS was put in place in 1965 with the assumption that various levels and types 
of performance could be arranged, measured, and examined to produce the best 
budgetary decisions. In principle, PPBS applied a decision-making framework to the 
executive branch budget preparation process by presenting and analysing options 
among long-term policy objectives and different ways of achieving them. 
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Performance was defined as agency outputs, with an agency’s programme structure 
linking outputs to long-term objectives. The essential part of PPBS was the use of 
systems analysis and other analytical tools to measure and to understand government 
outputs, benefits, and costs (GAO, 1997, pp. 5-6). 
 
Although initially successful in Defense, the PPBS failed elsewhere and by 1971 the 
requirement for agencies to carry out PPB had been withdrawn (Schick,, 1973, p. 
146). The reason it failed was that the approach it represented had little meaning or 
attraction for those actually involved in the administrative and political process of 
budgeting. Departments, “went through the motions and submitted the required 
documents” (Schick, 1973, 148) but it was too alien to those involved in budgeting 
for it to thrive. Kelly (2005, p. 105) noted that PPBS failed because it was impossible 
to quantify all available alternatives. 
 
In 1973 Drucker’s (1955) Management by Objectives (MBO) was initiated in 
government by President Nixon, to link agencies’ stated objectives to their budget 
requests. MBO aimed to make agency managers responsible for achieving agreed-
upon outputs and outcomes. Heads of agencies would be responsible for achieving 
presidential objectives and managers within an agency would be responsible for 
achieving objectives agreed by superiors as well as subordinates.  Performance was 
primarily defined as agency outputs and processes, but there were also attempts to 
define performance as the results of government spending or outcomes (GAO, 1997, 
p. 6). 
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Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) was introduced in 1977 for an executive branch budget 
preparation process. The main focus of ZBB was on optimizing what could be 
achieved at alternative levels of spend. Agencies were expected to set priorities based 
on the programme results that could be achieved at alternative expenditure levels. One 
of the alternatives would be a budget cut. In developing budget proposals, these 
alternatives were to be ranked against each other sequentially from the lowest level 
units to the highest ones within an agency without reference to a past budgetary base. 
The idea of the ZBB was to induce examination of the budget base in contrast to 
incremental processes where the base largely escapes scrutiny (GAO, 1997, p. 6). 
 
These past initiatives of rational budgeting generally failed to achieve their objectives. 
PPBS and ZBB failed because they attempted to develop performance plans and 
measures without the involvement of the legislative branch of government and the 
budget allocation processes. Therefore, there was no consensus between executive 
and legislative branches on what performance should be, how to measure it, or how to 
integrate performance information with budget allocation decisions (GAO, 1997, pp. 
6-7).   
 
In addition, it is argued that ZBB failed because of the enormous data and analysis 
requirements it imposed. Carrying forward the base of spending vastly simplifies the 
budgeting process in comparison with ZBB (White, 1994, p. 115). According to 
Wildavsky (1978, p. 505) ZBB assumes “there is no yesterday. Nothing is to be taken 
for granted. Everything at every period is subject to searching scrutiny. As a result, 
calculations become unmanageable”. ZBB involved too much paperwork for the 
relatively few discretionary budget items (Kelly (2005, p. 106). MBO was seen to 
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have failed because there was lack of consensus on the executives’ policy priorities, 
and because, “the submission of objectives of any type…would be welcomed {as long 
as} no additional financial or legislative resources would be required” (Kelly, 2005, 
pp.101 and 106).    
 
Although the history suggests that no single definition of performance budgeting 
incorporates the needs and interests of decision makers, these past initiatives 
contributed to the evolution of performance-based budgeting, (GAO, 1997, p. 7).   
Furthermore, Rubin (1990) noted that each budget reform has given new ideas and 
new techniques to be incorporated into budget processes. In the OECD countries, 
governments have been developing performance budgeting that includes performance 
information with the aim to be used in budget processes and resource allocation. 
Under the label of performance budgeting, a variety of terms and definitions are 
found in different countries such as budgeting for results, performance-based 
budgeting and performance funding (OECD, 2007, p. 20).  Thus, it can be said that 
the key characteristic of all performance budgeting models is that they attempt to link 
resource allocation and results with the use of performance information.  
 
The next sections develop the more recent discussion of performance based-budgeting 
that is relevant for this study.   
 
2.6 Performance Based-Budgeting  
This section discusses the modern concept of performance-based budgeting, the 
potential uses of performance information, evidence of the use of performance 
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information, limitation of performance information, benefits of performance-based 
budgeting, and challenges in implementing performance-based budgeting.   
 
2.6.1 The Concept of Performance-Based Budgeting 
The last two decades have witnessed a wave of enthusiasm for performance 
management and budgeting reforms both in industrial and developing countries (Shah 
and Shen, 2007, p. 137). Performance budgeting has been implemented in many 
nations in South and Central America, Europe, Australia, and Asia under new public 
management initiatives, frequently called “performance management” or “managing 
for results” (Berry, 2008, p. 285).  In Asia, under the broader label of performance 
management initiatives, performance-based budgeting has been introduced in Japan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia over the 
space of 1998-2003 (Koike, 2013, p. 348). In the USA and UK, public sector 
performance initiatives can be traced back since 1949 and the 1960s respectively 
(Jackson, 2011, p. 14). 
 
Although performance budgeting has been introduced and implemented around the 
world, there is no standard definition of modern performance-based budgeting. U.S. 
GAO (GAO, 1999, p. 4) refers performance budgeting as ‘the concept of linking 
performance information with the budget.’ Shah and Shen (2007, p. 143) defines 
performance budgeting as: 
a system of budgeting that presents the purpose and objectives for which funds 
are required, the cost of programmes and associated activities for achieving 
those objectives, and the outputs to be produced or service to be rendered under 
each programme. 
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The OECD has defined performance budgeting as ‘a form of budgeting that relates 
funds allocated to measurable results’ (OECD, 2005). Robinson and Brumby (2005, 
p. 5) suggest that performance budgets are: 
procedures or mechanisms to strengthen links between the funds provided to 
public entities and their outcomes and/or outputs through the use of formal 
performance information in resource allocation decision-making. 
The Indonesian government specifies that performance-based budgeting is used to 
justify the relationship between funds allocated with outputs/outcomes of 
programmes/activities (GoI, 2010a).  Melkers and Willoughby (2001, p. 55) suggests 
broader definition of performance-based budgeting: 
Performance-based budgeting is actually a more diverse set of requirements, 
blending various aspects of current public management trends, including 
outcome measurement, performance measurement systems, strategic planning 
and benchmarking. 
In relation to performance information, Joyce (2011) argues that performance 
budgeting involves the production of appropriate performance information, and the 
presence of the information when budgeting decisions are made.  
 
From the above, it is clear that the question of how performance is defined is 
fundamental to the design of performance budgeting. Jackson (2011, p.14) argues 
that, “There is no single answer to this question. It depends upon who is asked the 
question”. He goes on to list politicians, central government departments/agencies, 
auditors and regulators, public service managers, and interest/groups/user groups as 
amongst the stakeholders in defining performance.  
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One way of viewing the management of performance is through the lens of principal 
agent theory (Forrester, 2002, Jackson, 2011). In this model, the principals – 
ultimately the citizens seek to control the agents – public bureaus – to get what they 
see as the best use of resources. Principals are hindered in this quest by suffering from 
information asymmetry. They have inferior information to the agents who are closer 
to what is happening. However, the principal/agent structure in the public sector is 
likely to be far more complex than in the private sector (Propper and Wilson, 2003, 
251). Jackson’s discussion of how performance is defined can be seen in 
principal/agent terms as a problem of government agencies seeking to perform 
multiple tasks for multiple principals (Dixit, 2002, p. 709). Different principals may 
have different views on objectives and hence there may be a lack of agreement on 
what constitutes performance. In terms of Figure 2.1 performance can be seen as the 
maximisation of desired outcomes for a given input of resources. The question of 
what are the desired outcomes will be contested politically and organisationally. 
Politics is therefore a fundamental part of performance. “If politics is regarded in part 
as a conflict over whose preferences shall prevail in the determination of national 
policy, then the budget records the outcomes of this struggle” Wildavsky, 1964, p. 4). 
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Figure 2.1: The Public Production Process 
 
                                                                                 (Adapted from Jackson, 2011) 
 
The production model of Figure 2.1 indicates the various component aspects of 
performance. For a given financial budget, inputs can be obtained with maximum 
economy. Those inputs can then be subjected to processes to convert them into 
outputs with maximum efficiency. But it is important that outputs are those that lead 
to the desired outcomes, and this is usually seen as a question of maximising 
effectiveness. HM Treasury (2011, p. 15) gives an example of outputs and outcomes 
for an objective of increasing vocational training. Outputs could be human capital as a 
share of GDPO, and the proportion of the workforce with vocational training, and 
desired outcomes could be a socially optimal level of training and higher productivity 
for both trainees and co-workers. 
 
In terms of Figure 2.1 the ultimate purpose of allocating budget to inputs is to achieve 
the best results in terms of the benefits of desired outcomes. Yet often the importance 
of measuring outcomes is matched by the difficulty of defining, observing and 
measuring them (Stevens et al, 2006, Stevens, 2005). In the private sector, the value 
Inputs Outputs Outcomes 
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of outputs can be argued to be at least as great as market prices, but in the public 
sector outputs are not sold, and in the national accounts many outcomes are estimated 
by assuming that they are equal to the value of the inputs used. Clearly that latter 
approach is no basis for seeking to improve performance in generating desired 
outcomes from inputs (Stevens, 2005). Outcome measures are also likely to be gamed 
(Smith, 1995, Bevan and Hood, 2006) and are often co-produced by combining public 
sector outputs with inputs from citizens (Bovaird, 2007, Jackson, 2011). Where 
performance measures have been collected, there is also the major problem of 
aggregating them in a meaningful way. How should different measures be weighted 
when adding up? Even if measures are put into equal dimensions of percentile ranking 
there is still the problem of what weight to attach to the different indicators (Jackson, 
2011, p. 17). Such problems undermined the theoretical basis of the English system of 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (Jackson, 2011, Jacobs and Goddard, 2007). 
 
If the use of performance information is the heart of performance-based budgeting, 
the above problems are at the heart of driving systems on performance and 
performance information.   
 
Several authors/countries suggested various definitions of performance information. 
Curristine (2005, p. 130) defines performance and performance information as 
follows: 
Performance can be defined as the yield or result of actions carried out for a 
government, an organisation, a unit or an individual person with respect to a set 
purpose. It is the fulfillment or achievement of these purposes (in some specific 
cases it could be the way of doing the work or how things are done). 
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Performance information is related to assessing actions – and corresponding 
progress in – achieving set purposes. It is possible to apply different 
methodological approaches for doing this and these can be grouped into two 
broader concepts: performance measurement and evaluation. Performance 
information can be quantitative or qualitative (Curristine, 2005, p. 130). 
The Government of Indonesia specifies what to include as performance information in 
budget documents (RKAKL): programmes, activities, and performance targets (GoI, 
2010a). The government also requires performance measurement and evaluation of 
RKAKL’s execution that includes performance measurement and evaluation on the 
accomplishment of outcomes/outputs, efficiency, consistency between planning and 
execution, and budget spending (GoI, 2010a). Robinson and Lust (2009, p. 2) 
suggests that the vital requirements for performance-based budgeting are information 
about the objectives and results of government spending, in the form of key 
performance indicators and program evaluation; and the use of the information in 
budget decisions in budget preparation process. As noted above, performance 
information includes components of inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Table 2.2 
provides the descriptions of the components of performance information. 
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Table 2.2: Components of Performance Information 
Inputs Resource to produce outputs. A measure of what a government 
organisation or organisation manager has available to achieve an 
output or outcome. Inputs can include: number of staff, budget 
amounts, equipment, facilities, supplies, goods/services received, 
work processes, rules, and other resources that are used in line 
ministries/agencies. 
Outputs Quantity and quality of goods and services produced by line 
ministries/agencies for citizens, businesses and/or other government 
organisations/bodies. For example, a Ministry of Finance output could 
be the monthly delivery of financial performance reports and the 
annual financial statements. 
Outcomes Progress in achieving programme objectives.  The effects and 
consequences of government actions on a community. Outcomes 
reflect both the intended and unintended results stemming from 
government actions. For example, a Ministry of Finance outcome 
could be that government finances are sustainable and an outcome 
from the Ministry of Transport could be a decline in road accidents by 
5%. 
(Derived from: Curristine, 2005, pp. 129-130; Shah and Shen, 2007, pp. 143-144; 
Berry, 2008). 
 
In relation to the use of performance information in the budgeting process, there are 
various categories of performance budgeting. For example, Shah and Shen (2007, p. 
153) distinguish performance budgeting in four categories: performance-reported 
budgeting (PRB), performance-informed budgeting (PIB), performance-based 
budgeting (PBB), and performance-determined budgeting (PDB). The OECD places 
performance budgeting into three broad categories (OECD, 2007, p. 21) as 
summarised in Table. 2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Performance-Based Budgeting Categories 
Category Linkage between 
performance 
information and 
budget allocations 
Planned or actual 
performance 
Main purpose 
in the 
budgeting 
process 
Presentational No link Performance targets 
and or performance 
results 
Accountability 
Performance-
informed budgeting 
Loose/indirect link Performance targets 
and or performance 
results 
Planning and or 
accountability 
Direct performance 
budgeting 
Tight/direct link Performance results Resource 
allocation and 
accountability 
(OECD, 2007, p. 21) 
 
As shown in Table 2.3, the first category is presentational performance budgeting in 
which performance information, in the form of performance targets/results, is 
presented in budget documents/other documents. There is no connection between 
performance information and budget allocations. The information does not play a role 
in decision-making on allocations nor is it intended to do so. The second category is 
performance-informed budgeting. Budget allocations are connected with proposed 
future performance or past performance/results in an indirect manner. Indirect linkage 
indicates that performance information, along with other factors, is important and 
used in the decision-making process but it does not necessarily determine the amount 
of budget allocations. The third category is direct performance budgeting that 
involves direct/explicit linkage between budget amounts and units of performance, 
generally outputs. Therefore, budget allocations can be based on a formula/contract 
with specific performance indicators. Funding is also directly based on results 
achieved (OECD, 2007, pp. 21-22).  Looking at the types of performance information 
used in each category of performance budgeting, performance information can be 
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divided into two components: performance targets and performance results. Public 
sector organisations, such as central budget office, line ministries/agencies, 
parliament, may use both types of performance information.  
 
In summary, all the definitions of performance budgeting generally involve the 
presence of set purposes/objectives of programmes/activities and budget allocations 
associated with those programmes in order to attain performance or to fulfil 
achievement of those purposes. Performance budgeting also includes the use of 
formal performance information in budget allocation decision-making. Therefore, the 
availability of performance information and the use of performance information are of 
key importance in performance budgeting. The most important and intriguing 
question is whether government officials use performance information for 
determining budgets and other activities in the budgeting process. Robinson and Lust 
(2009, p. 4) argue that the availability of performance information is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition in measuring the success of performance-based budgeting. 
They go on to argue that performance information also has to be actually used in the 
budgeting process. Before discussing the use of performance information in the 
budgeting process, we turn our discussion on the potential uses of performance 
information. 
 
2.6.2 The Potential Uses of Performance Information 
A number of authors have attempted to suggest the purposes of the use performance 
information in public sector management and budgeting. In the broader management 
area, there are various ways of using performance information for managerial 
purposes. Behn (2003, p. 588) suggests that managers of ministries/agencies can use 
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performance information to: (1) evaluate; (2) control; (3) budget; (4) motivate; (5) 
promote; (6) celebrate, (7) learn, and (8) improve. He argues that these purposes are 
specific and distinct but somewhat overlapping. Moreover he also argues the ultimate 
purpose of using performance information is to improve the performance of public 
organisations. Table 2.4 summarises the eight purposes of using performance 
information (Behn, 2003, p. 588). 
 
Table 2.4: Eight Purposes of Performance Information Use 
The purpose The public manager’s question that the performance information 
can help 
Evaluate How well is my public agency performing? 
Control How can I ensure that my subordinates are doing the right thing? 
Budget On what programmes, people, or projects, should my agency 
spend the public’s money? 
Motivate How can I motivate line staff, middle managers, non-profit and 
for-profit collaborators, stakeholders, and citizens to do the things 
necessary to improve performance? 
Promote How can I convince political superiors, legislators, stakeholders, 
journalists, and citizens that my agency is doing a good job? 
Celebrate What accomplishments are worthy of the important 
organisational ritual celebrating success? 
Learn Why is what working or not working? 
Improve What exactly should who do differently to improve performance? 
(Behn, 2003, p. 588) 
 
In contrast to Behn, Van Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan (2010, pp. 100-101) 
classified the use of performance information for three purposes: to learn, to steer and 
control, and to give account. The first purpose is to learn. Performance information is 
collected with the aim of finding out whether the programmes work or why the 
programmes do not work. So the main question is how to improve policy or 
management. Secondly, performance information is about identifying and sanctioning 
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ministries/agencies as well as government official/practitioners (to control and to 
motivate) and about allocating budgets (to budget). The main question of this 
category is how to be in control of activities. The use of performance information in 
performance budgeting is included in this classification. Thirdly, the purpose of 
performance information is to give account. The main question is how to 
communicate with the outside world about performance. Performance information 
used for this accountability purpose is mainly past performance.  
 
Another scholar, Julnes (2008) suggests four purposes of collecting performance 
information: improvement, accountability, understanding, and mobilisation. Firstly, 
performance information is used for programme improvement, what changes should 
be made and what resources should be re-allocated in order to improve the 
programme. The second purpose is accountability. Performance information is mostly 
used for accountability and compliance to external audiences of ministries/agencies, 
such the President, the Parliament, and public. Thirdly, performance information is 
used by government officials to mobilise or to get support from external audiences. 
The fourth purpose of performance information is to learn and gain understanding of 
the programme. Performance information provides enlightenment about possible 
changes and direction that government managers may want to pursue in the future.  
 
In budgeting, Robinson (2014a, p. 8) argues that performance information can 
contribute in three primary ways. Firstly, performance information helps government 
to improve expenditure prioritisation so that the programmes and budgets allocated 
can deliver the utmost benefits to public.  Secondly, performance information can 
place more pressure on line ministries/agencies to improve the effectiveness of their 
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programmes because ministries/agencies recognise that the budget authorities, such as 
the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance, have good information about 
the effectiveness of the programmes and these authorities take into account the 
information for determining budget allocations. Thirdly, performance information, 
when it is available and used, can help in increasing efficiency of goods produced and 
services delivered by government.  
  
In relation to the use of performance information in the budget cycle, the World Bank 
(2010, p. 16) summarise the potential uses of performance information in each stage 
of the cycle as shown in Table 2.5. As shown in Table 2.5, performance information 
may be used at the start of the budget cycle during strategic planning and budget 
preparation stage, at budget approval, during budget execution, reporting stage, 
monitoring and evaluation, and audit stage.  
Table 2.5: Potential Uses of Performance Information in Budget Cycle 
Budget Cycle The Use of Performance Information 
During strategic planning and 
budget preparation 
To help set the macro-fiscal framework and 
inform budget negotiations, taking account of 
national plans, policies and sector strategies.  
At budget approval  To identify expected results from proposed 
appropriations to aid the legislature’s review of 
the proposed budget.  
During budget execution  To help managers manage and monitor 
performance during the year. 
Reporting  For reporting performance against plan, 
alongside financial information, in budget reports 
and ministry annual reports and others.  
Monitoring and evaluation As part of the formal monitoring, review and 
evaluation process.  
Audit  To ensure accountability through financial and 
performance audits. 
(World Bank, 2010, p. 16) 
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In addition, Hatry (2008a, pp. 231-236) discusses the large variety of uses of 
performance information including the use of performance information in budgeting 
processes. He indicates that performance information can be used for three purposes: 
it can be used for development or preparation of the budget, justification of the budget 
proposal, and performance information can be used to fulfill the requirements of the 
upper-level officials. Similarly, (Joyce, 2011, p. 357) argues that performance 
information can be used at each stage of the budgeting cycle: budget preparation in 
which ministries/agencies develop internal budget allocations and justify budget 
requests; budget approval from the parliament; budget execution by 
ministries/agencies; and audit and evaluation in which agencies and external auditors 
decide what have been the effects (financial and performance) of budgetary activities. 
 
With regard to the users of performance information, Jackson (2011, p. 14) suggests   
four different users of performance information: politicians; central government 
ministries/agencies; auditors and regulators; and public managers. According to 
Jackson, politicians do not use performance information systematically. They use 
performance information for political debates about failures/success of programmes. 
Central government ministries/agencies use performance information to allocate 
resources. Auditors use performance information to evaluate public sector 
organisations, such as line ministries/agencies, through performance audits or value 
for money evaluation. Public managers use performance information for broad 
managerial purposes (Jackson 2011, p. 14). Hatry et al (2003) found that government 
officials/managers may use performance information for managerial purposes, such as 
to: motivate staff; develop employee performance agreements; use as basis for "How 
are we doing?" meetings; recognize and reward high-performing staff; disseminate 
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good practice information; identify problem areas and modify operational practices; 
identify root causes of problems and develop action plans to address; trigger 
enforcement activities; identify technical assistance and compliance assistance needs; 
identify staff training needs and provide training; and identify the need for policy or 
legislative changes.   
 
As shown in Table 2.6, the World Bank (2010, pp. 23-25) identified some typical and 
emerging arrangements roles of budget actors and their responsibilities in OECD and 
other countries using performance budgeting at various stages of the budget cycle.    
 
Table 2.6: Roles of Budget Actors and Potential Uses of Performance 
Information 
Budget Actors and 
potential role in 
performance 
budgeting 
Potential uses of performance information at key decision points in the budget 
process 
During budget 
preparation 
At budget 
approval 
During budget 
execution, 
including in-year 
reporting and 
monitoring 
Year-end 
reporting, audit 
and evaluation 
1. Presidency or  
Cabinet 
 
Sets key objectives 
and policy 
priorities for 
government and 
determines 
allocation of 
resources. 
 
Holds ministers and 
agencies to account 
for achievement of 
objectives and 
delivery services. 
 
Accounts to 
legislature and 
citizens on 
spending and 
achievements. 
 
Performance 
indicators can be 
used to support 
political decisions 
concerning new 
policies and 
services or 
closing/changing 
existing 
policies/services 
Demonstrable 
results and 
forecasted 
performance 
levels can be key 
inputs to 
negotiations to 
secure budget 
approval from 
the legislature. 
Use of 
performance 
information is 
particularly 
strong where 
there are 
performance 
agreements 
between the 
president and 
line ministers or 
between 
ministers and 
ministers and 
other agencies. 
Formal year end 
reports at whole 
of government 
and entity levels 
can include 
reports on 
achievements for 
non-financial 
performance as 
well as annual 
financial 
statements, 
submitted to the 
legislature and 
published after 
the end of fiscal 
year. 
 
Achievements 
against 
performance 
indicators can be 
used to monitor 
and hold 
ministers, line 
ministries and 
agencies to 
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Budget Actors and 
potential role in 
performance 
budgeting 
Potential uses of performance information at key decision points in the budget 
process 
During budget 
preparation 
At budget 
approval 
During budget 
execution, 
including in-year 
reporting and 
monitoring 
Year-end 
reporting, audit 
and evaluation 
account. 
 
May include 
audits of 
financial and 
non-financial 
performance by 
external audit 
office. 
2. Ministers 
 
Hold their ministry, 
agencies, and other 
entities to account 
for performance 
and /or oversees the 
ministry’s 
performance and its 
capability 
(depending on how 
separated a minister 
is from a ministry). 
Approve their 
ministry’s budget 
and agencies’ 
budgets including 
the forecasted 
financial and non 
financial 
performance prior 
to submission. 
Also approve 
related policies and 
plans. 
Negotiate 
budgets in 
Cabinet and in 
some countries 
defend the 
budget in the 
legislature or its 
committees. 
Accountable for 
performance of 
ministry and 
agencies. 
Respond to 
changing 
priorities by 
requiring 
changes to 
performance 
from ministries 
and agencies 
within limits set 
by budget and 
law. 
Monitor 
performance in 
year in ad hoc or 
routine way. 
 
Answer to 
legislature for 
formal 
performance 
reports and 
reviews 
including audit 
reports relating to 
their ministry and 
agencies. 
3. Planning Agency 
(this function 
often within the 
Ministry of 
Finance) 
 
Develops national 
plan, and negotiate 
outcome targets for 
public investment 
programmes. 
 
Monitor degree to 
which the goals 
stated in the 
National 
Development Plan 
(or government 
plan) and 
investment targets 
are being achieved. 
 
Performance 
information on 
programme 
objectives and 
results can 
contribute to the 
negotiation 
between the 
planning agency 
and line ministries 
for investment 
budget. 
Performance 
information on 
programme 
objectives and 
results can be 
provided to the 
legislature for its 
examination of 
the proposed 
investment 
budget. 
Limited use in-
year performance 
information 
regarding public 
investment. 
Performance 
information 
supports 
reporting of 
progress against 
the National 
Development 
Plan. 
4. Finance Ministry 
 
Prepares medium-
term fiscal 
Performance 
information on 
previous and 
planned policy and 
Performance 
information on 
policy and 
service results 
Monitors in year 
performance 
reports including 
performance 
Performance 
information can 
be included with 
the annual 
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Budget Actors and 
potential role in 
performance 
budgeting 
Potential uses of performance information at key decision points in the budget 
process 
During budget 
preparation 
At budget 
approval 
During budget 
execution, 
including in-year 
reporting and 
monitoring 
Year-end 
reporting, audit 
and evaluation 
strategy/policy and 
annual consolidated 
budget submission 
incorporating 
performance 
information to 
justify allocation. 
 
Negotiates medium 
term and annual 
budget allocations 
with line 
ministries/agencies, 
drawing on 
performance 
information for 
submission to 
cabinet. 
 
May monitor 
performance 
agreements with 
line ministries and 
agencies. 
 
May monitor 
ownership interests 
in agencies, 
including SOEs, 
and guide budget 
aspects of 
performance 
reforms using 
regulation, 
oversight, and 
advice. 
 
service results can 
contribute to the 
negotiations 
between finance 
ministry and line 
ministries/agencies, 
and in some 
countries and sub 
national 
governments in 
preparation of 
medium term 
budget plans and 
annual budget bids. 
can contribute to 
the negotiation 
between 
ministers and 
budget 
committee of the 
legislature (some 
countries may 
involve 
negotiations 
between finance 
ministry and 
budget 
committee). 
affecting fiscal 
position and 
risks. Some 
finance 
ministries 
monitor non-
financial 
performance 
specifies in 
budget and 
related 
accountability 
documents and 
performance 
information in 
relation to 
performance 
agreements that 
this ministry has 
a mandate to 
monitor. 
 
Can also be used 
as part of 
performance 
management and 
review of key 
staff. 
financial 
statements 
submitted to the 
legislature and 
published after 
end of fiscal 
year. 
5. Line Ministries 
 
Tend to generate 
the majority of 
performance 
information. 
 
Can use 
performance 
information for 
internal 
management 
purposes, but 
Performance 
information can be 
used for sectoral 
policy and service 
development 
including planning 
and costing. 
 
In addition, sector 
ministries negotiate 
the budget with the 
finance and 
planning 
As line 
ministries 
increasingly 
directly to 
legislative 
demand for 
information 
concerning their 
performance, 
those ministries 
can use 
performance 
information in 
lobbying for 
Particularly 
strong in the 
context of 
performance 
agreements 
between finance 
and line 
ministries. Also 
used in internal 
management of 
the line ministry, 
and in the 
context of 
supplier-provider 
Annual reports 
by ministries can 
incorporate 
performance as 
well as financial 
information. 
Programme 
evaluation can 
both draw on and 
contribute to 
performance 
information. Line 
ministries can be 
required to 
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Budget Actors and 
potential role in 
performance 
budgeting 
Potential uses of performance information at key decision points in the budget 
process 
During budget 
preparation 
At budget 
approval 
During budget 
execution, 
including in-year 
reporting and 
monitoring 
Year-end 
reporting, audit 
and evaluation 
increasingly for 
negotiating budgets 
with the finance 
ministry and 
managing 
agreements with 
service providers. 
ministries. Those 
negotiations 
increasingly draw 
on performance 
information. 
budgetary 
support at the 
time of budget 
approval. 
arrangements or 
output based 
disbursements 
within the public 
sector or with 
other entities, 
including 
through use of 
league tables. 
 
Can also be used 
as part of 
performance 
management and 
review key of 
staff. 
 
improve the 
quality of data 
and of 
measurement on 
the basis of the 
findings and 
recommendations 
of audit reports. 
6. Legislature  
 
Approves the 
annual budget, 
informed by 
previous and 
planned policy and 
service 
performance 
information. 
 
Holds the executive 
to account for 
achievement 
against the targets 
set. 
 
May review 
expenditure and 
performance in 
committees. 
 
In principle there is 
opportunity for the 
legislature to 
participate in 
budget preparation 
and use 
performance 
information in the 
process. 
There is growing 
legislative 
demand for 
performance 
information to 
support the 
process of 
budget approval. 
There is some 
emerging 
reporting of 
performance in 
budget execution 
in many OECD 
countries. 
Performance 
information 
provided with 
annual financial 
statements, and 
the results of 
programme 
evaluation and 
performance 
audit, can 
potentially be 
used by the 
legislature to 
hold the 
executive to 
account for use 
of public 
resources. 
7. External Audit 
 
In some cases, 
undertakes 
performance audits 
of government 
programmes, to 
assess efficiency 
and effectiveness in 
achieving 
government 
objectives. 
 
Can comment on 
suitability of 
performance 
indicators for use 
in service 
performance 
documents that will 
be formally audited 
(if there exist). 
N/A N/A Performance 
auditing can 
inform the 
legislature and 
other 
stakeholders on 
programme 
performance. 
 
Can also assure 
the quality of 
performance 
information 
systems and 
measures. 
(World Bank, 2010, pp. 23-25) 
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Overall, these studies suggest that performance information can be used not only for 
budgeting purposes, but also for broader management purposes. For budgeting, 
processes performance information may be used in various stages of the budget cycle 
and can be used by central budget authorities, line ministries/agencies, and the 
Parliament. The planning agency and the finance ministry can use it during budget 
preparation. They can use performance information for determining budgets of line 
ministries and for examining budget proposals of line ministries. They can also use 
performance information during budget negotiations with the budget committee in the 
Parliament. On the other hand, line ministries can also use performance information 
in budget negotiations with planning and finance ministries. They can also use it in 
lobbying the Parliament for budgetary support at the time of budget meetings or 
budget approval. Subsequently, the Parliament can use performance information to 
support the process of budget approval. For a broad managerial application, 
government officials/public managers can use performance information for various 
purposes such as for accountability, for mobilising or getting support from 
stakeholders, and for learning and gaining understanding of the programme. The 
ultimate goal of using performance information is to improve the performance of 
public organisations. 
 
2.6.3 Evidence on the Use of Performance of Information   
In general, the use of performance information in the budgeting process can be 
divided into two major potential uses. Firstly, performance information is used for 
resource allocation decisions or budgetary decision-making. Secondly, performance 
information may be used for a broader management purposes. Numerous studies have 
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attempted to examine the use of performance information in performance-based 
budgeting in various countries and regions. 
  
In 2005, the OECD conducted a survey that aimed to review the development and use 
of performance information, in the form of performance measures and evaluation, 
across OECD countries (Curristine, 2005, p. 88). The results of the survey showed 
that 79% of respondents from the OECD countries indicated that performance results 
are used as part of the budget discussions between the Ministry of Finance and line 
ministries. However, two-thirds of respondents indicated that they do not directly link 
performance results to allocations. Only certain countries used performance 
information that directly linked performance information to budget allocations, such 
as Chile, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Norway, and Sweden (in the higher education 
sector). The majority of respondents stated that the Ministry of Finance often used 
performance information to inform budget allocations, along with other information 
and political factors, but performance information did not necessarily determine 
budget allocations. A few respondents used performance information as background 
information only. Therefore, the majority of respondents’ systems fit into the category 
of performance-informed budgeting (Curristine, 2005, pp. 103-105).  The results of 
the survey also indicated that most of the Ministries of Finance (96%) rarely or never 
used the results of performance measures to eliminate programmes or cut expenditure, 
or to reward line ministry/agency heads. In relation to using the results of 
performance evaluation, only Israel, Korea, and Poland responded that the Ministry of 
Finance frequently eliminate programmes that show poor performance. Eleven 
countries stated that this decision would be undertaken by the relevant ministry 
(Curristine, 2005, pp. 108-109).   
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Interestingly, the results of the OECD survey in 2005 indicated that the use of 
performance measures in the budget formulation process is more frequent and 
extensive among line ministries/agencies than in Finance Ministries, particularly in 
the case of performance agreement procedures between ministries and agencies. The 
Ministry of Finance rarely uses performance results to determine budget allocations 
(OECD, 2007, p. 44). The other uses of performance measures by line ministries are 
to redistribute resources, to extend programmes, and to provide information for policy 
development and advice (Curristine, 2005, p. 113). 
 
The most recent OECD Performance Budgeting Survey in 2011/2012 also provides 
similar evidence. Performance budgeting frameworks in the OECD countries are 
generally flexible and not linked with budget decisions (OECD, 2014). In fact, with a 
few exceptions, in certain areas such as education and health, no OECD countries 
directly link public expenditures to performance information. Performance 
information is used to inform the budget, not determine it. This means that fiscal 
discipline is not threatened by the implementation of performance budgeting.    
(Hawkesworth and Klepsvik, 2013, p. 120).   
 
The results of the OECD survey in 2011/12 also found that performance information 
is more frequently used for management and accountability purposes than for the 
allocation of resources. Performance budgeting is generally decentralised to line 
ministries/agencies but there is no clear answer about what the reaction of the 
government to bad performance may be (Hawkesworth and Klepsvik, 2013, p. 120).   
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In different region, as part of its review on budgetary institutions in G-20 countries, 
the IMF (2014a) argued that programme and performance budgeting are now the 
norm in both advanced and emerging G-20 countries. However, the initiatives to 
enhance the performance orientation of budget decision-making have been 
concentrated in emerging countries. With regard to the use of performance 
information in budgeting process, IMF (2014b) reported as specific evaluations for 
several emerging countries.  In Brazil, despite the progress made with reporting 
performance information, its use in funding decision is reportedly still quite limited. 
In China, performance information is not used systematically in budget negotiation or 
in the decision-making process of the State Council. In India, the linkages between 
performance and budget allocation are not always clear. In Indonesia, the government 
is in the process of introducing performance budgeting as is found in this thesis. In the 
current situation, performance information is not used extensively in budgetary 
decision making.  In Indonesia, non-discretionary expenditures that include 
operational expenditures tend to increase incrementally from year to year without any 
review.  IMF (2014a) recommended that countries need to make more systematic use 
of expenditure reviews to ensure that information on the efficiency and effectiveness 
of expenditure programmes actually informs decisions about their future budgetary 
allocations. 
 
In another region, CABRI (2013) studied the status of performance and programme-
based budgeting implementation in African countries and it found that the impact of 
performance and programme-based budgeting (PPBB) in Africa were mixed. The 
impact of PPBB on budget allocations was quite limited, 42% of the survey 
respondents noted that information from performance reports was not successfully 
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used to inform the ceilings for line ministries. One third of the respondents noted that 
information from performance reports was partially used to inform the ceilings for 
line ministries. Only one quarter of the respondents noted that performance 
information was successfully used to inform the ceilings for line ministries (CABRI, 
2013, pp. 26-27).  The positive effect of the PPBB was that the Ministry of Finance 
was more concerned with broader budget allocation decisions than with the micro-
management of ministries’ spending programmes. Line ministries/agencies also have 
more flexibility in determining their annual programme budgets. In addition, the 
budget bids from the line ministries have improved in quality and were more 
evidence-based (CABRI, 2013, pp. 26-27). With regard to the impact of PPBB on 
budget reporting and accountability, about half of survey respondents indicated 
success in measuring and reporting performance (outputs and outcomes) to the 
Ministry of Finance on a regular basis. However, only one quarter of the respondents 
indicated that performance was taken seriously by line ministries and PPBB was used 
to hold accounting officers and other officials to account.  
  
 
There have been a number of empirical studies examining the use of performance 
information during the budget preparation process by the executive branch of 
government. In the USA, Gilmour and Lewis (2006) conducted a regression analysis 
of the PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool) scores on changes in the President’s 
proposed budget, and found a modest but significant positive correlation. Their 
findings were in line with the result of a qualitative study by White (2012) who found 
that the influence of the PART on budget allocations to be marginal. Another 
qualitative study regarding the implementation of performance-based budgeting 
(PBB) by Hou and Lunsford et al (2011) in eleven states in the USA found that 
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performance budgeting was not necessarily used for budgetary decision-making 
during times of financial hardship.  
 
Hou et al (2011) examined the performance-based budgeting reform in USA state 
governments. They used a qualitative study, reviewing documents as well as 
interviewing budget, finance, and management officials in eleven state governments. 
They found that a good performance measurement system takes time to develop and 
operate well. Performance information was useful in providing direction for 
management improvement but it was not playing a significant role for budgetary 
decision making. 
 
Willoughby and Melkers (2000) conducted a survey of executive budget offices and 
legislative budget officials from states governments in the USA. One of the objectives 
of their survey was to assess the opinions about the success of this reform in terms of 
agency efficiency, effectiveness, decision making, public reaction, as well as 
perceived effect on agency workload and operations. They found that budget officials 
consider that performance based budgeting has been at least “somewhat effective” in 
improving agency programme results, decision making in government and 
coordination between agencies and the legislature. On the other hand, budget officials 
perceived that performance-based budgeting has been “less effective” in reducing 
duplicate services and affecting cost savings, and “not effective at all” in appeasing 
the public and changing appropriation levels.  
 
Zaltsman (2009) used qualitative analysis to investigate the use of performance 
information in budget allocations by Chile’s budget bureau. He found that 
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performance information did not affect budget allocation decisions. Melkers and 
Willoughby (2005) examined the effects of performance information on budgetary 
decision-making and other operations from a survey data of administrators and 
budgeters from nearly 300 local governments in USA. Melkers and Willoughby 
(2005, p. 188) found that performance information improves communication within 
and across branches of government, advances discussion about the results of 
government activities and services, adds value to budgeting decisions by providing 
relevant information about the results, costs, and activities. However, they found that 
the government practitioners did not find the effectiveness of performance 
information to influence budgeting processes. They found that respondents doubted 
the influence of performance information for budgetary purposes such as changing 
appropriation levels, reducing ineffective programmes, and reducing duplicated 
services. In contrast with other studies, Ho (2011) examined the influence of 
performance information at the sub-departmental programme levels in the city of 
Indianapolis in USA and found that performance measurement was positively related 
to intra-departmental programme budget changes.   
 
Sterck (2007) studied the impact of performance budgeting on the role of the 
legislature in Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada. He conducted a 
qualitative study using a literature review, document analysis, and semi-standardised 
interviews with civil servants that involved in performance budgeting reforms. Sterck 
(2007) found that performance budgeting initiatives have a dominant focus on 
changing budget structure, but do not seem very successful in actually changing the 
budget functions. There was very little evidence that performance information in 
budgets and annual reports was directly used by members of Parliament in their 
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oversight function. Similarly, Raudla (2012) found that the legislators in Estonia 
made only limited use of the formal documents of performance information because 
the documents were difficult to read, there was a time-constraint in the budget 
process, and the parliament had only a limited role in changing the budget.    
 
In summary, the literature shows that despite the potential use of performance 
information for budgeting purposes and the aspiration of performance budgeting to 
use performance information in budget processes and budget allocation, the actual use 
of performance information in determining a budget is very low. However, Joyce 
(1999) argues that performance information can do more than influence budget 
allocation decisions. Line ministries/agencies may use performance information for 
improving the use of the existing budgets and management purposes.  Julnes (2008) 
also argues that using performance information to inform dialogues among decision 
makers should be considered a positive contribution of performance measurement 
rather than a failure. 
 
2.6.4 Benefits of Performance-Based Budgeting 
Smith (1999, p. 5) identifies six benefits of performance-based budgeting. First, it 
increases the efficiency and effectiveness by concentrating resources for the most 
critical and important outcomes. Second, it improves decision making in using limited 
public resources effectively. Third, it improves processes by linking the budget to 
programme performance over time. Fourth, it improves understanding and 
communication about critical issues and priorities relative to resources. Fifth, it makes 
managers more accountable for programme decisions that affect budget outcomes. 
Sixth, it supports managements by connecting budget results and budget performance 
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measurement with programme performance measurement in the process of 
monitoring, evaluating, and reporting results. However, despite those benefits, Smith 
(1999) also argues that there are potential threats associated with each possible benefit 
of performance-based budgeting. Performance-based budgeting is more vulnerable to 
threats from fraud, falsification, and misrepresentation than previous budgeting 
systems.  
 
Joyce (1993) argues that performance measures can be useful as motivational tools; 
that is, they can encourage government practitioners to improve their performance. 
Ultimately, repeated use and exposure of performance information can develop 
“performance culture”. Performance targets and measurements may not be precisely 
correct at first. Because the measurements will not be right at first, government 
practitioners must be realistic about how much they can be used to influence 
budgeting in the short term. Line ministries/agencies should increase their ability to 
get the measures right over time.  Joyce goes on to argue that the budget process is 
not likely to be changed substantially until and unless decision makers use 
performance information in budget allocation decisions. This change is likely only to 
occur after the "performance culture" infiltrates the process. Therefore, in the short-
run the government should focus on developing of performance measures for 
management purposes rather than for use as a resource allocation tool. 
  
Moravitz (2008, p. 381) suggests four benefits of performance-based budgeting. 
Firstly, ministries/agencies can focus on their mission and goals rather than focus on 
scrutinising expenditures. Performance-based budgeting improves the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government by allocating budgets for the most important outcomes. 
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Secondly, performance-based budgeting can improve activities by linking budget and 
programme performance. It can also increase communication about important issues 
and priorities relevant to budget requests and the use of funds. Thirdly, at 
management level, performance-based budgeting permits government managers to 
make decision based on performance information to improve the effectiveness of 
activities.  
 
2.6.5 Limitations of Performance Information   
This section discusses the limitations of performance information in budgeting 
processes.  
 
Joyce (1999, pp. 613-614) suggests two reasons why it is not easy to figure out how 
to use performance information in budget allocation decisions. Firstly, it is very 
difficult to find common denominators of performance among government 
programmes/activities, as earlier pointed out by Key (1940, p. 1143). For example, 
the measures of success in the education programme are different from those in the 
health programme. Performance information can help government officials to 
determine budget needed by a programme, but it cannot aid the budget office on the 
question of how much to allocate budget for a programme at the expense of another 
programme. Politics plays an important and legitimate role in budget decisions 
although performance information exists. Secondly, the relationship between 
performance and the budget is not straightforward. Performance information may 
identify trends and developments about programmes/activities that demand attention, 
but government officials should takes a more comprehensive evaluation to reveal 
whether the cause of good or poor performance is related to the funding levels.  
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Furthermore, Hawkesworth, Melchor, and Robinson (2013, p. 7) argue that the reason 
why performance information is having less impact on budget allocation decisions 
than might be hoped is because cutting ineffective programmes is never easy 
politically, because there is always someone who benefits from each programme and 
therefore some political cost to abolishing it. When studying performance budgeting 
in Chile, Hawkesworth, Melchor, and Robinson (2013, pp. 7- 15) discussed four 
technical factors to explain the limited use of performance in the budget: weaknesses 
in the budgetary programme structure; the lack of sufficiently strong focus in the 
evaluation system on supporting budget preparation; the weaknesses of priority 
analysis; and the lack of a spending review mechanism.   
 
In addition, Hatry (2008a, pp. 237-238) indicates three limitations of performance 
information. Firstly, performance data do not provide information about why 
performance has been good or bad or what should be done to improve the 
performance of government programmes/services. This suggests that government 
officials should conduct detailed further examinations or evaluations to obtain a more 
complete understanding and get more information regarding the causes of the 
problem. Another limitation of performance information is that it generally focuses on 
a limited number of ‘key’ performance indicators. The performance measurement 
system might not span enough information to give a comprehensive perspective on a 
particular issue. Therefore, government officials will be likely to need more 
information than that included in their current performance measurement process. The 
final limitation of performance measurement is that it provides data about the past. 
The performance data provide a main source of information for government officials 
to make decisions about what should be done in the future. However, government 
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officials may face difficulties in projecting the past data into the future. The use of 
past data may be a particular limitation if a ministry/agency wants to consider 
innovative options/programmes rather than continue the existing programmes.  
 
In summary, performance information has had a limited effect on the implementation 
of performance-based budgeting systems because it is very difficult to define what is 
performance among government programmes. It is difficult to measure outcomes of 
government programmes. In addition, performance information generally focuses on a 
small number of key performance indicators. The relationship between performance 
and the budget is not straightforward. It is very difficult to compare performance 
among government programmes and decide how much to allocate budget for a 
program at the expense of another programme. Furthermore, the use of past 
performance data may be limited if a ministry/agency wants to consider innovative 
programmes rather than continue the existing programmes. Lastly, politics plays an 
important and legitimate role in budget decisions and may dominate such  
performance information as exists. 
 
2.6.6 Challenges Encountered in Implementing Performance-Based Budgeting 
 
Drawing from the literature regarding the implementation of performance based 
budgeting in the USA, Andrews (2004) suggests a model that emphasises three 
factors affecting reform implementation: ability, authority, and acceptance. Each 
factor has several aspects that contribute to the success or failure the implementation 
of performance-based budgeting. For simplicity, the three factors and their aspects 
can be seen in Table 2.7. 
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Table 2.7: Factors Affecting the Implementation of Performance-Based 
Budgeting 
No. Factors and Aspects Description 
1. Ability  
 Performance evaluation ability If governments lack the ability to measure a 
useful performance, performance-based 
budgeting is guaranteed to be failure. 
 Personnel ability Governments should ensure the 
competencies of key personnel when 
implementing performance-based budgeting. 
 Technical ability Particular technical requirements are needed 
to collect performance information and 
provide a commonly available database in 
which performance information is readily 
available, in appropriate formats, to a variety 
of users.  
2 Authority  
 Legal Authority Performance-based budgeting cannot be 
implemented if it conflicts with such 
legislation such as budgeting processes and 
or human resource legislation. 
 Procedural authority Successful performance-based budgeting 
reform implementation requires 
compatibility of the reform with existing 
rules and procedures. 
 Organisational authority Performance-based budgeting appears to be 
most effectively adopted when discretion is 
decentralised in decision making about 
staffing, budgeting, reporting and others. 
3 Acceptance  
 Political acceptance Performance measurement and the use of 
performance information in allocations 
decisions need acceptance from politicians. 
 Managerial acceptance If line ministries/agencies feel that 
legislators will use performance information 
to sanction line ministries/agencies more 
often than reward them, they will probably 
not support the initiative. If line 
ministries/agencies do not see performance 
information as useful in impacting decisions, 
they will not support performance-based 
budgeting.  
 Incentive ability Incentives are needed to make performance 
budgeting reforms effective.  
(Derived from Andrews, 2004) 
Shah and Shen (2007) summarized the critical factors or basic conditions needed to 
maintain performance budgeting reforms. First, a consensus on the need for 
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performance budgeting reform among officials is important to ensuring successful 
implementation. Second, strong and consistent political support from the legislature is 
important for performance budgeting efforts. Third, support and engagement from 
citizens is also important. Fourth, support for staff training, information technology, 
accounting systems, and the budget is also important for performance budgeting 
initiatives.  
 
With regard to performance information, Hatry (2008a, pp. 227-228) identified five 
key “technical” elements that appear essential for successful use of performance 
information. First, there is the question of the validity of the performance indicators: 
whether the indicators measure what is relevant and important about the particular 
issue, programme, or service. Second, there is the quality of data collected for each of 
the performance indicators. Third, there is the timeliness of data, whether the 
performance data is collected and reported in sufficient time and whether performance 
information is available when needed. Fourth, it is important that some basic data 
analysis at least has been carried out to put it into a meaningful form so that the users 
can interpret the levels of performance. Five, performance information needs to be 
presented in a form that the users can easily read, understand, and interpret it.  
 
OECD (2007, p. 69-71) listed several challenges encountered by most OECD 
countries with the implementation of performance budgeting reform. Firstly, many 
countries continue to have problems related to performance measurement. They 
struggled to find accurate measures for outcomes particularly and outputs of certain 
activities. There were also problems with time-lag issues and in some cases the results 
of programmes/activities are beyond the control of the government. In addition, most 
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countries faced a problem in their systems of data collection. Secondly, most 
countries find it is difficult to change the behaviour and culture of key budget actors 
that are familiar with traditional budget practices. Government practitioners in line 
ministries can resist change because it is not clear whether and how performance 
information will be used by central budget office (the Ministry of Finance) and 
politicians. Budget officials in the Ministry of Finance can also reject change by 
preferring the familiar systems of input control rather than focusing on performance 
information. The Ministry of Finance may fear that the change to performance 
budgeting will result in them having less control over expenditure. Other factors that 
affect the use of performance information are the quality of the information, the 
institutional capacity of the central budget office (the Ministry of Finance) and line 
ministries/agencies, and the political and economic environment.  
 
Lu, Mohr, and Ho (2015) reviewed literature about performance budgeting research in 
the USA and found that 27 important factors influence the use of performance 
information. These factors are grouped into six categories: the measurement system, 
support for performance, investment and capacity, implementation approaches, (dis) 
incentives, and characteristics of implementation organizations. The twenty-seven 
factors that influence performance information use are summarised in Table 2.8. The 
Table presents the factors’ frequency and percentages identified as important. 
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Table 2.8. Factors Identified as Important for Use of Performance Information 
Factor Frequency Percentage 
Measurement system (Avg. Pct. 25%)   
• Quality of measurement  37 61% 
• Timely data  5 8% 
• Link measures with strategic plans  9 15% 
• Link measures with resource allocation 10 16% 
Support for performance (Avg. Pct. 23%)   
• Legislative support 18 30% 
• Executive leadership support 20 33% 
• Management support 12 20% 
• Staff buy-in  5 8% 
• Citizen support 8 13% 
• Political support 31 51% 
• Performance-oriented organizational culture 7 11% 
• Shared responsibilities for PBB among stakeholders 9 15% 
Investment and capacity (Avg. Pct. 19%)   
• Time investment 5 8% 
• Resources 15 25% 
• Staff capacity 13 21% 
• Information system capacity 13 21% 
(Dis)Incentives (Avg. Pct. 14%)   
• Presence of requirement (legislation or executive order) 7 11% 
• Incentives/sanctions for meeting/not meeting performance 
target  
10 16% 
Characteristics of implementing organization (Avg. Pct. 
13%) 
  
• Economic factors (e.g., economic downturn)  5 8% 
• Organizational factors (e.g., size) 11 18% 
• Demographic variables 8 13% 
Implementation approach (Avg. Pct. 4%)   
• Reform timing 2 3% 
• Top-down or bottom-up approach to performance budgeting  4 7% 
• Use of benchmark 4 7% 
• Use of professional help  3 5% 
• Online reporting 1 2% 
• Audit 1 2% 
(Lu, Mohr, and Ho, 2015, p. 434) 
Looking at Table 2.8, overall, the top three factors that are important for the use of 
performance information in budgeting are: “quality of measurement” (it is mentioned 
by 61% of the articles reviewed), “political support” (51%), and “executive leadership 
support” (31%) ((Lu, Mohr, and Ho, 2015, p. 433).  
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In relation to developing countries, CABRI (2013) identified eight main challenges in 
implementing performance and programme-based budgeting (PPBB) in Africa. First, 
African countries encountered challenges in PPBB design and leadership. In 
particular, more than half of the survey respondents indicated that formulating clear 
objectives (outcomes) and/or developing appropriate performance information for use 
in budget allocation decisions were challenging. Some 40% of the respondents also 
indicated that understanding the concept of PPBB, such as programmes, outputs, and 
outcomes were challenging. In relation to leadership, one third of the respondents 
indicated a lack of leadership or commitment in promoting performance and 
programme-based budgeting. Second, African countries found challenges in using 
performance information. More than half of the respondents indicated it was difficult 
to define appropriate and relevant performance measures. They also noted that 
performance measures do not provide information on efficiency or cost-effectiveness 
of outputs. A quarter of respondents also noted that the role of performance 
information presented in the budget documents for budget decisions was unclear. 
Performance information provided was not relevant for budgetary decision-making. 
Third, African countries found challenges regarding resources. It was reported that 
there was insufficient capacity in the Ministry of Finance and line ministries to 
implement reforms. In addition, there were insufficient resources (time, staff, and 
funds) to implement reforms. Moreover, a major technical challenge for several 
countries was difficulty in mapping a programmatic structure from the line item 
budget to a programme budget. Several countries have created a programme structure 
for the budget which exists alongside the line item budgets and organisational 
structure. The three elements are not connected seamlessly in the annual budget, nor 
in national development plans. Fourth, several countries found an organisational 
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challenge. They found difficulties in aligning programmes to organisational structure. 
More than half of the respondents noted this to be a significant or very significant 
challenge. Some senior officials from countries such as Burkina Faso and Tunisia 
were resistant to PPBB reforms because they feared they would lose their job in any  
rationalisation of administrative structures. Fifth, promoting a performance culture 
and holding programme managers to account were found to be challenging. In many 
African countries, decision-making and management are highly focused at 
presidential or ministerial level. In line ministries, senior civil servants did not have 
enough skills in budget management and the identification and appointment of senior 
civil servants responsible for the management of budget programmes and 
performance has proven to be problematic. Sixth, African countries found 
technological challenges with regard to the capability of their information and 
technology systems in managing PPBB systems and integrating financial and non-
financial information. Seventh, there was a challenge of adopting a new/revised 
organic budget law to replace the existing legal and regulatory budget framework. 
The absence of a revised law means that a line-item approach was still being used in 
the budgeting process. Eighth, there were challenges in involving Parliament in PPBB 
reforms. Parliaments in African countries were weak and dominated by the ruling 
parties. There was little incentive for Parliament to scrutinise and challenge budget 
proposals from the government. Committees in Parliaments dedicated to managing 
the budgeting process either do not exist or are weak. In addition, most Parliaments in 
Africa lack the capacity for independent budget analysis that could assist Parliament 
in scrutinising annual performance reports. 
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2.7 Theoretical Framework Used in Performance-Based Budgeting Studies  
This section discusses a variety of theoretical frameworks used in existing studies of 
performance budgeting as well as broader area such as performance management and 
management accounting. In their review of past performance-based budgeting studies, 
several authors noted that the majority of the studies did not contain any theoretical 
framework. For example, Lu, Mohr, and Ho (2015, p. 441) found that 45 out of 61 
studies examined did not use any theoretical framework. Studies were mainly 
descriptive and tried to help readers understand how a particular government 
implemented performance-based budgeting during a certain era. Mauro, Cinquini, and 
Grossi (2015, p. 8) also found that the majority of the papers examined (15 out of 24 
papers) lacked a strong and clear reference to theories. Among the studies that have 
employed some theoretical discussion or perspective, the authors also found that no 
clearly dominant paradigm had assisted the research on performance-based budgeting. 
This section briefly discusses a variety of theoretical frameworks or approaches that 
can be identified as being used by past studies.   
 
A number of studies (see for example Kelly and Rivenbark, 2008; Reddick, 2003) 
provide theoretical discussion of the implementation of performance budgeting in the 
context of incrementalism. This incremental approach has been discussed earlier in 
Section 2.4 of this chapter. Reddick (2003) examined the government budget 
outcomes in the USA from 1968 to 1999 and the result provided support for 
incremental budgeting. Kelly and Rivenbark (2008) used local government per capita 
expenditures in the USA from 1994-2004 and they found that incrementalism was 
present as represented by the annual percentage of change over the 10-year period.  
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Other studies examined performance budgeting from an organisational management 
perspective. Using the dialogue theory that emphasises the ambiguity of performance 
information and related resource allocation choices, Moynihan (2006) found a variety 
of ways in which different individuals can examine the same programme and, using 
logical warrants, come to different conclusions about performance and future funding 
requirements. Sterck (2007) used literature on budgeting as well as innovation 
literature to develop an analytical framework for comparing performance budgeting 
initiatives in Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada. He argued that 
performance budgeting can be seen as an innovation which can be examined into four 
phases in the innovation cycle: the context, the innovation process, the adoption, and 
the implementation. The three hypotheses were tested in his study: an innovation will 
be more successful when the different functions of the budget system are well 
balanced; innovation pressure is a crucial driver for reform; and capacity for 
innovation has a positive influence on the adoption and implementation of reforms. 
The study concluded that the performance budgeting initiatives in the four studied-
countries have a dominant focus on changing the budget structure, but do not seem 
very successful in altering the budget functions.  
 
Mimba, Van Helden, and Tillema (2013) used a revised version of a neo-institutional 
framework developed by Brignall and Modell (2000) to study the design and use of 
performance information in a local government in Indonesia. This framework 
assumes that each group of stakeholders namely funding bodies, statutory boards, and 
purchasers has its own performance interests. They used this framework for less 
developed countries as a context which are characterised by a low institutional 
capacity, lack of market pressure, and high levels of corruption. Following the 
 78 
argument of Brignall and Modell (2000), they argue that when one group of 
stakeholders is dominant, performance information related to its performance interests 
is integrated throughout the organisation hierarchy and is used functionally. 
Traditionally, funding bodies were the only powerful stakeholders. However, the 
symbolic use of performance information will be stimulated by the presence of low 
institutional capacity and the high level of corruption in less developed countries. 
Furthermore, they also argue that when more groups of stakeholders become more 
powerful, performance information will be used symbolically rather than functionally 
(Mimba, Van Helden, and Tillema, 2013, p. 18-19). Using this framework, they 
concluded that managers in the selected local government agencies focus more on 
fulfilling the formal requirements regarding the format of the annual performance 
reports and on their timely submission than on their contents. These features are 
symptoms of a symbolic rather than functional use of performance information. 
However, the managers use the reports that include information on inputs in a 
functional manner. In terms of the analytical framework used, the impact of the 
characteristics of less developed countries on the use of performance information on 
outputs and outcome overshadows the impact of a dominant stakeholder (Mimba, Van 
Helden, and Tillema, 2013).  
 
An institutional framework is also applied by Burns and Scapens (2000) to suggest 
how management accounting change can become routinised. Drawing from old 
institutional economics, the framework explores the complex and ongoing 
relationship between actions and institutions, and demonstrates the importance of 
organisational routines and institutions in shaping the process of management 
accounting change. The framework suggested that management accounting change as 
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a process, is considered as a routine organisational practice, and potentially 
institutionalised. Organisational routines play an important role in the relationship 
between actions and institutions. In the process of routinisation, rules could be 
described as routines when groups of individuals in an organisation repeatedly follow 
rules that become the habits of the group. Rules are ‘the formalised statement of 
procedures’ or ‘things that should be done’, whereas routines are ‘the procedures 
actually in use’ or ‘things that are actually done’ (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 6-7). 
Burns and Scapens (2000) use the example of budgeting to illustrate the process of 
routinisation. They argue that budgeting routines emerge and reproduce, over time, 
once budgeting rules and procedures are established. Ultimately, budgeting can then 
become taken for granted among personnel such that its enactment is performed 
without conscious recourse to the initial rules. In an organisation, the process may 
move from routines to rules. Routines may emerge which either have departed from 
the original rules, or never explicitly set out in the form of rules. These established 
routines may be formalised in a set of rules. Therefore, there can be a two-way 
relationship between rules and routines. In either case the enacting and reproduction 
of rules and routines will continue over time, and in this process the routines may be 
changed. The enactment of rules and routines may be subject to resistance, 
particularly if they challenge existing conditions and actors have power to intervene 
the process. It seems likely that change which is consistent with existing rules and 
routines will be easier to achieve than change which challenges those rules and 
routines. Therefore, it is important that managing change requires a comprehensive 
understanding of the current context of the organisation. The emerging routines can 
be said to be institutionalised when they become widely accepted in the organisation 
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such that they become the unquestionable form of management control (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000).   
 
Furthermore, Burns and Scapens (2000) suggest three dichotomies of the processes of 
management accounting change found in old institutional economics literature that 
can be useful for studying management accounting change. Firstly, there is the 
dichotomy between formal and informal change. Formal change occurs by design 
through the introduction of new rules or through the actions of powerful individual or 
group. In contrast, informal change occurs when new routines adapt over time to 
changing operating conditions. Secondly, there is the dichotomy between 
revolutionary and evolutionary change. Revolutionary change includes a fundamental 
disruption to existing routines and institutions. Evolutionary change, however, is 
incremental with only minor disruption to existing routines and institutions. Thirdly, 
there is the dichotomy between regressive and progressive change. Regressive change 
is behaviour that reinforces ceremonial behaviour, thus restricting institutional 
change. On the other hand, the progressive change displaces ceremonial behaviour by 
instrumental behaviour.  
 
In summary, this section has discussed the various types of analytical framework or 
theories used by existing studies on performance budgeting as well as management 
accounting. The incremental approach as discussed earlier in Section 2.4 and 
institutional framework suggested by Burns and Scapens (2000), in particular, will be 
useful to inform interpretive studies of the processes of management accounting 
change, in this case, for seeking evidence on the existence of incremental budgeting 
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practices and understanding the process of the implementation of performance-based 
budgeting in Indonesia. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the two main approaches that can be distinguished in 
budgeting, incremental budgeting and performance budgeting, that are particularly 
relevant for this study. It is argued that incremental budgeting practices are still 
important in public budgeting. Budgeting continues to be incremental because 
incremental approach makes decisions on resource allocation easier, simpler, and 
more flexible. It can also reduce conflict among budget actors and offers stability 
among government programmes.  
 
On the other hand, performance budgeting practices have been implemented in many 
countries across different continents. Performance budgeting is a concept that links 
performance information with the budget. Conceptually, the identification of 
performance as the maximisaton of social welfare from the effective production of 
valued outcomes resulting from outputs efficiently produced by the use of 
economically procured inputs has long been clear in the abstract terms of neoclassical 
economic theory. Operationalising that theory in a way that leads to clear practical 
procedures for measuring performance that can be aggregated or compared across 
different agencies remains problematic. However, the availability and use of 
performance information very important in performance-based budgeting and there 
has been much progress in pragmatic and piecemeal development of indicators. The 
use of performance information in the budgeting process can be divided into two 
major potential uses. Firstly, performance information is used for resource allocation 
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decisions or budgetary decision-making. However, previous studies have suggested 
that the actual use of performance information in the practice of determining a budget 
is generally minimal. Performance information has a limited effect on the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting systems because, as noted, it is very 
difficult to define what is performance with sufficient precision and clarity to aid 
allocation decisions between competing government programmes. That is because it 
is hard to measure outputs and outcomes of government programmes and hence 
compare performance between government programmes and decide how much to 
allocate budget for a program at the expense of another programme. Politics plays an 
important and legitimate role in budget decisions and may dominate the impact of 
such performance information that exists.  
 
Advocates of performance-based budgeting may have underestimated the complexity 
of the public budgeting process. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that the actual 
implementation of performance-based budgeting has been very limited. Other than for 
allocating budgets, performance information can be used by central budget 
authorities, line ministries/agencies, and the Parliament in budget meetings and 
negotiations in various stages of the budget cycle. Performance information can also 
be used for broad managerial applications. Government officials and public managers 
can use performance information for various purposes such as for accountability, for 
mobilising or getting support from stakeholders, and for learning and gaining 
understanding of the programme. The ultimate goal of using performance information 
is to improve the performance of public organisations.  
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Most countries have also encountered several challenges in seeking to  implement of 
performance budgeting reform.  Most countries continue to have problems related to 
performance measurement particularly in finding accurate measures for outcomes and 
outputs of programmes and activities. They have faced a problems in their systems of 
data collection. Countries have  also faced problems in getting support for leadership 
and management in promoting performance budgeting. Furthermore, most countries 
find it is difficult to change the behaviour and culture of key budget actors that are 
familiar with traditional budget practices. Other factors that affect the use of 
performance information are institutional capacity of the central budget offices and 
line ministries/agencies, and the political and economic environment. It is argued that 
the implementation of performance budgeting can be regarded as a process of change 
in organisational rules and routines. Therefore, the institutional framework developed 
by Burns and Scapens (2000) can be used for interpreting the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting in Indonesia. The framework suggests the complex and 
ongoing relationship between actions and institutions, and demonstrates the 
importance of organisational routines and institutions is shaping the process of 
management change. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the evolution of performance-based budgeting 
implementation in Indonesia.  
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Chapter 3 - Budget Reforms and Performance-Based 
Budgeting in Indonesia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the evolution of performance-based budgeting implementation in 
Indonesia that has been in process since the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 
political transition in Indonesia of 1998. How such a process is implemented depends 
a lot in practice on the precise institutional arrangements put in place. The chapter 
describes these arrangements in detail and provides the necessary background for the 
empirical research reported in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The Government of Indonesia has 
carried out a series of measures designed to implement performance-based budgeting. 
  
The chapter starts by discussing the background of public management reforms in 
Indonesia that began to be implemented after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The 
key laws and regulations that have guided the planning and budgeting process in 
Indonesia and that have affected the implementation of performance-based budgeting 
are also discussed. The significant phases of the reforms are then described. The 
features of Indonesian performance-based budgeting, including the introduction of 
performance measurement and evaluation (performance scores), are also presented. 
The chapter then continues with a discussion of the four key actors involved in the 
planning and budgeting process, and the three budgetary decision stages of the 
Indonesian processes. The chapter concludes with an identification of the potential 
uses of performance information in the planning and budgeting process. 
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3.2 Public Financial Management Reforms in Indonesia 
The public financial management reforms in Indonesia were triggered by the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 and the political transition of 1998 (ADB, 2010, p. 4; Rhodes 
et al., 2012, p. 246). At that time, Indonesia experienced a severe economic crisis that 
caused a sharp rise in poverty, a 13% fall in GDP, and near bankruptcy of the 
financial sector (Chaudhuri, 2009, p. iv). Since then, the public has demanded greater 
transparency and accountability from the government (World Bank, 2001a, p. i).  
 
In 2001, according to its report, the World Bank assessed several weaknesses of the 
Indonesian budget, such as the existence of dual budgeting i.e. the separation of 
routine and development budget that was paralleled by the separation of responsibility 
between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning (Bappenas), and the 
absence of information on programmes and outputs. The World Bank report also 
commented that the budget systems generated little information on programme 
results. The absence of performance information made it difficult to hold budget 
planners accountable for determining budget allocations. There was performance 
information on output, for the development budget, but it was not linked to the budget 
preparation process. In conclusion, there was no performance-based budget system in 
Indonesia (World Bank, 2001a, pp. 7-10). 
 
Responding to the assessment from the World Bank, the Indonesian government, led 
by the Minister of Finance, established a high-level committee, called the Financial 
Management Reform Committee, to guide reform of the financial management 
system (World Bank, 2001b, p. 3.5).  
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The commitment of the government to reform the financial management system, led 
by the Financial Management Reform Committee, was demonstrated by the issuance 
of the White Paper of Reform of Public Management System in 2002 (Thomas et al., 
2012).  In this paper, the committee assessed the need for reforms in the government 
budget and financial management process with regard to the budgetary process, 
budget execution and government auditing (the Ministry of Finance (MoF), 2002). In 
relation to the existing budgetary process, the committee identified the following 
characteristics (MoF, 2002): 
• As noted above, the expenditure budget was divided into two major elements: 
routine or recurrent budget and development budget. As a result, budget 
duplications frequently occurred. The Directorate General of Budget in the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) was responsible for preparing the recurrent 
budget. The development budget was prepared by the Ministry of Planning 
(MOP)/Bappenas (the National Planning and Development Agency). The 
committee found a need to adopt a unified budget system. It also found that to 
improve the planning and budgeting process, the role and responsibility of the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance should be clearly defined in 
terms of the national strategic planning and the annual budget preparation. 
• The committee found that the budgeting system was input-based. The input-
based budgeting approach did not provide relevant information for measuring 
the   performance of spending units in line ministries/agencies. Although the 
budget was classified into organisational units, functional, and economic 
classification, it was limited to an input approach. These classifications failed 
to accommodate performance measures. The committee recommended the 
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introduction of a performance-based budgeting system for performance 
control and evaluation. 
 
In order to reform the public financial management system and to improve the legal 
framework of public financial management, the government proposed three draft laws 
to the Parliament: the State Finance Law, the State Treasury Law, and the State Audit 
Law. The draft State Finance Law, in particular, was intended to be an organic law 
laying down major principles for public expenditure management in Indonesia (MoF, 
2002). Thus, following the financial crisis and the transition to democracy in 
Indonesia, there was a strong emphasis on reforming the legal framework for 
budgeting (Blondal, Hawkesworth, Choi, 2009, p. 6).  
 
The key elements of the reforms were set in place by the enactments of four major 
laws: the State Finance Law 17/2003, the State Treasury Law 1/2004, the State Audit 
Law 15/2004, and the National Development Planning Law 25/2004. The enactments 
of the laws were significant steps for Indonesia in adopting good international 
practice (World Bank, 2008, p. 97). The State Finance Law 17/2003, in particular, 
provides a legal basis for the implementation of budgetary reforms in Indonesia 
(Directorate General of Budget, 2012, p. 71).   
 
3.3 The State Finance Law 17/2003 and the System of National Development 
Planning Law 25/2004 
 
This section discusses the importance of the State Finance Law 17/2003 and the 
National Development Planning Law 25/2004 in the planning and budgeting process. 
 88 
The implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia is an integral part 
of the planning and budgeting process regulated by these laws. 
 
The issuance of the State Finance Law 17/2003 was a major step for Indonesia in    
implementing a sound public finance management system (Ginting, 2003, p. 353). 
The law mandates the government to implement best practices in managing state 
finances, such as accountability with results-orientation, professionalism, 
proportionality, and openness (GoI, 2003). The law stipulates the general principles 
and the authorities for the management and accountability of state finances, specifies 
the constitutional provisions for the budget process, mandates specific milestones and 
dates for the preparation and adoption of the budget, and establishes the financial 
relationship between the central government and other institutions (Blondal, 
Hawkesworth, Choi, 2009, p. 6). 
 
Aiming to implement performance-based budgeting, the law required line 
ministers/agencies to develop their annual work plans and budget documents 
(RKAKL) using performance targets. The law also established the requirement for a 
unifying performance management system in the budgeting process, amending budget 
classifications to conform to international best practices, and introducing a medium 
term expenditure framework (MTEF) in the annual budget process (GoI, 2003).  
Changes in budget classifications were intended to facilitate the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting, to provide an objective and proportional portraits 
regarding government activities, to maintain consistency with the public sector 
accounting standards, as well as to facilitate the presentation and to enhance the 
credibility of government financial statistics.  The law also mandated the integration 
 89 
of the routine budget and the development budget. The separation of the routine 
budget and the development budget, which was originally intended to give emphasis 
on the importance of the development budget had in practice raised the chances of 
budget duplication, overlapping, and irregularities. The recent developments also 
required the implementation of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in 
the annual budgeting system  (GoI, 2003).  
 
The enactment of the State Finance Law 17/2003 was then followed by the enactment 
of the State Planning Law 25/2004 concerning the system of the national development 
planning. The law specified the national development planning process, the 
preparation and approval of plans, and the role of the Ministry of Planning/National 
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) (Blondal, Hawkesworth, Choi, 2009, p. 
6). The law also specifies the National Development Planning System as an integrated 
development planning procedure with the aim to produce long-term, medium-term, 
and annual development plans which will be implemented by every government entity 
involving citizens in central and local governments. According to the law, the 
planning process comprises four components: a political process, a technocratic 
process, a participative process, and a bottom-up and top-down process (GoI, 2004). 
It was envisaged that this law aimed to improve the roles of the Ministry of 
Planning/Bappenas by integrating the planning and budgeting system, and 
strengthening its role in coordinating monitoring, evaluation, and performance 
accountability (Ministry of Planning (MoP), 2014, p. II-3). 
 
The State Finance Law 17/2003 and the System of National Development Planning 
Law 25/2004 aim to connect the planning process with the budgeting process.  While 
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Law 25/2004 regulates the planning process, Law 17/2003 regulates the budgeting 
process. Figure 3.1 summarises the relationship between Law 25/2004 and Law 
17/2003 in the planning process and budgeting process.  
 
Figure 3.1: The Relationship Between Law 25/2004 and Law 17/2003 
 
 
Source: Derived from the Directorate of the State Budget Preparation, 2014. 
 
Looking at Figure 3.1, the planning process involves the preparation of three planning 
documents at the national level: the long-term national plan document (RPJPN), the 
medium-term national plan (RJPMN), and the annual government work-plan (RKP).   
RPJPN is a long-term planning document for a twenty-year period that consists of 
vision, mission, and national development strategies, enacted by law. The second 
document is RPJMN, a national medium-term planning document for a five-year 
period that covers programmes of the elected President. RPJPN guides the preparation 
of RPJMN. The elected President issues the RPJMN document by enacting a 
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presidential regulation. The third document is RKP, the annual government work-plan 
that implements RPJMN. Every year, usually in May, before the next year’s budget 
begins, the President issues a presidential regulation regarding the RKP (Directorate 
of the State Budget Preparation, 2014, p. 42). The Minister of Planning is responsible 
for preparing the drafts of RPJPN, RPJMN, and RKP (GoI, 2004).   
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, at the line ministry/agency level, there are two planning 
documents: the strategic plan of the line ministry/agency (RENSTRA-KL), and the 
annual work-plan of the line ministry/agency (RENJA-KL). RENSTRA-KL is a five-
year period planning document that was prepared using RPJMN as its guidance.  
RENSTRA-KL consists of vision, mission, strategies and policies of line 
ministries/agencies. It also covers indicative programmes and activities of 
ministries/agencies. RENSTRA-KL, and the annual government work-plan (RKP) 
guide the preparation of RENJA-KL. RENJA-KL contains the policies, programmes, 
and activities of the government (Directorate of the State Budget Preparation, 2014, p. 
43). 
 
After the preparation of RKP and RENJA-KL, the process continues with the 
budgeting process. According to Law 17/2003, the budgeting process involves the 
preparation of the state budget (APBN) at the national level and the preparation of   
the work plan and budget documents (RKAKL) at the ministry/agency level (GoI, 
2003). The planning documents, RKP and RENJA-KL in particular, guide the annual 
budget preparation. At the national level, RKP guides the preparation of the state 
budget draft (RAPBN). RENJA-KL guides each line ministry/agency in preparing its 
RKA-KL (Directorate of the State Budget Preparation, 2014, p. 43). 
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3.4. The Implementation of Performance-Based Budgeting 2005-2009 
As mandated by the State Finance Law 17/2003, the Government of Indonesia started 
to introduce performance-based budgeting in 2005. This section provides a summary 
of the implementation of performance-based budgeting over the period of 2005-2009 
and presents several problems of the implementation were identified by the 
government.  
 
The implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia for the period 
2005-2009 was regarded as ‘the introduction phase’. This phase focused on the 
implementation of unified budgeting, integrating the routine budget and the 
development budget. The unification of the budgeting system was followed by the 
integration of three different budget execution documents (namely DIK, DIP, and 
SKO) into one budget execution document (DIPA). Furthermore, the budgeting 
system categorised the budget into three classifications: functions, organisations, and 
expenditures. This phase also emphasized that the spending units in line 
ministries/agencies acted as the ones that hold accountability of their activities (MoF, 
2011a, p. 102).   
 
In summary, the implementation of performance-based budgeting 2005-2009 can be 
described as follows (Directorate General of Budget, 2012, pp. 77-78): 
• In 2005, line ministries/agencies were asked to provide performance targets 
(outputs) along with the budget details (inputs) in their work plan and budget 
documents (RKAKL).  
• In 2006, cost standards were introduced as part of performance-based budgeting.  
• In 2007, there was an initiative to synchronize the activities of line 
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ministries/agencies with programmes stated in the government work-plan (RKP). 
Line ministries/agencies were also requested to identify their outputs. 
• In 2008, the implementation of performance-based budgeting was aimed at 
ensuring there was connection between the government work plan (RKP) and the 
annual work-plan of line ministries/agencies (RENJA-KL) and the work plan and 
budget documents (RKAKL).   
 
Although Law 17/2003 has mandated the implementation of performance-based 
budgeting since 2003 and it had been introduced in 2005 (Directorate General of 
Budget, 2012, p. 77), in practice performance-based budgeting has not been fully 
implemented in the planning and budgeting process over the years 2005-2009. The 
government itself identified several problems with regards to the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting in this period, as follows (MoF and MoP, 2009a, p. 2): 
• The existing programmes and activities could not be used as tools for 
measuring the effectiveness of development targets and efficiency of 
expenditures. 
• The existing programmes and activities could not be used as tools for 
measuring performance accountability of spending units in line 
ministries/agencies. 
• On an operational level, there were question marks regarding the connection 
between planning documents and budget documents.   
In detail, several problems concerning the structures of the existing programmes and 
activities can be set out as follows (MoF and MoP, 2009b, pp. 3-5): 
• The existing programmes were formed with an input-based approach using a 
line-item budget. The programmes were not formed based on an output-
outcome oriented approach. 
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• The existing programmes and performance indicators could not be used as 
tools to measure the effectiveness of the development goals, spending 
efficiency, and performance accountability (GoI, 2009). The reason for this 
problem is that the programmes generally cut across several ministries and the 
performance indicators were not always relevant for the particular activities 
concerned (Allen et al., 2007).    
• The existing programmes were used by several line ministries/agencies 
without any clear working arrangements and performance indicators.  
• Some programmes were too narrow and others were too broad. It was difficult 
to identify outputs for the “too broad” programmes. 
• There were too many activities under certain programmes that were not 
relevant to those programmes.  
• There was no separation between programmes that covered only internal 
activities of line ministries/agencies and programmes that aimed to serve the 
public interest. 
   
Triggered by the problems found during the implementation of performance-based 
budgeting in the period of 2005-2009, the government then launched the next phase 
of planning and budgeting reform in mid 2009.  
 
 3.5. The Planning and Budgeting Reform of 2009   
Led by the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the government 
launched a further planning and budgeting reform in June 2009. The government 
introduced two key initiatives. Firstly, it rearranged the structures of programmes and 
activities in line ministries/agencies. It was required that the programmes and 
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activities must be complemented by performance indicators. Secondly, it restructured 
the planning and budgeting process with the aim of ensuring that there is a connection 
between the planning and the budget documents at national and ministerial level, 
supported by an integrated planning and budgeting system (GoI, 2009).  
 
The commitment of the government to reform its planning and budgeting process was 
then included in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN, 2010-
2014). As part of RPJMN 2010-2014, the government indicated that the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting aimed to improve the quality of 
public services, to improve the effectiveness and the accountability of 
ministries/agencies, and to combat corruption (GoI, 2010b, p. I-39). The government 
also specified that the implementation of performance-based budgeting should be 
accompanied by the use of a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF). The 
government also promised to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation mechanism in 
the planning and budgeting cycle (GoI, 2010b, pp. I-87-I-88). 
 
The reform continued with the piloting of performance-based budgeting in the 
Ministry of Finance as a line ministry in 2009. The piloting then extended, in 2010, to 
five other ministries: the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Public-Works, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Planning 
(MoF, 2009, p. 128). 
 
The implementation of performance-based budgeting and the medium term 
expenditure framework with new structures of programmes and activities for all line 
ministries/agencies was started in fiscal year 2011 (Directorate General of Budget, 
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2012, p. 78). The government required that the annual work plans and budget 
documents (RKAKL) of every line ministry/agency must incorporate relevant 
performance information i.e. performance (outputs and outcomes) targets. It has also 
required that past and planned performance information, among other factors, should 
be used in the budget allocation process (GoI, 2010a). The past performance 
information used in the budget preparation process is the set of results from the 
performance measurement system of RKAKL (RKAKL performance scores, 
hereafter) based on the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011. The planned 
performance information consists of performance targets proposed by line ministries. 
The Ministry of Finance has the aim that performance information in the Indonesian 
budgeting system should not only be used for performance reporting purposes but 
also should be used for budgetary decision-making (Directorate General of Budget, 
2012, p. 78).  
 
As part of the reform process, the government then issued Government Regulation 
90/2010 concerning the preparation of the work plans and budget documents of line 
ministries/agencies (RKAKL). The significance of this regulation for performance-
based budgeting is presented in the next section.  
 
3.6. The Significance of Government Regulation 90/2010 for Performance-Based 
Budgeting 
As the main law that regulates the management of state finances, the State Finance 
Law 17/2003 mandated the government to set out a Government Regulation that 
guides the preparation of work plans and budget documents of line 
ministries/agencies (RKAKLs) using three approaches: performance-based, unified-
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budgeting, and the use of a medium-term expenditure framework (GoI, 2003).  
 
One year after the Law 17/2033 was issued, the Government then set out the 
Government Regulation 21/2004 as the basis for line ministries/agencies in preparing 
RKAKLs. The regulation then largely served as ‘an introduction phase' for line 
ministries/agencies regarding the budget preparation using the three approaches 
(Directorate General of Budget, 2012, p. 103). 
 
Five years after its establishment, the regulation began to lose relevance to the recent 
condition of the budgeting process. Therefore, the government decided to replace the 
regulation with the Government Regulation 90/2010 (the Directorate General of 
Budget, 2012, p.103). The fundamental changes set out in the new regulation are as 
follows (GoI, 2010a): 
• The introduction of the rolling budget concept that classified two government 
or line ministries/agencies policies into two components: the current policies 
and ‘new initiatives’. 
• The revision of the budget preparation process from the preparation of 
RKAKLs to the approval of budget execution documents (DIPA). 
• There were new provisions for the budget amendment process.   
• There were new provisions for the establishment of performance measurement 
and performance evaluation (RKAKL performance scores) as well as the 
implementation of an integrated information system. 
 
Government Regulation 90/2010 is a very important regulation in relation to the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting. This study identifies seven articles 
in the regulation that have a close connection with the implementation of 
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performance-based budgeting. The seven articles are as follows (GoI, 2010a): 
• Article 5 stipulates that the preparation of the work plans and budget 
documents of line ministries/agencies (RKAKLs) must use three approaches: a 
medium-term expenditure framework unified budgeting, and performance-
based budgeting. The RKAKLs are prepared by using performance indicators, 
cost standards, and performance evaluation. 
• Article 6 stipulates that RKAKLs include performance information (in the 
form of programmes, activities, and performance targets) and budget details.   
• Article 7 stipulates that in relation to the preparation of the indicative budget 
ceilings, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance should evaluate 
current programmes and activities as well as new initiative proposals by line 
ministries/agencies. The Ministry of Planning coordinates the evaluation 
process.   
• Article 9 stipulates that the Ministry of Finance prepares the budget ceilings 
based on fiscal capacity, the indicative budget ceilings, the work plans of line 
ministries/agencies (RENJA-KL), and considering the results of performance 
evaluation of line ministries/agencies (RKAKLs performance scores). 
• Article 10 stipulates that the Ministry of Finance coordinates the review of 
RKAKL documents for establishing the budget allocations. The review 
assesses the sufficiency of the relationship between performance targets and 
the budget amount. It also assesses the consistency between line 
ministries/agencies’ performance targets and the government work plan 
(RKP). 
• Article 19 stipulates that each line ministry/agency carries out performance 
measurement and evaluation of the execution of RKAKL in the past and 
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current year. The results of the performance measurement and evaluation 
should be reported to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning. 
Further regulation concerning performance measurement and evaluation will 
be regulated by a Minister of Finance’s Regulation. 
• Article 20 stipulates that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning 
should perform a monitoring of line ministries/agencies’ performance 
achievement. The results of monitoring and evaluation could be used as one of 
the considerations in the implementation of reward and punishment in 
determining budget ceilings of line ministries/agencies.  
 
3.7 The Features of Performance-Based Budgeting in Indonesia   
In describing the features of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia, this study 
relies on five books issued by the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance 
that guided the planning and budgeting reforms in 2009, the Government Regulation 
90/2010 and the Minister of Finance’s regulations concerning the guidance of the 
preparation and the review of work plans and budgets documents of line 
ministries/agencies (RKAKL).   
 
Performance-based budgeting in Indonesia is defined as an approach in the planning 
and budgeting system of government expenditures that clearly shows the relationship 
between budget allocations and performance targets, and considering efficiency in 
achieving the targets. Performance is defined as outputs produced through activities 
and outcomes achieved in programmes (GoI, 2014, p. 1).  
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As mandated by the State Finance Law 17/2003, the implementation of performance-
based budgeting is accompanied by the implementation of unified budgeting and the 
implementation of medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) (GoI, 2010a).  
 
The implementation of performance-based budgeting includes three main principles 
(GoI, 2010a):    
a. ‘Money follows function’. This means that the budget is allocated based on 
programmes and activities that conform to the roles of line 
ministries/agencies/spending units and their organisational structures. 
b. ‘Output and outcome oriented’. This means that the budget is allocated aiming 
to produce or to achieve specific outputs and outcomes. 
c. ‘Let the managers manage’. This means that there is flexibility in managing the 
budget with accountability.   
 
With these three principles, the implementation of performance-based budgeting is 
aimed at (GoI, 2014, pp. 1-2): 
a. Presenting direct linkages between performance targets and budget. 
b. Improving operational efficiency and transparency in the budgeting process. 
c. Improving flexibility and accountability of spending units in managing the 
budget.   
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the performance-based budgeting framework at the national and 
at line ministry/agency level. The government work plan (RKP) contains programmes 
and activities of the government and the national outcomes. RKP is implemented by 
line ministries/agencies through their annual work plan (RENJA-KL) and the work 
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plans and budget documents (RKAKL) to produce outcomes at the ministry/agency 
level. The outcomes of line ministries/agencies support the achievement of national 
outcomes  (MoF and MoP, 2009a). 
 
Figure 3.2: Performance-Based Budgeting Framework at the National Level 
 
Source: Derived from MoF and MoP (2009a)   
 
Figure 3.3 describes the performance-based budgeting framework at the national level 
and at the ministry/agency level in more detail. The implementation of performance-
based budgeting at the national level can be described as follows (GoI, 2014, p. 2): 
a. The government determines the objectives of national development, in the 
form of priorities and focus of priorities, in the RKP of a particular budget 
year.  
b. Based on these objectives, the government defines priority activities and/or 
regular activities, based on the roles of each line ministry/agency, performance 
indicators and outputs. The government then calculates the budget needed, 
considering its fiscal capacity. 
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c. Each line ministry/agency (and its spending units) will implement those 
government objectives in the form of the Programmes and Activities that in 
line with the roles of each line ministry/agency. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The Detail of A Performance-Based Budgeting Framework in 
Indonesia 
 
Source: Derived from GoI (2014). 
 
Looking at Figure 3.3, at the ministry/agency level, based on its strategic plan 
(RENSTRA), each Echelon I in each ministry/agency defines a programme, key 
performance indicators of the programme, and outcomes. The programme then will be 
cascaded into activities in line with the organisational level of Echelon II in each 
Echelon I. Each Echelon II defines performance indicators and outputs of its activity.  
Finally, the programmes, activities, all performance indicators, outputs, and outcomes 
are incorporated in the planning and budgeting documents (RENJA-KL, RKAKL and 
DIPA) (GoI, 2014, p. 3). A summary of the budget structures in performance-based 
budgeting can be seen in Figure 3.4.   
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Figure 3.4: Budget Structures in Performance-Based Budgeting 
 
Source: Derived from GoI (2014) 
 
3.8 Performance Measurement and Evaluation (RKAKL Performance Scores) 
according to the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011 
This section discusses the performance measurement and evaluation (RKAKL 
performance scores) that should be used by government officials and practitioners in 
the planning and budgeting process.  
 
Government Regulation 90/2010 stipulates that line ministries/agencies, in preparing 
the work plans and budget documents (RKAKLs), use three instruments: performance 
indicators, cost standards, and performance evaluation. Furthermore, Article 19 of the 
regulation stipulates that each line ministry/agency carries out performance 
measurement and evaluation of past year RKAKL’s execution and current year 
RKAKL’s execution. Line ministries/agencies report the results of measurement and 
evaluation to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning. According to the 
Government Regulation 90/2010, the Minister of Finance regulates this performance 
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measurement and evaluation (GoI, 2010a).  
 
In 2011, responding to the mandate of the Government Regulation 90/2010, the 
Minister of Finance enacted the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011 concerning 
the Performance Measurement and Evaluation of the RKAKL’s execution.  
According to this regulation, the Performance Measurement and Evaluation of the 
RKA-KL’s execution is the process of producing information on the performance 
achievement of the performance targets stated in RKA-KL documents (GoI, 2011).   
 
The regulation instructs each line ministry/agency to conduct performance 
measurement and evaluation of the past and current year’s programmes within the 
ministry/agency. There are two purposes of performance measurement and evaluation 
(GoI, 2011): 
a. Accountability. The evaluation is aimed at giving evidence and accountability 
to the public that budgets are spent in line with the public interest. 
b. Improvement. The evaluation is intended to identify factors that support 
and/or hamper the RKAKLs execution. The results of the evaluation are used 
as inputs in preparing and executing RKAKLs for the following year. 
 
Performance measurement and evaluation consists of three aspects: the 
implementation aspect, the benefit aspect, and the contextual aspect (GoI, 2011). 
Performance measurement and evaluation for the implementation aspect is conducted 
to produce performance information with regard to the execution of activities and the 
achievement of outputs. Four components are measured in this respect: budget 
spending, consistency between planning and execution, outputs achievement, and 
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efficiency. Performance measurement and evaluation for the benefit aspect is 
conducted to produce information about changes in society or stakeholders as 
recipients of outputs achieved by the programmes or activities. The indicators 
measured in this performance evaluation are the achievement of the key performance 
indicators or outcomes. Performance evaluation for the contextual aspect is conducted 
to produce information on whether the inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes are 
relevant to the current situation, including current government policies. Performance 
evaluation of the implementation aspect and the benefit aspect is conducted every 
year. Performance evaluation for the contextual aspect is carried out at least once a 
year or it is carried out as necessary in consideration of the current situation. 
Therefore, the process of performance measurement and performance evaluation is 
conducted only for the implementation aspect and the benefit aspect.  
 
Performance measurement can be defined as a process to produce performance scores 
for every indicator by comparing its achievement with its targets (GoI, 2011).  
Measurement for the implementation aspect is conducted using the formulae 
determined in the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011. For simplicity, this thesis 
uses the term “RKAKL Performance Scores” to refer to the results of performance 
measurement of the work plan and the budget documents of line ministries/agencies 
(RKAKLs). The summary of the formulae, weighted for each component, is provided 
in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Formulae Used in Calculating RKAKL Performance Scores (the 
Implementation Aspect) 
Components measured for 
the implementation aspect 
Formulae Weight (%) 
Budget spending Comparing budget spending with budget 
allocations. 
9.70 
Consistency between 
planning and execution 
Measuring the consistency of budget 
disbursements by comparing the monthly 
budget disbursements with the monthly 
planned budget disbursements. 
18.20 
Outputs achievement Comparing the achievement of outputs with 
the targets. 
43.50 
Efficiency Comparing budget spending per output with 
budget allocation per output.    
28.60 
  100.00 
Source: (GoI, 2011).   
 
The measurement of the achievement of outcomes for the benefit aspect is conducted 
by comparing the achievement of key performance indicators with the targets. The 
total performance scores are calculated using the following weights for each aspect 
(GoI, 2011). The weight for each component is set out in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Formulae Used in Calculating Total RKAKL Performance Scores 
Aspect Weighted 
(%) 
Weighted for the first-two 
years since the enactment of 
the regulation (%) 
The implementation aspect 33.30 100.00 
The benefit aspect 66.70 0.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 
  Source: (GoI, 2011) 
The regulation stipulated that for the first two years since the enactment of the 
Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011, the weight for the benefit aspect is 0%. 
Therefore, in practice, the RKAKL performance scores are only calculated using the 
implementation aspect. The RKAKL performance scores are classified into five 
categories, as can be seen in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Category of RKAKL Performance Scores 
Performance scores Category 
<90% to 100% Very good 
<80% to 90% Good 
<60% to 80% Normal 
<50% to 60% Poor 
To 50% Very Poor 
                                                                          Source: (GoI, 2011) 
 
As mandated by Government Regulation 90/2010, each line ministry/agency should 
carry out performance measurement and evaluation of the execution of RKAKL in the 
past and current year using the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011. The results 
of performance measurement or the RKAKL performance scores should then be used 
by the following actors in the planning and budgeting process (GoI, 2010a): 
• Line ministries/agencies for preparing the work plans and budget documents 
(RKAKLs).  
• The Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance for preparing the 
indicative budget ceilings.     
• The Ministry of Finance for preparing the budget ceilings.   
• The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning to monitor line 
ministries/agencies’ performance achievement. The results of monitoring and 
evaluation could be used as one of the considerations in the implementation of 
reward and punishment in determining budget ceilings of line 
ministries/agencies.  
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3.9 The Four Key Actors in the Planning and Budgeting Process 
The annual planning and budgeting process involves government officials and 
practitioners from four key institutions: the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate 
General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance, line ministries/agencies that receive 
budget allocations, and the Parliament.  This section provides a summary of the roles 
and the functions of each institution in the planning and budgeting process, including 
the complexity of arrangements between offices/directorates in each institution in the 
planning and budgeting process.   
 
3.9.1 The Ministry of Planning 
The Ministry of National Development Planning, or the Ministry of Planning (MOP) 
in short, is headed by a Minister who is also the Head of Bappenas (the National 
Development Planning Agency). The two terminologies, the Ministry of Planning and 
Bappenas, can be used interchangeably. According to the Presidential Regulation 
82/2007, all units and resources in Bappenas also carry out the duties and functions of 
the Ministry of Planning (GoI, 2007a). This study prefers to use the term Ministry of 
Planning (MOP) for this ministry/agency. 
 
The Ministry of Planning is responsible for performing national development 
planning. Specifically, it performs the following functions: 
a. Preparing the national development plan. 
b. Formulating policies in the national development planning area.  
c. Assessing government policies in the national development planning area. 
d. Preparing development programmes to support the state budget (APBN) 
formulation, together with the Ministry of Finance. 
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e. Coordinating, facilitating, and finding sources of financing from domestic and 
overseas and allocating budgets for developments in coordination with other 
ministries. 
f. Facilitating and guiding other government institutions in national development 
planning area. 
  
According to the Minister of Planning Regulation 005/M.PPN/10/2007, the Ministry 
of Planning consists of eleven departments as the Echelon I units: the main 
secretariat, the main inspectorate, and nine offices of deputies. The main secretariat 
and inspectorate manage the internal functions of the ministry. The nine offices of 
deputies are responsible for managing the national development planning as well as 
managing the planning and budgeting process (GoI, 2007b).  
 
In relation to the planning process, the nine offices in the Ministry of Planning can be 
classified into three groups. This study follows the classification used by the Ministry 
of Planning through the Minister of Planning Regulation 008/M.PPN/11/2007 
concerning the Guidance in Preparing the Government Work Plan (RKP): the Office 
of Deputy of Development Funding; the Office of Deputy of Performance Evaluation; 
and seven Offices of Deputy of Sectors/Regionals. The simplified version of the 
organisation chart of the Ministry of Planning can be seen in Figure 3.5 
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Figure 3.5: Organisation Chart of the Ministry of Planning 
 
 
 
The relationship between the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding and other 
Offices of Deputies is important, particularly in preparing the indicative budget 
ceilings for line ministries/agencies. Although the Office of the Deputy of 
Development Funding is responsible for coordinating the preparation of indicative 
budget ceilings with the Ministry of Finance, the preparation of the indicative budget 
ceilings within the Ministry of Planning involves all seven Offices of Deputy of 
Sectors/Regionals that responsible for managing the planning process of line 
ministries/agencies under their authority.  They provide information regarding 
prioritised programmes and activities that are to be funded in each line 
ministry/agency. In addition, the Office of the Deputy of Performance Evaluation 
provides an evaluation of the achievement of prioritised activities in the government 
work plan (RKP) (GoI, 2007c).   
 
 
Minister of Planning/ 
Head of Bappenas 
Seven Offices of Deputies 
of Sectors/Regionals 
(Echelon I) 
Directorates in each 
Offices of Deputies 
(Echelon II) 
Office of Deputy of 
Development Funding 
(Echelon I) 
Directorates 
(Echelon II) 
Offices of Deputy of   
Performance Evaluation 
(Echelon I) 
Directorates 
(Echelon II) 
Secretariat General 
(Echelon I) 
Inspectorate General 
(Echelon I) 
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The process of preparation of the indicative budget ceilings in the Ministry of 
Planning is carried out in internal consultation meetings. The purpose of these internal 
consultation meetings is to improve the quality of planning and budgeting, to clarify 
the distribution of national priorities into activities for every line ministry/agency 
involved, as well as to assess the budget needed for those activities, and to improve 
the transparency of the process of preparing indicative ceilings (GoI, 2007c).   
 
3.9.2 The Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance 
The Directorate General of Budget (DGB) is one of eleven Echelon I units in the 
Ministry of Finance. It has a central role in formulating and implementing policies 
and standards in the budgeting area. In carrying out its mandates in the budgeting 
area, the Directorate General of Budget conducts the following functions: policy 
formulation, policy implementation, standards and procedures preparation, technical 
assistance, and evaluation.  
 
The organisational structure of the Directorate General of Budget consists of eight 
units of Echelon II: the Secretariat of the Directorate-General; the Directorate of State 
Budget (APBN) Preparation; Directorate of Budget I-III, Directorate of Non-Taxes 
Revenue; Directorate of Budgeting System; and Directorate for Harmonisation of 
Budgeting Regulations (GoI, 2010c). A simplified version of the organisation chart of 
the Directorate General of Budget can be seen in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6 Organisation Chart of the Directorate General of Budget 
 
 
In relation to the budget preparation process, the Directorate General of Budget has 
roles in: preparing the State Budget (APBN) and its amendments, allocating a budget 
for line ministries/agencies, optimising the non-tax revenues, determining the 
resource envelope, determining the indicative budget ceilings, determining budget 
ceilings, determining budget allocations, determining budget amendments, and 
preparing budgeting policies (Directorate General of Budget, 2015, p. 4).  
 
In the Directorate General of Budget, there are five directorates that are closely 
related in formulating and determining the indicative budget ceilings, the budget 
ceilings, and the budget allocations. They are the Directorate of the State Budget 
(APBN) Preparation, the Directorate of Budget I, II, and III, and the Directorate of the 
Budgeting System (GoI, 2010c). 
 
The Directorate of the State Budget Preparation has a main function in preparing the 
state budget (APBN) that includes: 
Directorate General of 
Budget 
of the Ministry of Finance 
Directorate of  
Budget I, II, III 
Sub Directorates 
(Echelon III) 
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Budget (APBN) 
Formulation 
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(Echelon III) 
Directorate of 
Budgeting System 
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(Echelon III) 
Two other 
Directorates 
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Secretariate of 
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a. Formulating the macroeconomic assumptions and revenue targets, medium-
term budgeting framework, analysis of the economic situation, as well as  
analysing the realisation of revenue targets. 
b. Formulating, allocating, monitoring, and evaluating both annual and medium-
term expenditures budget for personnel, material, and capital and other 
expenditures. 
c. Projecting, synchronizing, monitoring and evaluating both annual and medium 
term expenditures budget for line ministries, agencies, the education sector 
and other priorities. 
d. Projecting, allocating, monitoring and evaluating both annual and medium-
term plans for interest payments, subsidies, and transfers to local governments.   
e. Projecting, allocating, monitoring and evaluating both annual and medium-
term plans for budget financing and fiscal risks (GoI, 2010c). 
 
The Directorate of the Budgeting System has crucial roles in the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting. It has responsibility for developing and conducting 
policies, standards, and procedures in the budgeting system.  It is responsible for 
publishing the annual cost standards used in the budgeting process. Another important 
function of this directorate is the responsibility for providing guidance for measuring 
performance, and monitoring and evaluating performance achieved. It conducts 
performance analysis and evaluation. This directorate also manages the budgeting 
information system and provides technical assistance in information technology (GoI, 
2010c).   
 
The Directorates of Budget I, II, and III have similar functions between them. The 
only difference is that each Directorate has the responsibility for managing the annual 
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budgeting process for specific line ministries and or agencies. In detail, each 
directorate carries out the following functions:   
a. Preparing materials for allocating and evaluating indicative budget ceilings, 
budget ceilings, budget allocations and additional budgets for line ministries, 
agencies, subsidies, and other units.   
b. Reviewing special cost standards proposed by line ministries/agencies. 
c. Conducting reviews of the RKAKLs and technical assistance for line 
ministries in preparing the RKAKLs.   
d. Consolidating all RKAKLs and coordinating the consolidation process with 
other directorates.   
e. Preparing budget execution documents (SAPSK) and facilitating the revision 
of budget execution documents (DIPA).   
f. Conducting the budget monitoring and evaluation process (GoI, 2010c). 
 
3.9.3 Line Ministries/Agencies 
This section provides a summary of the line ministries/agencies in the Indonesian 
central government that receive budget allocations from the government. Line 
ministries/agencies are established to perform specific duties that are mandated by the 
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 and other laws and regulations (GoI, 2014). Until 
2014, there were eighty-six line ministries/agencies receiving budget 
portions/allocations from the state budget (Directorate of the State Budget 
Preparation, 2014, p. 212). It is not easy to give a full coverage of the types or the 
organisational structures of all line ministries/agencies. However, for simplicity, this 
thesis splits line ministries/agencies into three categories: the state ministries, the non-
ministerial government institutions (LPNK), and the state institutions. 
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The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 stipulates that the President, in managing the 
government, is assisted by state ministers. The state ministers are responsible for 
managing particular government functions or affairs. The formation, amendment or 
dissolution of ministries is regulated by the law (GoI, 2008). According to Law 
39/2008 concerning the State Ministries, each ministry manages particular 
government affairs that are categorised into three types (GoI, 2008):  
a. Government affairs that are directly mentioned in the Indonesian Constitution 
of 1945. These include home affairs, foreign affairs, and defence affairs.  
b. Government functions that are mentioned in the Indonesian Constitution of 
1945. The affairs that fall into this category are religious, law, human rights, 
education, cultural affairs, health, social affairs, manpower, industry, trade, 
mining, energy, civil work, transmigration, transportation, information, 
communication, agriculture, plantations, forestry, farming, maritime, and 
fisheries. 
c. Government affairs for managing, coordinating, and synchronising 
government programmes. These affairs consist of national development, the 
state apparatus, the state secretariat, state-owned enterprises, land, population, 
environment, science, technology, investment, cooperatives, small and 
medium enterprises, tourism, empowerment of women, youth, sports, housing, 
and development of regional or disadvantaged areas 
Those three different types of ministries have different organisation structures. 
According to Law 39/2008, the typical organisation structures for different types of 
ministries can be seen in Table 3.4. According to Law 39/2008, the number of 
ministries that can be formed by the President is limited to thirty four (GoI, 2008).  
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Table 3.4: Organisational Structures of Line Ministries 
Role/Function Type A Type B Type C 
Leader Minister Minister Minister 
Assistant of the leader Secretariat General Secretariat General State Secretariat 
Executor of the main 
functions 
Directorate General Directorate General Office of Deputy 
The controller Inspectorate General Inspectorate General Inspectorate 
Supporting units Centre Centre Not applicable 
Supporting in the 
regions or abroad 
Applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
 
In addition to the ministries, there are non-ministerial government institutions 
(LPNK) or executive agencies, as part of the executive branch of the government. 
Each agency has a functional relationship with a particular ministry. The specific laws 
and regulations stipulate the functional relationship between a ministry and an agency 
(GoI, 2008).  One example of an agency would be the Government Procurement 
Policy Agency (LKPP). This agency is formed by the Presidential Regulation 
106/2007 that has a responsibility to develop government policies in public 
procurement. In conducting its duties, LKPP is coordinated by the Minister of 
Planning (GoI, 2007d). The organisational structure of LKPP is somewhat smaller 
than those of the ministries. It consists of the head of agency, the main secretariat, and 
four offices of deputies with specific roles and duties (GoI, 2007d). 
Another type of institution in Indonesia is the state institutions. According to the 
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 and its amendments, there are seven state institutions 
that include the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), the House of 
Representatives or the Parliament (DPR), the House of Regional Representatives 
(DPD), the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), the Supreme Court (MA), the 
Constitution Court (MK), and the Judicial Court (KY). In managing its roles and 
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duties, each state institution is assisted by executives, such as a secretariat, and/or 
supporting units. For example, BPK is supported by BPK’s executives that consist of 
the Secretariat General, auditing units, supporting units, and others (GoI, 2006).    
Each line ministry or each agency consists of organisational units at Echelon I level 
with names such as the Secretariat General, Directorate General, Inspectorate 
General, and Offices of Deputies. Each Echelon I consists of spending units of 
Echelon II. A spending unit performs activities of programme under its Echelon 1 or 
other government policies (GoI, 2014). In relation to the preparation of the state 
budget’s draft, each line ministry/agency prepares the work plan and budget 
document (RKAKL) based on the expected performance targets (GoI, 2003). In each 
ministry/agency, the planning and budgeting process is coordinated by a 
bureau/division that has responsibility for managing the planning and budgeting 
process.  
 
3.9.4 The Parliament (DPR) 
The Parliament (DPR) has an important role in the budgeting process.  Every year, the 
Parliament discusses the macroeconomic frameworks, fiscal policies, general policies 
and prioritised budgets with the Government (the President) and then the Parliament 
gives an approval (or disapproval) on the draft of the state budget law, as proposed by 
the President (GoI, 2003). In practice, the Budget Committee in the Parliament 
discusses matters related to the state budget with the Government. In the budgeting 
process, the Budget Committee works together with all commissions in the 
Parliament. Each commission has representatives in the Budget Committee 
(Directorate of State Budget Preparation, 2014, pp. 25-30).   
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Each member of the Parliament is a member of a commission. Commissions are the 
main working units in the Parliament and they are responsible for oversight of 
specific government affairs. For example, the Commission III has responsibility for 
oversight of government affairs on laws, human rights, and defense. In the period of 
2009-2014, the Parliament had eleven Commissions (Directorate of State Budget 
Preparation, 2014, pp. 26-27). In the budgeting process, the commissions in the 
Parliament are responsible to (1) discuss the draft state budget with the Government; 
(2) discuss and determine budget allocations of line ministries/agencies; (3) report the 
results of budget meetings with line ministries/agencies to the Budget Committee for 
synchronization (Directorate of State Budget Preparation, 2014, pp. 26-28).  
  
3.10 The Annual Planning and Budgeting Process  
This section discusses the annual planning and budgeting process and key actors 
involved in the process, the three stages of budgetary decisions, and the potential uses 
of performance information in the planning and budgeting process as well as in the 
budgetary decision making.  
 
3.10.1 The Annual Planning and Budgeting Process 
Although the planning process and the budgeting process are inter-connected, may 
overlap, and are not easily described, but for simplicity the these two processes are 
explained here separately and sequentially. The annual planning process can be 
divided into seven steps (GoI, 2010a): 
a. The President issues policy direction and national development priorities.   
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b. Line ministries/agencies evaluate the implementation of their current 
Programmes. Based on the results of Programmes’ evaluation, line 
ministries/agencies may propose new initiatives and a budget estimate to the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
c. The Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance evaluate the current 
Programmes and review new initiative proposals based on national 
development priorities and the feasibility of the proposals. 
d. The Ministry of Planning initiates the draft of government work plan (RKP).    
The Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance issue indicative budget 
ceilings for each line ministry/agency.   
e. The Ministry of Planning coordinates trilateral meetings between the Ministry 
of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and each line ministry/agency. The 
trilateral meetings are conducted separately for each line ministry/agency. The 
purposes of the trilateral meeting are as follows: (a) to improve coordination 
and understanding between the three parties regarding national priorities, 
fiscal and spending policies; (b) to ensure that all policies would be consistent 
among planning and budget documents; and (c) to gather commitments in 
improving the draft of RKP. The meeting discusses the performance targets 
and budget of prioritised Programmes, Activities, and Outputs; the fulfilment 
of the operational budget, new initiative proposals and other administrative 
requirements that should be included in the RENJA-KL of line 
ministry/agency. 
f. Every line ministry/agency prepares its RENJA-KL based on the indicative 
budget ceilings and the results or the agreement from the trilateral meeting. 
Every line ministry submits its RENJA-KL to the Ministry of Planning and the 
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Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Planning finalises the draft of RKP that 
is to be used for a meeting between the government and the Parliament. The 
Ministry of Finance prepares the budget ceilings for line ministries/agencies. 
g. The government and the Parliament conduct a meeting to discuss the final 
draft of RKP and then the President approves it. 
 
The budgeting process starts after the issuance of the government work plan (RKP). 
The steps of the budgeting process are as follows (GoI, 2010a): 
a. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is responsible in issuing the budget ceilings of 
line ministries/agencies.  
b. Line ministries/agencies prepare the annual work plan and budgets (RKAKL) 
based on the budget ceilings, their work plan (RENJA-KL), the government 
work plan (RKP), and the cost standards. 
c. Each line ministry discusses its work plans and budgets (RKAKL) with the 
related commission in the Parliament. 
d. The Ministry of Finance conducts the RKAKL review meetings with the 
Ministry of Planning which are attended by every spending ministry. 
e. The Ministry of Finance compiles all work plans and budgets (RKAKLs), 
prepares the financial note, the draft of state budget and the draft of state 
budget laws to be discussed in the Cabinet meeting.     
f. The Government presents the financial note, the draft of state budget and the 
draft of state budget law to the Parliament. 
g. The Government and the Parliament conducts budget meetings to discuss the 
draft of national budget. The results of the budget meetings between the 
Government and the Parliament may change the total revenues and 
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expenditures of the national budget draft. It may also change the budget 
expenditures of line ministries/agencies. The term used in these changes is 
called “the optimisation of budget ceilings”.  
h. The Ministry of Finance issues the budget allocations for all line 
ministries/agencies. 
i. Each line ministry adjusts its work plans and budgets (RKA-KL) with regard 
to the budget allocations given by the Ministry of Finance. 
j. The President enacts the state budget law and issues a Presidential Decree 
regarding the details of budget allocations for central government. 
 
The summary of the planning and budgeting process, timeline, and products of the 
process are set out in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Central Government Planning and Budgeting Process 
Stage of Planning 
and Budgeting 
Preparation 
Process 
Key Actors 
Involved 
Description of Activities End Product 
Indicative budget 
ceilings-MOP 
(March) 
The Ministry of 
Planning (MOP), 
the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), 
line 
ministry/agency, 
President, Cabinet 
MOF prepares the fiscal capacity, 
resource envelope, and amends MTEF. 
Line ministries propose new 
initiatives. MOP prepares the draft of 
government work plan (RKP) and 
indicative budget ceilings using the 
resource envelope from MOF. 
Indicative Budget 
Ceilings and the 
draft of 
government work 
plan (RKP) 
Trilateral 
Meeting-MOP 
(April) 
MOP, MOF, line 
ministry/agency 
Line ministry prepares the draft of 
annual line ministry’s work plan 
(RENJA) based on indicative budget 
ceilings. Then MOP, MOF, and line 
ministry officials discuss the draft of 
RENJA and its budget. MOP finalises 
RKP. 
Annual line 
ministry’s work 
plan (RENJA). 
Government-
wide work plan 
(RKP) 
Budget Ceilings-
MOF (June) 
MOF on behalf of 
President, and 
Parliament 
The preliminary meeting between the 
government and Parliament to discuss 
RKP. MOF prepares budget ceilings. 
RKP and budget 
ceilings. 
 
The Budget 
Meeting-
Line 
ministry/agency, 
Line ministry prepares Line ministry’s 
work plan and budget (RKAKL) based 
on budget ceilings, discusses it with 
Line ministry’s 
work plan and 
 122 
Stage of Planning 
and Budgeting 
Preparation 
Process 
Key Actors 
Involved 
Description of Activities End Product 
Parliament (July) Parliament the Parliament and submits it to MOF. budget (RKAKL) 
Budget Review 
Meeting-MOF 
(July) 
MOF, MOP, line 
ministry/agency 
MOF and MOP review RKKAL of 
line ministry.   
RKAKLs. 
Budget Meeting-
Parliament 
(August) 
MOF, President, 
Cabinet meeting, 
Parliament. 
MOF prepares financial notes, draft of 
state budget, and draft of state budget 
law; discuss them in cabinet meetings; 
and submits them to the Parliament. 
RKAKL, draft of 
state budget, 
draft of state 
budget Law. 
Budget Meeting-
Parliament 
(October) 
President, MOF on 
behalf of 
government, 
Parliament 
The discussion of draft of state budget, 
and draft of state budget law. 
State budget, and 
state budget law. 
Budget 
Allocations-MOF 
(November) 
MOF on behalf of 
President   
MOF issues the budget allocation of 
line ministries. 
Budget 
allocations,  
Budget Review 
Meeting-MOF 
(November) 
MOF, MOP, line 
ministry/agency 
Line ministry prepares the adjustment 
of RKAKL based on budget 
allocations, discusses it with the 
Parliament and submits it to MOF. 
RKAKL, state 
budget, and 
stated budget 
law.    
Budget execution 
preparation 
(December) 
MOF, line 
ministry/agency 
Line ministry prepares budget 
execution document (DIPA) based on 
RKAKL. Then MOF authorises DIPA. 
DIPA. 
Source: Author’s summary based on Government Regulation 90/2010. 
 
During each stage, line ministries/agencies may also propose additional budgets or 
new initiatives to the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance. Line 
ministries/agencies may also propose additional budgets during the budget meetings 
with the Parliament.   
 
It is worth noting that in reality, the planning and budgeting preparation processes set 
out in Table 3.5 are more complex, iterative, and involves various divisions and 
government officials and practitioners in the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of 
Finance, line ministries/agencies, and the Parliament. This complex process might (or 
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might not) contribute to the implementation of performance-based budgeting, 
particularly the use of performance information in budgetary decision-making.   
 
3.10.2 Three Budgetary Decision Stages 
According to the Government Regulation 90/2010 as summarised in Table 3.5, there 
are three budgetary decision-making stages in the Indonesian central government 
planning and budgeting process, namely: the indicative budget ceilings in March, the 
budget ceilings in June, and the budget allocations in November. Figure 3.7 provides 
a summary of the three budgetary decision stages in the planning and budgeting 
process.  
 
Figure 3.7: Three Budget Decision Stages  
 
 
 
The Ministry of Planning, in co-operation with the Ministry of Planning, is 
responsible for formulating indicative budget ceilings for all the line ministries. The 
Ministry of Finance prepares the fiscal capacity to determine the indicative budget 
ceilings. The Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance issue the indicative 
Indicative 
Budget Ceilings 
(March)  
• The Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) are 
responsible for determining indicative 
budget ceilings.  
Budget Ceilings 
(June)  
• The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is 
responsible for determining it. The 
Parliament involves in this process. 
Budget 
Allocations 
(Nov)  
• MOF is responsible for 
allocating it, after the state 
budget law is agreed by the 
Parliament.   
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budget ceilings for each line ministry/agency and considering the results of evaluation 
on current Programmes and Activities, new initiatives, baseline adjustments, and 
fiscal capacity. The Minister of Planning and the Minister of Finance sign the circular 
letter concerning the indicative budget ceilings (GoI, 2014).  
  
The budget ceilings and the budget allocations are solely the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Finance. In formulating budget ceilings, the Ministry of Finance considers 
fiscal capacity, the indicative budget ceilings, the work plans of line 
ministries/agencies (RENJA-KL), and new initiatives. The Ministry of Finance also 
considers the results of performance evaluation (RKAKL performance scores of line 
ministries/agencies). The Ministry of Finance issues the budget allocations after the 
Parliament and the Government agree on the state budget draft proposed by the 
Government. The Budget allocations cover the adjustment of work plans and budgets 
(RKAKL) of line ministries/agencies and new initiatives.  
 
3.11 The Potential Uses of Performance Information   
The discussion in the previous sections has showed that there are potential uses of 
performance information by government officials and practitioners in the Ministry of 
Planning, the Ministry of Finance, line ministries/agencies, and the Parliament in the 
planning and budgeting process. From the discussions in the previous sections, Table 
3.6 identifies the potential uses of performance information by each actor/institution 
in a particular activity.  
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Table 3.6: The Potential Uses of Performance Information by Government 
Officials and Practitioners 
Activity The Potential Uses of Performance Information by 
Government Officials and Practitioners 
The 
Ministry of 
Planning 
The 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Line 
Ministries/ 
Agencies 
The 
Parliament 
Preparing the Indicative 
Budget Ceilings 
Yes Yes   
Trilateral Meetings Yes Yes Yes  
RKAKL Review Meetings Yes Yes Yes  
Budget Meetings with the 
Parliament 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Preparing the Budget 
Ceilings 
  Yes   
Preparing the Budget 
Allocations 
 Yes   
Monitoring and Evaluation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Preparing budget proposals 
(the work plans and budgets 
documents/RKAKL) 
  Yes  
Allocating budgets within 
the ministries/agencies 
  Yes  
Using performance 
information for managerial 
purposes. 
  Yes   
 
Looking at Table 3.6, the results of the examination of these potential uses of 
performance information by government officials and practitioners will be presented 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
3.12 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the evolution of performance-based budgeting 
implementation in Indonesia. It has presented important laws and regulations that 
affect the implementation of performance-based budgeting and the features of the 
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Indonesian performance-based budgeting including the introduction of RKAKL 
performance scores. The chapter has also discussed the roles of the Ministry of 
Planning, the Directorate General of Budget, line ministries/agencies, and the 
Parliament in the planning and budgeting process. Three budgetary decision stages in 
the planning and budgeting process have also been presented. The chapter concludes 
with the identification of the potential uses of performance information in the 
planning and budgeting process examined in this research. The following chapter 
outlines the research design and methods adopted for this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127 
Chapter 4 - Research Design And Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has set out institutional details of the budget reform in 
Indonesia, including steps taken towards implementing performance-based budgeting 
in the planning and budgeting process. It also discussed the potential use of 
performance information in the planning and budgeting process by the Ministry of 
Planning, the Ministry of Finance, line ministries/agencies, and the Parliament. Later 
chapters will set out the results of fieldwork study and a statistical analysis examining 
the extent of the use of performance information in Indonesia. The study includes 
exploring the use of performance information by different government practitioners 
involved in the budgeting process and investigating the challenges encountered by 
government practitioners in implementing performance-based budgeting. 
 
In this chapter an overview of the research design adopted in the thesis is provided. It 
describes the sampling strategies and the research methods used, data collection 
processes and data analysis. It begins with a discussion of the issues relevant to 
conducting research on performance-based budgeting. 
 
4.2 Methods of Performance-Based Budgeting Research 
 
A range of methods has been used by previous researchers in studying performance-
based budgeting practice. Based on a systematic review of 61 articles on 
performance-based budgeting between 2002 and 2011, Lu, Mohr, and Ho (2015, p. 
439) examined the methodologies used in literature to analyse the practice and impact 
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of performance-based budgeting. Studies often included more than one method. For 
example, a case study based on interviews or surveys might also contain descriptive 
and multivariate statistical analysis (Lu, Mohr, and Ho, 2015, p. 439). The most 
frequently used method was descriptive statistics (44.3%), then case studies and 
interviews (36.1%), surveys (26.2%), and multivariate statistics (23.0%) (Lu, Mohr, 
and Ho, 2015, p. 439).  
 
Statistical analysis is still not a dominant methodology. One of the barriers to 
statistical analysis is the lack of availability of appropriate data (Lu, Mohr, and Ho, 
2015, p. 441). While performance information has become more transparent and 
publicly available, how performance information is actually used and how the usage 
differs by agencies, programme nature, and leadership structure are still puzzles (Lu, 
Mohr, and Ho, 2015, p. 441). Until there is a more systematic release of programme 
performance and budget data and the process characteristics of budgetary decision-
making, attempts to conduct any large-scale quantitative analysis of performance-
based budgeting practice and impact will remain a challenge. Research in 
performance-based budgeting still needs well-designed qualitative studies to provide 
in-depth insights into how performance information is used in the budgetary process 
(Lu, Mohr, and Ho, 2015, p. 441). 
 
Robinson and Brumby (2005, pp. 43-45) found that the empirical literature on 
government-wide performance budgeting was limited in its methodology. Opinion 
surveys have been the primary research tool. They found that because of 
methodological and data availability problems, there was little use of the actual 
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expenditure data for assessing the impact of performance budgeting on budget 
allocations.    
 
(Lu, Mohr, and Ho, 2015, p. 447) suggested that in future research it would 
appropriate to use different types of methods contingent upon the availability of data 
and on context, and there is a need for the collection of both qualitative and 
quantitative data.  
 
 
4.3 The Choice of a Case Study Design 
 
Social research needs a research design before data collection or data analysis can 
begin (de Vaus, 2001, p. 9). The research design gives a framework for the collection 
and analysis of data (Bryman, 2012, p. 46). Further, de Vaus (2001, p. 9) explains that 
‘the function of research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to 
answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible.’  
 
There are variations on research designs. Bryman (2012, p. 50) classified research 
designs into five different types: experimental design, cross-sectional design, 
longitudinal design, case study design, and comparative design (Bryman, 2012, p. 50). 
Other authors such as de Vaus (2001, pp. 48-51) divide research designs into four 
broad types: experimental design, longitudinal design, cross-sectional design, and 
case studies. While McNabb (2002, p. 81) argues that researchers in the social and 
administrative sciences are no longer required to follow a single design for their 
researches, this particular research employs a case study design to investigate the 
implementation of performance based budgeting in Indonesia with particular attention 
 130 
to the use of performance information in the planning and budgeting process. This is 
in line with the definition of a case study. According to Yin (2003, p. 13), a case study 
is ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon with its real life 
context especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are 
not clearly evident’. Furthermore, Bryman (2012, p. 66) argues that the basic case 
study involves the detailed analysis and intensive analysis of a single case. Although 
the most common use of the term ‘case’ links the case study with a location, such as 
an organisation or a community (Bryman, 2012, p. 67), Yin (2003, pp. 22-23) argues 
that a case can be an individual, individuals, or some event or entity. According to de 
Vaus (2001, p. 220) a case is the object of the study and the unit of analysis that 
researchers seek to understand as a whole. Furthermore, Yin (2003, p. 23) also argues 
that case studies have been carried out about decisions, programmes, implementation 
processes, and organisational change. Therefore, this research selected the case study 
design because it intentionally seeks to investigate the recent status of the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia. In particular, this 
research involves the detailed and intensive analysis of the use of performance 
information by government practitioners in the planning and budgeting process in the 
context of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia. The challenges encountered in 
implementing performance-based budgeting are also investigated.  
 
After selecting the implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia   as 
the case, or the object of the study, as a whole, it was necessary for this research to 
identify various components within that case. According to de Vaus (2001, p. 220), it 
is important to distinguish between cases as a whole and cases that involve various 
levels or components. Furthermore, de Vaus (2001, p. 221) argues that a well-
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designed case study needs to collect information from many levels or components to 
gain more understanding of the whole case. The implementation of performance 
based budgeting in Indonesia involves various components or government 
institutions. This research identified that the implementation of performance based 
budgeting in Indonesia involves government officials or practitioners from four key 
government institutions: the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate General of Budget 
in the Ministry of Finance, line ministries/agencies, and the Parliament. As de Vaus 
(2001, p. 221) suggests that different data collection methods may be necessary for 
different components, this research also employed different research instruments or 
methods of data collection.  
  
4.4 Rationale for Selection of the Research Methods 
The research method can be seen as distinct from the research design. The research 
design is the logical structure of the study, while the research method is associated 
with data collection (de Vaus, 2001, p. 9). A research method is simply a technique 
for collecting data and it is associated with all different types of research design 
(Bryman, 2012, pp. 45-46). Each design type can use any data collection method, 
such as questionnaire, interview, observation, and documentary analysis (de Vaus 
2001, pp. 9-10).  
 
This case study research employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods of data collection in answering the research questions. According to Bryman 
(2012, p. 68), case studies are frequently employed in both quantitative and 
qualitative research. In the case study approach, researchers can use a variety of types 
of data (quantitative or qualitative) and a combination of research methods 
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(interviews, questionnaires) as part of the study (Denscombe, 2014, p. 56). In 
addition, any of the data collection methods can be used in a case study, provided that 
it is practical and ethical (de Vaus, 2001, p. 231).  
 
Table 4.1 summarises the relationship between the research questions, methods of 
data collection, and data analyses employed for this research. Research questions 
number 1 and 2 are answered by three different methods of data collection and 
analysis. Research questions number 3 and 4 are answered by two different methods 
of data collection and analysis.   
 
Table 4.1: The Relationship Between Research Questions, Methods of Data 
Collection, and Data Analysis Used in this Research  
 
Research Questions  Methods of Data Collection Data Analysis 
RQ1: Is there evidence that 
performance results/scores 
are used in determining 
budget allocations? 
 
RQ2: Is there evidence that 
incremental budgeting 
practices still exist in the 
planning and budgeting 
process? 
Interviews with government 
officials or practitioners 
 
Thematic Analysis  
Collecting RKAKL performance 
scores and budget data  
Statistical Analysis 
 
A Self-Completion 
Questionnaire to government 
practitioners 
 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
RQ3: How, in practice, do 
government practitioners 
use performance 
information in the planning 
and budgeting process?   
 
RQ4: What challenges have 
government practitioners 
encountered in seeking to 
implement performance-
based budgeting?   
 
Interviews with government 
practitioners 
 
 
 
Thematic Analysis 
 
 
A Self-Completion 
Questionnaire to government 
practitioners 
 
 
Descriptive 
Statistics  
 
From Table 4.1, it can be seen that the research uses a combination of quantitative 
methods and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. According to 
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Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, p. 6), this research is defined as a mixed method 
research as it involves both collecting and analysing quantitative and qualitative data. 
The rationales for why this research employs the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods are for reasons of offset, completeness, and triangulation. 
 
Offset implies that both quantitative and qualitative methods have their own strengths 
and weaknesses so that combining them allows the researcher to offset their 
weaknesses and draw on the strengths of both methods (Bryman, 2006, p. 106). 
Mixed methods research offers strengths that offset the weaknesses of both 
quantitative and qualitative research (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007, p. 9). The data 
collection methods used for this study were a self-completion questionnaire and a 
semi-structured interview. There are several strengths and weaknesses in using these 
two methods. Compared with the interview, Bryman (2012, pp. 233-234) argues that 
the self-completion questionnaire has several strengths. It can be cheaper and quicker 
to administer, avoids interviewer effects and interviewer variability, and is convenient 
for respondents. However, Bryman (2012, pp. 234-235) also states that the 
weaknesses of a self-completion questionnaire are that the interviewers cannot help 
respondents if they have difficulty in answering the questions; the interviewers cannot 
ask further or additional questions. In addition, the researchers do not know who 
answers, it can be the targeted respondents, their subordinates, their family members, 
or their friends. It is also difficult to ask a lot of questions in self-completion 
questionnaires, there is a greater risk of missing data and there are usually lower 
response rates.   
 
 134 
In addition, one major advantage of the interview is its adaptability. In contrast to 
questionnaire responses that have to be accepted when they are returned, an interview 
response can be developed and clarified during the interview process (Bell, 2005, p.  
157). Interviews can also produce rich materials to be explored (Bell, 2005, p.  157). 
However, interviews also have weaknesses. Interviews are time-consuming and are 
highly subjective because there is a possibility of bias when a researcher analyses the 
responses or when interviewees respond to the questions (Bell, 2005, p. 158).  
 
Another reason for using both quantitative and qualitative methods for this research is 
to provide completeness. The use of more than one method can improve the findings 
by giving a richer and more complete picture of the subject that is being investigated 
(Denscombe, 2014, p. 147). Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, p. 9) also argue that 
mixed methods research provides more complete evidence for examining a research 
problem than a single method.  Mixed methods research also assists in answering 
research questions that cannot be answered by qualitative or quantitative methods 
alone (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007, p. 9).  For this particular research, the use of 
both methods can produce a more comprehensive evidence and understanding 
regarding the use of performance information in the planning and budgeting process. 
The research can provide evidence not only about the extent of use of performance 
information in funding decisions but also the extent of use of performance 
information for other uses, such as in budget meetings and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Another reason for using both quantitative and qualitative methods is for 
triangulation. Triangulation is a process whereby the results of an examination using 
one method are validated against the results gained by using another method 
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(Bryman, 2012, p. 635). In this research, the results of statistical analysis of 
performance and budget data and the questionnaire are validated against the results of 
interviews.  
4.5 Sampling Strategies  
The research has involved interviewing and surveying a large sample of Indonesian 
central government officials or practitioners with different ranks and roles in the 
planning and budgeting process.  
 
The study used a two-stage sampling procedure to select participants to be 
interviewed. Firstly, it selected ten government institutions/ministries/agencies to be 
involved in the interviews. Purposive sampling as suggested by, for example, Bryman 
(2012, p. 418), was used in the design of sampling, ensuring that those sampled were 
relevant to the research questions. Ten government institutions/ministries/agencies 
purposely sampled from 86 government institutions/ministries/agencies in Indonesian 
central government. Secondly, the study selected government officials/practitioners to 
be interviewed from these 10 government institutions/ministries/agencies.  
 
After selecting the ten line ministries/agencies to be involved in the interviews, a self-
completion questionnaire was distributed to the remaining 79 ministries/agencies that 
were not involved in the interviews.  
 
4.5.1 Selecting the Ten Government Institutions Included in the Interviews  
Together with members of the Parliament (DPR), the main actors of the planning and 
budgeting process in the Indonesian executive branches are government officials or 
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practitioners in the Ministry of Planning, in the Directorate General of Budget in the 
Ministry of Finance, and in line ministries/agencies.  
 
The study aimed to examine ten government institutions/ministries/agencies. The 
Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget were selected because 
they have a role as the central planning and budgeting authorities that are responsible 
for the initiation of the planning and budgeting process. The Parliament (DPR) was 
selected because it is also involved in this process. The other seven line 
ministries/agencies were selected from the remaining eighty-three line 
ministries/agencies that received budget allocations in 2013. The sample accounted 
for just above 8% of the total number of line ministries/agencies.   
 
Four general criteria were used in selecting the seven ministries/agencies with the aim 
of providing a representative sample of line ministries/agencies: the size of 
organisation, the performance scores of line ministries/agencies for the fiscal year 
2012, the involvement of a ministry/agency in the piloting stage of performance-
based budgeting in 2010, and the involvement of a ministry/agency in the initial 
bureaucratic reform programme in 2007. It is worth noting that a ministry/agency 
selected for this study does not necessarily have all these four characteristics.  
 
The rationales for using these four criteria in selecting the seven line 
ministries/agencies are as follows.  
(1) The budget size of organisation. The budget size of an organisation in general 
could describe its size, number of staff that work there, and the complexity of 
its work, including in implementing performance-based budgeting. The budget 
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size of ministries/agencies is compared to others using budget allocations in 
2013. This research selected ministries/agencies that have large, medium, and 
small budgets. 
(2) RKAKL Performance scores of the ministry/agency in 2012. Performance 
scores could describe the performance of a ministry/agency. The scores used 
were the total scores for each ministry/agency. This research selected 
ministries/agencies that span possible good, fair, or poor performance scores.  
(3) This research selected line ministries/agencies that both joined and those that 
did not join the piloting of the implementation of performance-based 
budgeting in 2010. There were six ministries/agencies that joined this pilot 
project: the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Education and Culture, 
the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, and 
the Ministry of Agriculture.  
(4) This research selected line ministries/agencies that both took part and those 
that did not take part in the early bureaucratic reform programme in 2007. 
There were three ministries/agencies taking part in the programme: the Audit 
Board of Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance, and the Supreme Court. 
 
Using the above four criteria, this research selected seven line ministries/agencies to 
be included in the interview process. These seven ministries/agencies are the Ministry 
of Public Works (MPW), the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC), the Ministry 
of Forestry (MOFO), the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK), the Government Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP), and the 
Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (MABR). Table 4.2 provides a 
summary of all seven selected ministries/agencies and their corresponding criteria.  
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Table 4.2: Line Ministries/Agencies Selected For Interviews 
No. 
  
Criteria 
 
Ministry/Agency*  
MPW MEC MOFO BPK KPK LKPP MABR 
1 Budget Size in 
2013  
Large ✔ ✔ ✔     
Medium    ✔ ✔   
Small      ✔ ✔ 
2. RKAKL 
Performance 
scores in 2012 
Good    ✔ ✔ ✔  
Fair ✔      ✔ 
Poor  ✔ ✔     
3. Involved in the 
piloting of 
performance 
based budgeting 
in 2010 
Yes ✔ ✔      
No   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
4. Included in the 
initial of 
bureaucratic 
reform 
programme in 
2007 
Yes    ✔    
No ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 *Note: MPW: the Ministry of Public Works; MEC: The Ministry of Education and Culture; 
MOFO: the Ministry of Forestry; BPK: the Audit Board of Indonesia; KPK: the Corruption 
Eradication Commission; LKPP: the Government Procurement Policy Agency; MABR: the 
Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. 
 
 
Table 4.3 provides further explanation of how each of these seven line 
ministries/agencies corresponded to the criteria used. 
 
Table 4.3: The Explanation of the Selected Line Ministry/Agency and Its 
Corresponding Criteria 
 
No. Line Ministry/Agency Corresponding Criteria 
1 The Ministry of Public 
Works (MPW) 
1. Ranked number 2 out of 86 ministries/agencies in term of 
budget size. It has budget amount of Rp77.9 trillion (13% of 
all ministries budget) in 2013.  
2. Performance score of 2012: 77.10 (Fair)   
3. Listed among six ministries/agencies that included in the 
performance budgeting piloting in 2010.   
2 The Ministry of Education 
and Culture (MEC) 
1. Ranked number 3 out of 86 ministries/agencies in term of 
budget size. It has budget amount of Rp73 trillion (12% of all 
ministries budget) in 2013. 
2. Performance score of 2012: 58.89 (Poor)   
3. Listed among six ministries/agencies that included in the 
performance budgeting piloting in 2010.   
4. It did not take part in the initial bureaucratic reform 
programme in 2007.  
3 The Ministry of Forestry 
(MOFO) 
1. Ranked number 15 out of 86 ministries/agencies in term of 
budget size. It has budget amount of Rp6.7 trillion (1.1% of 
all ministries budget) in 2013. 
2. Performance score of 2012: 42.22 (Very Poor) 
3. It did not join the piloting of performance budgeting.    
4. It did not take part in the initial bureaucratic reform 
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No. Line Ministry/Agency Corresponding Criteria 
programme in 2007. 
4 The Audit Board of 
Indonesia (BPK) 
1. Ranked number 28 out of 86 ministries/agencies in term of 
budget size. It has budget amount of Rp2.9 trillion (0.48% of 
all ministries budget) in 2013. 
2. Performance score of 2012: 96.27 (Very good) 
3. It did not join the piloting of performance budgeting.    
4. One of three ministries that took part in the initial 
bureaucratic reform programme in 2007. 
5 The Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) 
1. Ranked number 53 out of 86 ministries/agencies in term of 
budget size. It has budget amount of Rp706 billion (0.11% of 
all ministries budget) in 2013. 
2. Performance score of 2012: 97.03 (Very good) 
3. It did not join the piloting of performance budgeting.  
4. It did not take part in the initial bureaucratic reform 
programme in 2007. 
6 The Government 
Procurement Policy Agency 
(LKPP) 
1. Ranked number 73 out of 86 ministries/agencies in term of 
budget size. It has budget amount of Rp211 billion (0.036% 
of all ministries budget) in 2013. 
2. Performance score of 2012: 141.67 (Very good) 
3. It did not join the piloting of performance budgeting.   
4. It did not take part in the initial bureaucratic reform 
programme in 2007. 
7 The Ministry of State 
Apparatus and Bureaucratic 
Reform (MSA) 
1. Ranked number 74 out of 86 ministries/agencies in term of 
budget size. It has budget amount of Rp201 billion (0.033% 
of all ministries budget) in 2013. 
2. Performance score of 2012: 71.61 (Fair) 
3. It did not join the piloting of performance budgeting.  
4. It did not take part in the initial bureaucratic reform 
programme in 2007. 
 
4.5.2 Selecting Interview Participants  
After selecting ten institutions to be included in the research, the next step was to 
select government officials or practitioners to be interviewed from those institutions. 
In order to explore the use of performance information and the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting in the planning and budgeting process as 
comprehensively as possible, the research aimed to select government officials or 
practitioners from a range of departments/bureaus/directorates within those 
institutions that represent the role of their institutions in the planning and budgeting 
process.  
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Table 4.4 provides the list of departments/bureaus/directorates from each 
ministry/agency/institution selected for this research. In the Ministry of Planning, 
there were two Offices of the Deputy and five Directorates involved in the study 
including the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding. As discussed earlier in 
Chapter 3, the office of the Deputy of Development Funding is the key office that has 
responsibility for managing the whole planning process. Five selected-directorates 
represent directorates that manage the planning process for a particular sector or 
ministry/agency. The Office of the Deputy of Monitoring, Evaluation, and Controlling 
was also selected because it has the responsibility to conduct monitoring and 
evaluation. From the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance, all 
five Directorates within that office were selected in the study. All these directorates 
have different roles in the budgeting process. From each of the seven 
ministries/agencies, government practitioners selected came from a 
department/bureau/directorate that manages the planning and budgeting process 
within their ministry/agency. Finally, the study also aimed to obtain views from the 
Members of Parliament regarding the use of performance information and the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting. 
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Table 4.4: Selecting Interviews Participants 
Ministry/Agency/Institution Department/Bureau/Directorate 
The Ministry of Planning (MOP) § The Office of the Deputy of Development 
Funding 
§ The Directorate of Religion, Culture, Youth, and 
Sport (The Directorate of Religion in short) 
§ The Directorate of State Apparatus 
§ The Directorate of Transportation 
§ The Directorate of Water and Irrigation 
§ The Directorate of Forestry 
§ The Office of the Deputy of Monitoring, 
Evaluation, and Controlling  
The Directorate General of 
Budget in the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) 
§ The Directorate of Budget I 
§ The Directorate of Budget II 
§ The Directorate of Budget III 
§ The Directorate of Budgeting System 
§ The Directorate of State Budget Formulation 
The Ministry of Public Works 
(MPW) 
§ The Planning Bureau in the Secretariat General 
§ The Directorate of Programme in two 
Directorate Generals 
The Ministry of Education and 
Culture (MEC) 
§ The Planning Bureau in the Secretariat General 
§ The Directorate General of Basic Education 
The Ministry of Forestry (MOFO) § The Planning Bureau in the Secretariat General 
§ The Directorate General of Forest Protection and 
Nature Conservation  
The Audit Board of Indonesia 
(BPK) 
§ The Directorate of Planning and Performance 
Management 
§ The Finance Bureau 
The Ministry of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform 
(MABR) 
§ The Planning and Performance Management 
Bureau 
§ The Office of the Deputy of Bureaucratic 
Reform, Accountability, and Monitoring 
The Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) 
§ The Planning and Finance Bureau 
The Government Procurement 
Policy Agency (LKPP) 
§ The Bureau of Planning and Organisation 
The Parliament (DPR) § Members of the Commission XI 
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4.6 Data Collection Procedures 
Data collection aims to gather data from the sample relevant to answering the research 
questions (Bryman, 2012, p. 14). This study employed three different data collection 
procedures: collecting performance scores and budget data; conducting interviews; 
and distributing the questionnaire. Performance scores and budget data were collected 
earlier in the research; the interview process and the questionnaire distributions were 
conducted concurrently.  
 
Research that involves data collection methods such as questionnaires and interviews 
from or about people generally requires ethical approval (Denscombe, 2014, p. 307). 
The ethical review form of the research was submitted and reviewed by the 
Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee of the University of 
Birmingham before the fieldwork commenced. The research was granted ethical 
approval on 27 September 2013 with reference number ERN_13-1022. All relevant 
requirements complied with and aligned to the University’s Code of Practice for 
Research. 
 
4.6.1 Collecting Performance Scores and Budget Data 
Performance scores and budget data were used in statistical analyses for answering 
the first two research questions. Firstly, performance scores and budget data were 
used in examining the relationship between performance scores and budget 
allocations.  Secondly, budget data were used in examining the extent of incremental 
budgeting in Indonesia. This research used budget data for the fiscal year 2011-2014 
and performance scores data for 2011-2013. 
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Performance scores and budget data were collected from the Directorate General of 
Budget in the Ministry of Finance. Due to data availability, the collection of these 
data from that office was conducted in two stages. A first letter requesting data was 
sent to the Directorate of Budgeting System in the Directorate General of Budget on 
10th June 2013. A second letter was sent to the Directorate General of Budget on 13th 
November 2013 concurrently with the request to conduct interviews with government 
officials from the Directorate General of Budget.  
 
The research used budget data from various sources because one source of data could 
not provide all data required. For example, the circular letter of the Minister of 
National Planning Number 0181/M.PPN/04/2010 and the circular letter of the 
Minister of Finance Number SE-120/MK/2010 regarding the indicative budget 
ceilings of the fiscal year 2011 only provided budget data at the ministry level. 
Therefore, the data at Programme level needed to be gathered from another source. In 
this case, the indicative budget ceilings data at Programmes level for the fiscal year 
2011 were taken from the Ministry of Finance Circular Letter Number SE-
294/MK.02/2010 regarding the budget ceilings of fiscal year 2011. Appendix I 
provides the list of sources of budgetary and performance scores data gathered from 
the Directorate General of Budget.   
 
The research used budget data from various sources, so further analysis showed that 
several elements of budget data were not necessarily fully matched with other data. 
For example, for one ministry, there was a possibility that the sum of the budget at the 
ministerial level was different from the sum of the budget at the programme level. 
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4.6.2 Conducting Interviews 
The researcher sent a request letter to each head of ministry/agency to assign 
officials/practitioners that have responsibility in the planning and budgeting process 
to be interviewed for this research. With the aim of getting access to government 
officials/practitioners to be interviewed from each selected-ministry/agency, the letter 
was sent to each ministry/agency on 13th November 2013. The letter was 
supplemented by a summary of the project, the reasons why the ministry/agency were 
selected for the study, the list of targeted departments/directorates/bureaus in the 
ministry/agency, and the project information sheet for interview candidates.  
 
In practice, not all heads of ministry/agency replied to the letter and hence did not 
assign officials to be interviewed. The researcher tracked which department, bureau or 
division within each ministry/agency had received the request letter regarding this 
research from their superior. As Bryman (2012, p. 151) argues, gaining access for 
research is a matter of negotiation and is usually controlled by several layers of 
gatekeepers relevant to the research. Although these several ministries/agencies had 
not replied to the request letter, they had actually decided to be involved in the 
research and each head of ministry/agency internally had instructed their subordinate 
to follow up the request.   
 
After getting access for interviews, most interviewees were approached by phone or 
the researcher had to visit the office of ministries/agencies to make arrangements for 
the interviews with the assigned officials/practitioners. Again, this arrangement 
required a constant process of negotiation and renegotiation to get agreement on 
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which government officials or government practitioners could be interviewed and 
when the interviews could be performed.  
 
Different arrangements were made to get access to Members of Parliament. The 
researcher used his personal contacts to reach them. The Members of Parliament were 
busy in their campaign for the general election of 2014, therefore the researcher only 
managed to persuade two Members of Parliament to be interviewed.  
 
Table 4.5 provides profiles of the interviewees from each institution/line 
ministry/agency. In total there were 53 participants: 49 males and 4 females. From the 
nine ministries/agencies, most of the interviews’ participants held senior positions in 
their ministries/agencies. Nine participants (18%) were at the upper-management 
level (echelon I and II), nineteen participants (37%) were at the middle-management 
level (echelon III), and twenty-three participants (45%) were at the lower-
management level (echelon IV or similar levels).   
 
Table 4.5: Profiles of the Interviewees  
No Institution/Line Ministry/Agency 
Interviewee Profile Number of 
Interviewees Sex Echelon 
M F I II III IV 
1. The Ministry of Planning (MOP) 8 2 1 1 7 1 10 
2. The Directorate General of Budget in the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
15 0 0 1 0 14 15 
3. The Ministry of Public Works (MPW) 5 0 0 0 1 4 5 
4. The Ministry of Education and Culture 
(MEC) 
4 0 0 2 2 0 4 
5. The Ministry of Forestry  (MOFO) 4 0 0 1 3 0 4 
6. The Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) 4 2 0 1 3 2 6 
7. The Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK) 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
8. The Government Procurement Policy 
Agency (LKPP) 
2 0 0 1 1 0 2 
9. The Ministry of State Apparatus and 
Bureaucratic Reform (MSA) 
4 0 0 1 1 2 4 
10. Members of the Parliament (DPR) 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
 Total 49 4 1 8 19 23 53 
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The interviewees from the Ministry of Planning came from seven different offices of 
deputies or directorates. The government officials to be interviewed from the 
Directorate General of Budget were from five different directorates. Interviewees 
from ministries/agencies came from a department/bureau/directorate within the 
ministry/agency responsible for managing the planning and budgeting process. Table 
4.6 provides the distribution of the interviewees for each line ministry/agency. 
 
Table 4.6: The Distribution of the Interviewees 
Line Ministry/Agency/ 
Institution 
Department/Bureau/Directorate Number of 
Interviewees 
The Ministry of Planning  § The Office of the Deputy of Development 
Funding 
§ The Directorate of Religion, Culture, Youth, 
and Sport (or the Directorate of Religion in 
short) 
§ The Directorate of State Apparatus 
§ The Directorate of Transportation 
§ The Directorate of Water and Irrigation 
§ The Directorate of Forestry 
§ The Office of the Deputy of Monitoring, 
Evaluation, and Controlling  
2 
 
2 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
The Directorate General 
of Budget 
§ The Directorate of Budget I 
§ The Directorate of Budget II 
§ The Directorate of Budget III 
§ The Directorate of Budgeting System 
§ The Directorate of State Budget Formulation 
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
The Ministry of Public 
Works 
§ The Planning Bureau in the Secretariat 
General 
§ The Directorate of Programme in two 
Directorate Generals 
2 
 
3 
The Ministry of 
Education and Culture 
§ The Planning Bureau in the Secretariat 
General 
§ The Directorate General of Basic Education 
3 
 
1 
The Ministry of Forestry § The Planning Bureau in the Secretariat 
General 
§ The Directorate General of Forest Protection 
and Nature Conservation  
3 
 
1 
The Audit Board of 
Indonesia 
§ The Directorate of Planning and 
Performance Management 
§ The Finance Bureau 
4 
 
2 
The Ministry of 
Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform 
§ The Planning and Performance Management 
Bureau 
§ The Office of the Deputy of Bureaucratic 
Reform, Accountability, and Monitoring 
3 
 
1 
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Line Ministry/Agency/ 
Institution 
Department/Bureau/Directorate Number of 
Interviewees 
The Corruption 
Eradication Commission 
§ The Planning and Finance Bureau 1 
The Government 
Procurement Policy 
Agency 
§ The Bureau of Planning and Organisation 2 
The Parliament  § Members of the Commission XI 2 
 
A semi-structured one-to-one interview was conducted with each selected participant 
in Jakarta, Indonesia between 6th January and 30th April 2014. Most interviews were 
performed at the office of each interviewee. One interview with a government official 
from the Ministry of Planning was conducted at a hotel after that official attended a 
meeting there. One interview with a Member of Parliament was conducted by phone 
because he was very busy at that time. Another interview with another Member of 
Parliament was performed at his house outside office hours.  
 
The researcher interviewed the participants based on a list of questions that covered 
five main themes: general questions about the profile of the interviewee; the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia; the use of performance 
information in determining budget allocations; the use of performance information in 
the budgeting process; and a question on what challenges were encountered by 
government officials/practitioners in implementing performance-based budgeting. 
The questions were open-ended, which allowed the participants to express their 
experiences, opinions, and feelings about the implementation of performance based 
budgeting and the use of performance information. Follow-up questions were 
improvised during the interviews.  
 
Before each interview commenced, the researcher provided the interviewee with the 
participant information sheet and explained to each interviewee about the researcher, 
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the purposes of the research, and why the interviewee had been invited to take part in 
the research. The interviewee was given an opportunity to ask any questions about the 
research and was asked to sign a consent form. The researcher requested permission 
from the interviewee to tape-record the entire interview and the interviewee was given 
opportunity to stop the interview at any time.   
  
All interviews were tape-recorded. On average, each interview took approximately 50 
minutes. The shortest interview took 23 minutes and the longest one took 120 
minutes. All interviews were then transcribed for analysis.  
 
In reporting the research outcomes, pseudonyms were used to protect the privacy of 
all government officials and practitioners. Code numbers for the interviews were used 
for cross checking to what the researcher had done. For instance “Interview 6” refers 
to the sixth respondent that was interviewed. The researcher has the full record of the 
interview. 
 
4.6.3 Distributing the Questionnaire 
A self-completion questionnaire was sent to all line ministries/agencies that receive 
annual budget allocations from the government, with the aim of revealing the range of 
uses of performance information in the budgeting process. An exception was made for 
the seven ministries/agencies that were visited for interviews. In total, the survey was 
sent to 79 out of 86 ministries/agencies.  
 
It was requested that the survey should be filled in by the Head of the Planning 
Bureau or a senior manager with a similar position that has responsibility for 
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managing the planning and budgeting process in her/his ministry. He or she acted as 
the representative of his/her ministry/agency. The survey asked for the official’s view 
and experience of the ministry in using performance information for the budgeting 
process and managerial activities. Performance information, as defined in this survey, 
covers performance indicators/targets as stated in the planning and budget documents 
and performance scores/results based on the Minister of Finance Regulation 
249/2011. 
 
With regard to the research questions and the objectives of the research, the questions 
in the survey were categorised into five themes: 
(1) the use of performance information by government officials/practitioners from 
the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance and the Parliament in 
determining budgets. 
(2) the use of performance information by government officials/practitioners from 
the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance and the Parliament in the 
planning and budgeting process. 
(3) the use of performance information by government practitioners from line 
ministries/agencies in the planning and budgeting process. 
(4) the use of performance information by government practitioners from line 
ministries/agencies beyond the budgeting process in their ministries/agencies.    
(5) the implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia. This 
includes the exploration of factors affecting the use of performance 
information and challenges encountered by government practitioners from line 
ministries/agencies in using performance information. 
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In each category, the respondents were also encouraged to answer an open-ended 
question. The open-ended questions were designed with the aim of obtaining different 
insights from respondents that were not covered by the closed questions.   
 
According to Denscombe (2014, p. 170), from both ethical and practical 
considerations, the researcher needs to provide some background information about 
the research and the questionnaire such as the purpose of the research, voluntary 
responses, confidentiality, and return address and date. In the questionnaire, the 
researcher provided the background and the purpose of the questionnaire on the front 
page. The questionnaire also clearly stated that the participation of the respondents 
was voluntary. In addition, the researcher kindly asked respondents to answer the 
statements in the questionnaire honestly and stated that their responses will be 
valuable for the research. The researcher also declared that all information collected 
from the questionnaire would only be used for the research. All personal information 
regarding the respondents would also be treated as confidential.   
 
The survey was sent on 6th January 2014 to 79 Head of Secretariats/ Secretary 
Generals of line ministries/agencies. The researcher asked the ministries/agencies to 
fill in and return the answered-survey within six weeks. The success of a research 
questionnaire depends on three things: response rate, completion rate, and validity of 
responses (Denscombe, 2014, p. 167). With the aim of increasing the response rate of 
the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to send their responses using one of 
three methods: by postal address to the researcher using the stamped-addressed 
envelope provided; or scanning and sending by email to the researcher’s email 
address; or by requesting the researcher to collect directly from their offices. The 
researcher rented a PO Box to be used as a postal address for receiving responses 
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from the respondents. The researcher also provided his telephone number so that he 
could be contacted by respondents. It was expected that the responses would be 
received no later than 14th February 2014. 
 
By the 14th February deadline, however, the researcher had only received 17 
responses (21.5%). Under the circumstances, the researcher decided to send a second 
letter to remind those ministries/agencies that had not sent their responses. The second 
letter and the survey were sent on 14th February 2014 to the remaining 
ministries/agencies that had not responded to the first letter. The deadline for 
responding to the survey was extended for another five weeks, until 21st March 2014.  
 
The researcher also made several phone calls to several ministries/agencies reminding 
them about the survey in order to increase the response rate. This process took about 
two weeks, between 17th and 28th February 2014. Telephone reminders were time 
intensive, the researcher had to contact several people before reaching the person in 
charge of handling the questionnaire. In the process, the researcher accepted the 
completed answered surveys from line ministries/agencies, despite the deadline 
having passed.  
 
By 8th April 2014, the researcher had received 60 responses in total from 53 
ministries/agencies. The discrepancy results from the fact that there were seven 
ministries/agencies that sent two responses. These responses are treated the same as 
others because the persons who completed the survey were different. In total, the 
response rate for the survey was almost 76%. The percentage of ministries/agencies 
that responded to the survey was 67%. 
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Initially, the aim of the research was to have survey responses filled in by the Head of 
the Planning Bureau or the person who has a similar role and position (echelon II) in 
each line ministry/agency. However, analysis of the responses shows that the rank of 
respondents was generally lower than expected, varying from echelon II, III, IV, staff 
and others.  The profiles of the respondents can be seen in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Profiles of the Survey’s Respondents 
 
 
Although the rank of the respondent who filled in the survey was lower than was 
expected, further examination revealed that the respondents all come from Planning 
Bureaus or similar divisions responsible for managing the budgeting process within 
their ministries/agencies. Most respondents also have fairly lengthy working 
experience in the budgeting process. Figure 4.2 shows the length of experience of the 
respondents in managing the budgeting process in their ministries/agencies. 
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Figure 4.2: Length of Experience of the Respondents 
 
 
The Figure shows that the majority of respondents (80%) have two or more years 
working experience in managing the budget process for their ministries/agencies. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the government practitioners who filled in the 
survey have a good level of knowledge, competency and experience in the planning 
and budgeting process for the period 2011 to 2014. 
 
4.7 Data Analysis 
The process of data analysis covers data preparation, initial exploration of the data, 
analysis of the data, presentation and display of the data and validation of the data  
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007, p. 129).  The data gathered from the fieldwork were 
analysed separately using qualitative methods of analysis for the interview data. 
Quantitative data analysis was used to examine the effect of performance scores on 
the percentage change in budget allocations year-on-year both at the ministry level 
and at the programme level. The study therefore examines the Pearson correlation 
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coefficient betwee between the performance scores of the previous years and budget 
allocations of the following years. In the simple bivariate methods used this 
correlation coefficient is equal to the linear regression coefficient between the two 
variables when they are both standardized. Because the size of the non-standardised 
regression coefficient is not of interest per se, as the units of measurement are not of 
great interest, we conduct the analysis in terms of the correlation coefficient. In our 
statistical work we test the null hypothesis that the true correlation coefficient is equal 
to zero against a null hypothesis that it is not equal to zero.  The study examines the 
correlation between the two variables, performance scores and changes in budget 
allocations. The models rely on budget data at the ministry and programme level for 
the period of 2011-2014 and performance scores data for the period of 2011-2013.  
We can note that the statistical analysis is quite simple in that multiple regression 
analysis is not used. This raises the possibility that our results could be affected by 
omitted variable bias, and further research might pursue further refinement using 
multivariate analysis. Nevertheless we believe the results of this simple analysis, 
presented in the next chapter are of interest. 
 
We also use the budget data are also used to seek evidence on whether incremental 
budgeting practice still exists in the budgeting process. The statistical analyses are 
discussed further in Chapter 5.  
 
For the qualitative data from the interviews, all interviews were transcribed and then 
analysed using thematic analysis. According to Bryman (2012, p. 717), thematic 
analysis is defined as “a term used in connection with the analysis of qualitative data 
to refer to the extraction of key themes in one’s data. It is a rather diffuse approach 
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with few generally agreed principles for defining core themes in data”. As argued by 
Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 82), a theme that counts in research is a theme that 
captures something important about the data relevant to the research question, and 
represents some level of patterned response within the data set. Therefore, the 
importance of a theme is not necessarily dependent on quantifiable measures. The 
judgement of the researcher is vital in determining what a theme is (Braun and Clarke, 
2006, p. 82). The steps of thematic analysis are: reading and re-reading the data to get 
initial ideas, coding interesting features of the data, collating codes into potential 
themes, gathering all data relevant to each theme, defining and naming themes, and 
producing the report (Braun and Clarke, 2006, pp. 86-93). Depending on the relevant 
research questions, the results of the analysis are reported in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
 
The questionnaire responses were analysed using descriptive statistics and are 
presented based on four themes in the following chapters.  
1. The results of the questionnaire that relate to the direct use of performance 
information by budget officials in the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate 
General of Budget and Parliament in determining budgets are presented in 
Chapter 5. 
2. The results of the questionnaire that relate to the use of performance 
information by budget officials in the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate 
General of Budget and Parliament in the planning and budgeting process are 
presented in Chapter 6. 
3. The results of the survey that relate to the use of performance information by 
government practitioners from line ministries/agencies in the planning and 
budgeting process are presented in Chapter 6. 
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4. The results of the survey that relate to the use of performance information by 
government practitioners from line ministries/agencies beyond the budgeting 
process within their ministries/agencies are presented in Chapter 6.  
5. The results of the survey that relate to the challenge encountered by 
government practitioners from line ministries/agencies in implementing 
performance-based budgeting in Indonesia are presented in Chapter 7.  
 
4.8 Reflexivity in the Research Process 
 
An important aspect to be considered in this research concerns the role of the 
researcher as an insider. Robson (2002) defines an ‘insider’ as “a researcher who 
conducts a study that is directly concerned with the setting in which they work.” The 
researcher is an employee of the Indonesian Government and he previously managed 
the planning and budgeting process in his office. Therefore the researcher is rather 
familiar with the planning and budgeting process in the Indonesian central 
government. This is one of the advantages as an insider. As Griffiths (1985, p. 211) 
argues that insiders have a better initial understanding of the setting because they 
know the context.  
 
Another advantage of being an insider is that the researcher already knew several 
government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate General of 
Budget, and the Audit Board of Indonesia involved in the study. However, the 
researcher has tried to keep his distance from the participants and explained to those 
participants that the study is not related to the status of the researcher as an employee 
of the Government and his previous role. As Kanuha (2000, p. 442) argues, the most 
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critical aspect of the insider role is the need to distance himself from the project and 
the participants.  
 
In addition, although Mercer (2007, p. 6) argues that access is more easily granted to 
the insider researcher, this was not the case with this study. The researcher had to 
follow the normal procedure to get performance and budget data, to meet participants, 
and to distribute the questionnaire. It was rather difficult and time consuming to get 
performance and budget data from the Directorate General of Budget. Arranging the 
schedule of the interviews with government practitioners also took considerable time 
and energy in negotiating with layers of gatekeepers. The researcher also could not 
recruit several participants who had been targeted for the research, such as officials 
from the Directorate Budget I, II, and III in higher positions.  
4.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the research design and methods employed in this research. 
It has explained and justified the choice of a case study design in investigating 
performance-based budgeting in Indonesia. The chapter has also discussed the 
adoption of both quantitative and qualitative research methods relevant in answering 
the research questions of the research. The two-stage sampling procedure used in 
selecting the ten institutions/ministries/agencies and participants of the study has also 
been presented. The procedures of collecting performance scores and budget data, 
conducting interviews with government practitioners, and distributing the 
questionnaire to the respondents from line ministries/agencies have been reported. 
The chapter then discussed the analysis used in managing and interpreting the data. 
The simple bivariate models used in the quantitative statistical analysis have been 
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explained and their possible limitations discussed. In addition, the chapter has 
reflected on the key challenges encountered by the fieldwork.  
 
In the next three chapters we turn to considering the findings from the research. 
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Chapter 5 – Factors Affecting Budget Allocations, the Use of 
Performance Scores for Determining Budget Allocations, 
and the Extent of Incremental Budgeting Practices 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the findings that relate to research questions number one and two. 
Research Question Number One asks: ‘Is there evidence that performance 
results/scores are used in determining budget allocations?’ while Research Question 
Number Two asks, ‘Is there evidence that incremental budgeting practices still exist 
in the planning and budgeting process?’ To answer these two questions, this research 
applies two approaches. In the first approach, the research collects evidence from 
interviews with government officials from the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate 
General Budget in the Ministry of Finance, and government practitioners from line 
ministries/agencies to identify what factors, including performance information might 
be used by government officials from these two Ministries in the budgeting decisions 
as well as to identify whether the existence of incremental budgeting is a feature of 
the planning and budgeting process. In addition, the research also collects evidence 
from the research survey of government practitioners from line ministries/agencies.  
 
In the second approach, the research uses statistical analysis to further examine the 
relationship between performance scores and budget allocations and uses statistical 
analysis to further examine the question of whether incremental budgeting still exists 
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in practice. This second statistical approach allows a degree of triangulation with the 
interview study presented in the first part of the chapter. 
 
 The chapter begins with a discussion of the importance of the “indicative budget 
ceilings” stage of budgeting compared to the other two budgetary decision stages, 
namely: the “budget ceilings” and the “budget allocations”. Then, the discussion 
continues by exploring the use of performance information by government officials 
from the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry 
of Finance in preparing the indicative budget ceilings. The third section of the chapter 
discusses factors affecting budget allocations. The discussion continues by presenting 
the results of statistical analysis of the relationship between performance scores and 
budget allocations and the extent of incremental budgeting practice.  
 
5.2 The Importance of the Indicative Budget Ceilings Stage 
As discussed in Chapter 3, according to the Government Regulation 90/2010, there 
are three budgetary decision-making stages in the Indonesian central government 
planning and budgeting process, namely: the indicative budget ceilings in March, the 
budget ceilings in June, and the budget allocations in November. The Ministry of 
Planning, in co-operation with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), is responsible for the 
formulation of the indicative budget ceilings for all line ministries. Government 
Regulation 90/2010 and the annual Minister of Finance decrees, concerning the 
preparation of line ministries’ work plan and budget (RKAKL) (for example the 
Minister of Finance decree 94/2013), stipulate that the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance should consider various factors, including performance, in 
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formulating the indicative budget ceilings, the budget ceilings, and the budget 
allocations.  
 
Although the budget allocations are the ultimate budgets allocated for line 
ministries/agencies, the process in setting the budget allocations is in general not 
independent from the previous budget allocation stages, namely the indicative budget 
ceilings and the budget ceilings. In other words, the previous stages of the budgeting 
process may have important roles in determining the budget allocations. Here we seek 
to identify which are the more decisive budget stages in the budgeting process. To do 
this, we analyse the opinions on this question of government officials from the 
Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of 
Planning.    
 
The interview responses of government officials from the Directorate General of 
Budget in the Ministry of Finance were varied but most interviewees suggested that 
the first stage of budgeting, namely the indicative budget ceilings, is the most 
important funding decision. A number of reasons were advanced for this.  Seven out 
of nine budget officials thought that the indicative budget ceiling is crucial in 
determining the final funding for line ministries/agencies. In addition, three budget 
officials believed that the changes of budget amount from the indicative budget 
ceiling to the next stages are not significant. Changes made are usually to include new 
policies, fiscal policy revision, or new initiative proposals into the funding decision. 
The officials also talked about the influence of the Parliament on the changes of the 
indicative budget ceilings. They made comments:   
[The budget changes] from the indicative budget ceiling to next budgets are not 
significant. The change usually occurred because the changes of fiscal policy 
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from the Parliament. As long as there is a fiscal space, we can only add the 
budget to line ministries/agencies. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget 
II, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 32) 
 
Yes. Its [the indicative budget ceiling] name is only “indicative”, but it is very 
crucial because it will affect how much the budget allocation for a 
ministry/agency will be. In the budget ceilings stage, there are possibilities to 
increase budget in order to cover new initiatives proposed by line 
ministries/agencies or directions of the President, but these increases would not 
much. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget II, the Directorate General 
Budget, Interview 28) 
  
Deciding the indicative budget ceiling is crucial because our decision in the 
indicative budget ceiling will affect the next stages of budget process. 
Adjustments of the indicative budget ceiling may occur in the next budget 
stages if there are new policies such as the policy to increase salary of civil 
servants, budget increases from the government, or budget optimisation which 
is decided by the Parliament. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget II, 
the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 26) 
  
One budget official considered the indicative budget ceiling is the most important 
resource allocation arguing that any mistakes in calculating the indicative budget 
would be difficult to correct in the next stages of resource allocation. Here is his 
comment: 
I think the indicative budget is the most important one…the mistakes [of 
calculation] in the indicative budget ceiling will be carried forward to the 
budget allocation. For example, if we miscalculated the budget for salaries, it 
will be difficult to be corrected in the next budget stages. (Head of Section at 
the Directorate of Budget III, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 29) 
  
Two interviewees from the Directorate General of Budget discussed the important 
roles of deciding the indicative budget ceiling. One of them, Director of the 
Directorate of Budgeting System, pointed out that those are in the Directorate General 
of Budget should play their roles as budget analysts using a scientific approach in 
deciding the indicative budget. Another official argued that the indicative budget 
ceiling could inform the public about how the government has set its priorities and 
targets. 
The indicative budget is crucial…because it gives a signal to the 
economy…about the fiscal policy of a country in spending…in preparing the 
 163 
indicative budget ceilings, we should have set priorities and targets that we want 
to achieve with that money. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budgeting 
System, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 34) 
 
He further commented that at the budget ceilings stage, generally there were only 
small changes in policies, such as the increase of salaries for civil servants, and the 
budget increases determined by the Parliament.   
 
Another budget official also agreed that the indicative budget ceiling has a crucial 
position and he gave the following reason: 
In my opinion, the crucial [point] is the indicative budget ceiling. It means that 
if the budget allocated in the indicative budget ceiling is still the same until the 
budget allocation stage [the final stage], we do not need to review the RKAKLs. 
(Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget I, the Directorate General of 
Budget, Interview 31) 
 
In contrast, two budget officials have different opinions. One official argued that the 
budget allocation stage is the most important one with a reason that it has included all 
budgets that have been allocated for line ministries/agencies.    
Actually, the budget allocation stage is the most important one. Because it has 
covered all budget adjustments. An unexpected additional budget sometime 
occurred in this stage. The Parliament might increase the budget to a particular 
ministry/agency although they did not need it. (Head of Section at the 
Directorate of Budget I, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 25) 
  
The other differing official argued that the budget ceiling is the most vital budget 
decision because it has incorporated agreements between the government and the 
Parliament. He commented as follows: 
The budget ceiling is the most important because after the issuance of budget 
ceilings, we in the Ministry of Finance examine and review the work plan and 
budget document of line ministries (RKAKL). This budget has also 
accommodated agreements reached between the government and the 
Parliament. The indicative budget ceiling is a pure government policy but in the 
process of deciding the budget ceilings, the government had communicated with 
the Parliament. In term of aggregate budget, it seems that for the strategic 
ministries such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education, there 
are major differences between the indicative budget ceiling and the budget 
ceiling. However, the difference between these two budgets for small 
 164 
ministries/agencies is minimal. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget II, 
the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 27) 
 
Three officials of the Ministry of Planning, asked the same question, supported the 
opinions of most interviewees from the Directorate General of Budget. They also 
believed that the indicative budget ceiling is the most vital budget decision. They 
made comments as follows: 
The first one [indicative budget] determines most of budget… actually there is 
not much difference between the indicative budget ceilings and the budget 
ceilings. The tricky one is if there is [budget] optimisation in the budget 
allocations stage. In the budget meeting with the Parliament, we mostly depend 
on the agreement between each line ministry/agency and the Parliament. We 
cannot really control the behaviour of line ministries/agencies in the budget 
meetings with the Parliament even though there are agreements in cabinet 
meetings before they meet the Parliament. (Head of the Office of the Deputy of 
Development Funding, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 39)  
 
The process of deciding the indicative budget ceiling is a purely technocratic 
process… It is important and there is relatively no intervention [political 
intervention from the Parliament]. (Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate 
of Water and Irrigation, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 46)  
 
The budget ceiling is roughly the same as the indicative budget ceiling. The 
differences may happen because of the change of macro assumption such as the 
exchange rate and other policies for example the salary increase and other 
operational budget. Furthermore, the change from the indicative budget ceiling 
or the budget ceiling to the budget allocation comes 100% from Parliament’s 
intervention, but usually this [the percentage of change from previous budgets] 
is not much. (Head of Sub Directorate at the Office of the Deputy of 
Development Funding, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 52)  
 
From the interviews, there is a strong conclusion that the most important budget 
decision made by the government is the indicative budget ceilings. The interviews 
suggested that the budget change between the indicative budget ceilings and the 
budget ceilings is minimal. Adjustments of the indicative budget ceilings may occur 
in the next budget stages, such as new initiatives proposed by line ministries/agencies, 
new directions from the President, the policy to increase salary of civil servants, the 
agreement between line ministries/agencies and the Parliament, and/or budget 
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optimisation requested by the Parliament. The interviewees also did not comment on 
the effect of performance information or RKAKL performance scores on all budget 
decision stages. In the indicative budget ceiling stage, the influence of the Parliament 
is limited or non-existent. Their influence on the budget decision would only exist in 
the later budget stages: the budget ceilings and the budget allocations stage.  
 
We conclude from this discussion of budgets that we need to place most attention on 
the indicative budget ceilings decision in the statistical analysis of the influence of 
performance scores on budget allocations and the extent of incremental budgeting,  
 
5.3 The Use of Performance Information in Preparing the Indicative Budget 
Ceilings 
In the previous section, the results of interviews suggested that the most important 
budget decision made by the government is the indicative budget ceilings. This 
section examines the use of performance information by government practitioners 
from both the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget within the 
Ministry of Finance in preparing the indicative budget ceilings. 
 
The Use of Performance Information in Preparing the Indicative Budget Ceilings by 
Government Practitioners in the Ministry of Planning 
 
The researcher asked government practitioners from the various directorates within 
the Ministry of Planning about the use of performance information. It was found that 
the preparation of the indicative budget ceilings began some twelve months before the 
start of a budget year (the budget year starts at 1st January). Each directorate from 
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seven offices of deputies in the Ministry of Planning (referred to as  ‘sector’ 
directorates’) has responsibility for managing the preparation of the indicative budget 
ceiling for one or more line ministries or agencies. Each year, officials from these 
directorates hold discussions with the practitioners from the line ministries/agencies 
under their responsibility.  
 
An official from the Directorate of State Apparatus explained that a year before the 
budget begins, his directorate invites officials from line ministries/agencies to discuss 
their needs. He also explained that he asked the officials from the line 
ministries/agencies to present their line ministries/agencies’ achievements and to 
present what activities they have been executing in the current budget year. Another 
practitioner from the Directorate of Forestry has a similar comment.  
In the beginning of the year, like this time [the interview was conducted on 13 
January 2014], we always talk to line ministries asking, “Which programmes do 
you have for next year?” We conduct bilateral meetings with them. We review 
whether the [current] programmes have achieved their targets or not. (Head of 
the Directorate of Forestry, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 7) 
 
Officials from the Ministry of Planning sought to obtain performance information 
from line ministries/agencies for preparing the indicative budget ceilings. 
 
From the interviews, it was established that the Ministry of Planning was responsible 
for preparing the annual government work plan (RKP) as well as the indicative budget 
ceilings. Thus, the process of preparing the indicative budget ceilings is part of 
preparing the RKP. Government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning evaluated 
performance information of line ministries/agencies by considering past achievements 
and forecasting the current year’s achievement.  
In preparing the draft of the annual government work plan (RKP), we evaluated 
the implementation of the previous year’s activities. In the evaluation we 
determined past achievements, the budget allocations, the forecast of the current 
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year’s achievement, and forward budget estimates for the next budget year. 
(Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of Religion, Culture, Youth and 
Support, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 43) 
 
An official from the Directorate of Forestry provided an example of how he used 
performance information, as the result of evaluating performance, to determine 
budget needs of a line ministry. 
In the process of preparing the government annual work plan (RKP), we 
communicated with the line ministry. We evaluated its performance. For 
example if we saw that its performance in the previous budget year didn’t 
achieve what was expected, we would propose a budget increase for the 
following budget year. The results of evaluation would bring consequences to 
the budget. Then we submitted the budget proposals to the Office of the Deputy 
of Development Funding. (Head of the Directorate of Forestry, the Ministry of 
Planning, Interview 7) 
 
 
Two officials from the Directorate of Transportation and the Directorate of Water and 
Irrigation explained how they examined the performance achievement of a line 
ministry. They compared its performance targets specified in the five-year national 
development plan (RPJMN) and its performance report (LAKIP report).  In addition, 
one of them also explained that he encouraged a line ministry to determine the unit 
cost of each activity as part of calculating its budget needs.  
For the purpose of preparing the indicative budget ceilings, we knew the 
performance targets of the line ministry in the RPJMN, we also knew the 
achievement of its performance from the LAKIP. We then evaluated the 
remaining targets that should be achieved to calculate budget needs. We 
encouraged line ministries to forecast budget needs by determining unit costs 
for planning purposes. The process was continuous and tireless. (Head of Sub 
Directorate at the Directorate of Water and Irrigation, the Ministry of Planning, 
Interview 46) 
 
 
It is worth noting that sometimes government practitioners from the Ministry of 
Planning obtained performance information during quarterly meetings with 
practitioners from line ministries/agencies, even though these meetings were not 
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particularly aimed at preparing the indicative budget ceilings. The officials might use 
this kind of information to determine the budget needs of a line ministry.  
We had also communicated indirectly with line ministries/agencies in quarterly 
meetings. For example in discussing the implementation progress, they talked 
about what (targets or activities) they want to propose for the following budget 
year. (Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of Religion, Culture, Youth 
and Support, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 43) 
 
The interviews also revealed that, as well as the past achievement and performance 
targets, officials from the Ministry of Planning also considered the medium term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) in calculating a budget for a line ministry/agency. 
This is the five-year budget forecast for every line ministry/agency that has been 
established in the national five-year plan (RPJMN) document. For example, in the 
RPJMN 2010-2014, a line ministry forecasted its annual budget need from 2010 to 
2014. In addition, officials considered new policies and priorities in assessing budget 
needs for line ministries/agencies. The interviews also revealed that the officials from 
directorates that have a close relationship with the line ministries/agencies under their 
responsibility have no authority in determining the final amount of the indicative 
budget ceilings. They were only responsible for preparing budget proposals. 
In preparing the indicative budget ceilings, we were guided by the MTEF [the 
Medium Expenditure Framework] to indicate the budget needs (of a line 
ministry). Then we reviewed the achievements of programmes, we compared 
them with the annual performance targets. We also took into account new 
policies, the level of priority of every policy to exercise budget needs. We were 
responsible for exercising budget needs or making budget proposals, but we 
didn’t determine the [final] indicative budget ceiling. (Head of Sub Directorate 
at the Directorate of State Apparatus, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 19) 
 
 
It was found that all directorates that have a role in the planning and budgeting 
process in the Ministry of Planning (referred to as  ‘sectors’ directorates’) must 
submit their indicative budget ceilings proposals or calculation to the Office of the 
Deputy of Development Funding in the Ministry of Planning. During this process, 
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there was a bilateral meeting between each directorate and the Office of the Deputy of 
Development Funding. This office then compiled calculations of the indicative budget 
ceilings from all sectors. One practitioner from the Directorate of Water and Irrigation 
explained that in determining budgets, this office must review all national priorities 
for the particular budget year. 
The Office of the Deputy of Development Funding reviewed all national 
priorities for the particular budget year. We then received the feedback or the 
draft of the indicative budget ceilings of line ministries under our responsibility.  
We could give comments on the feedback from the Office of the Deputy of 
Development Funding based on data we have, such as performance targets and 
performance results (Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of Water and 
Irrigation, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 46). 
 
  
One official from the Directorate of Religion Culture, Youth, and Sport suggested that 
in preparing the indicative budget ceiling, the Office of the Deputy of Development 
Funding conducted an evaluation of proposals from all directorates in the Ministry of 
Planning using its own method of calculation. Asked whether this office used 
performance information to determine budgets, an official from the Directorate of 
Water and Irrigation commented: “We used the results of performance evaluation in 
preparing the indicative budget ceilings, but I didn’t know about them in detail” 
(Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of Water and Irrigation, Interview 46). 
 
The interviews also revealed that, during the process of preparing the indicative 
budget ceilings, there were communications between the Office of the Deputy of 
Development of Funding and the Directorate General of Budget within the Ministry 
of Finance. The sector directorates were not involved in these communications.  In the 
end, most interviewees noted that the budgets needed by line ministries/agencies had 
never been fulfilled by the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance. 
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Our proposal of the indicative budget ceilings was submitted to the Deputy of 
the Development Funding. There were discussions between them and us but in 
the end they have the final decision. Usually it was lower than our proposal. 
(Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of Transportation, the Ministry of 
Planning, Interview 20) 
 
In my opinion, the budgets that were needed to meet performance targets in the 
RPJMN have never been fulfilled from the resource envelope. According to my 
communication with one of the officials from the Office of the Deputy of 
Development Funding, they said that the total budget available (the resource 
envelope) is always smaller than total budget needs.  (Head of Sub Directorate 
at the Directorate of Water and Irrigation, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 
46) 
 
 
An official from the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding explained that the 
main factor they considered in determining the indicative budget was the government 
work plan (RKP). The indicative budget ceilings were determined with the aim of 
achieving the goals or priorities of the government set out in its work plan. However, 
the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding has to consider how much money 
they have (the resource envelope), calculated by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and 
all budget rigidities. The Ministry of Finance sets out the resource envelope based on 
the fiscal policies of the government. The official commented, ‘Our responsibility is 
to balance all government priorities and indicative budget proposals, the process is 
iterative’ (Head of the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding, Interview 39). 
He also acknowledged that using performance information in determining the budget 
is “a very difficult task”. He argued that the Ministry of Planning has implemented it 
gradually, by monitoring the achievement of performance targets that can be used for 
budgetary decision-making. However, he clearly stated that the use of performance 
information for determining the budget is unstructured. He further commented that his 
office did not use the RKAKL performance scores based on the Minister of Finance 
regulation 249/2011 because the results of evaluation are only based on financial 
information. 
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Asked whether the Office of the Deputy of the Development of Funding considered 
the calculations or proposals of the indicative budget ceilings from sector directorates, 
an official from the office explained that the Office of the Deputy of Development 
Funding did not use their proposals because he believed that the proposals were not 
reliable.     
We received proposals of an indicative budget from other Directorates/Deputies, 
but we didn’t use them because the proposals sometimes directly came from the 
line ministries. Sometimes Deputies review the proposals but they still adopt with 
same number [budget amount] as proposed by line ministries. (Head of Sub 
Directorate, the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding, the Ministry of 
Planning, Interview 52) 
 
In conclusion, although other directorates claimed that they had used performance 
information in formulating indicative budget proposals, the Office of the Deputy of 
Development Funding did not use the results of evaluation in finalising the indicative 
budget.    
If we accepted all proposals, our money [the resource envelope] would not be 
enough. The first approach we used was to secure the goals to be achieved by the 
government, what priorities we wanted to achieve. If there is enough money then 
we will see the request from line ministries. (Head of Sub Directorate, the Office 
of the Deputy of Development Funding, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 52) 
 
One reason for the lack of use of performance information is that the Ministry of 
Planning does not have a good system to gather all necessary information. With 
regard to budget rigidities, an official from the Office of the Deputy of Development 
Funding in the Ministry of Planning noted that there were budget rigidities or budget 
constraints such as the requirement that the fulfilment budget for salary and 
allowances of civil servants, operational budgets (general and overhead expenditures), 
and mandatory expenditures, must be prioritised before determining the budget for 
other activities. Furthermore, another official of the Office of the Deputy of 
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Development Funding emphasised that there are no recognised formulae for 
determining the budget: 
The formula we use in allocating budgets is non-existent. It happens in every 
country in the world, even in China. However, we share the same principles in 
allocating budgets such as distribution, political interests, the growth rate or 
others. However, the main focus is political interest. We do not have a certain 
formulation to take into account all factors; our focus is to achieve the goals or 
targets set out by the government. (Head of Sub Directorate, the Office of the 
Deputy of Development Funding, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 52) 
 
 
The Use of Performance Information in Preparing the Indicative Budget Ceilings by 
Government Practitioners in the Directorate General of Budget 
 
The research also asked government practitioners from the Directorate General of 
Budget (DGB) within the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to reveal the range of 
performance information used by them. Government practitioners from the various 
directorates within the Directorate General of Budget were asked about the way in 
which indicative budget ceilings were prepared.  
 
The interviews indicated that budget officials used various methods to prepare 
indicative budget ceilings. One official from the Directorate Budget III within the 
Directorate General of Budget explained that every year the Directorate General of 
Budget decides a norm to be used in preparing the indicative budget ceilings. He 
explained how he prepared the most recent budget. 
Usually, [in preparing the indicative budget ceilings] we used data from 
previous budget years. Now if we are preparing the indicative budget ceilings 
for 2015, then we use budget data of 2014 to prepare it. Our role is to adjust the 
budget data of 2014 according to rules/norms agreed within the Directorate 
General of Budget. For example, that is what we have to do with personnel 
expenditures. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget III, the Directorate 
General of Budget, Interview 29) 
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A practitioner from the Directorate of Budget II explained that he reviewed the 
baseline budget in preparing the indicative budget ceilings. He then commented that 
practices in reviewing the baseline were diverse. Every output in the budget proposal 
documents of line ministries/agencies (RKAKLs) was reviewed to identify which 
activities were recurrent and still need a budget, and which activities had been 
concluded and no longer needed a budget.  
 
Another Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget I stated that his office was 
requested to make calculations and scenarios for indicative budget ceilings. However, 
that was only required for the operational budget, which includes personnel 
expenditures and operational expenditures. They did not make scenarios for the non-
operational budget. He further said that, in making the scenarios, he started with the 
previous years’ budget spending of line ministries/agencies.  His colleague from the 
same directorate also explained that in preparing the indicative budget ceilings, he 
only focused on determining the operational budget, including such things as 
personnel expenditures, because the Ministry of Planning is responsible for 
determining the non-operational expenditures. However, he mentioned that the top 
management within the Directorate General of Budget required its staff to have a 
greater understanding of the non-operational budgets. Another official from the 
Directorate of Budget III noted that there were internal discussions to finalise the 
budgets before the indicative budget ceilings were approved by the Minister of 
Finance and the Minister of Planning.   
 
When asked whether they used performance information in preparing the indicative 
budget ceilings, one official from the Directorate of Budget III explained that they 
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used the previous years’ budget spending data, not the realisation of outputs.  Another 
practitioner made a similar comment about the limitation of performance information 
use in preparing indicative budget ceilings. 
 
In practice any information in RKAKLs [work plan and budget documents of 
line ministries/agencies] is rarely used to determine the budget except any 
recent issues that were informed by line ministries/agencies such as when they 
planned to build a new office, then we allocated the budget for that. (Head of 
Section at the Directorate of Budget I, the Directorate General of Budget, 
Interview 24) 
 
This interviewee made an interesting comment on how the Directorate General of 
Budget determining the budgets. 
We determine the budgets the old-fashioned way, using the same percentage. I 
agree that we should differentiate budget allocations for ministries/agencies that 
could spend 90% of their previous year’s budget with ministries/agencies that 
could only spend 70% of their previous year’s budget. [But] to be honest, for 
2014, they all were given the same percentage. (Head of Section at the 
Directorate of Budget I, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 24) 
 
The practitioner also commented that the role of budget officials within the 
Directorate General of Budget in determining budget allocation was not effective 
because they relied heavily on the resource envelope or the funds available. When 
asked whether line ministries/agencies were actively involved in the process of 
determining indicative budget ceilings, he explained that they were not. However, for 
urgent matters he definitely contacted them. For example, regarding the calculation of 
the personnel budget he required confirmation from line ministries/agencies as to 
whether or not there was an increase in the number of employees. He compared how 
the Directorate General Budget and the Ministry of Planning work in preparing the 
budget.  
The difference between the Directorate General of Budget and the Ministry of 
Planning is that we in the Directorate General of Budget evaluated past budget 
documents (RKAKLs) to determine budget needs of line ministries. Whereas 
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the Ministry of Planning invited line ministries to discuss their planning for the 
next budget year. We have never invited line ministries. (Head of Section at the 
Directorate of Budget I, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 24) 
 
Overall, these results indicate that government officials at sector directorates in the 
Ministry of Planning had used performance information of line ministries/agencies by 
considering past achievements and forecasting the current year’s achievement for 
formulating the indicative budget ceilings. However, the Office of the Deputy of 
Development Funding did not use the results of evaluation in finalising the indicative 
budget. It is recognised that the use of performance information in determining the 
budget is a very difficult task. This seems to be a reason why the use of performance 
information for determining the budget is unstructured. The interviews also show that 
there are no recognised formulae for determining the budget.  
 
Furthermore, the results of interviews with government officials from the Directorate 
General of Budget also indicate the limitation of the use of performance information 
in preparing the indicative budget ceilings. Officials mainly focused on determining 
the operational budget and used the previous years’ budget spending of line 
ministries/agencies in formulating their budget.  It is also seen that the role of budget 
officials in the Directorate General of Budget in determining budgets was ineffective 
because they relied heavily on the resource envelope or the funds available. The 
budgets needed or requested by line ministries/agencies are always greater than the 
resource envelope. The results of interviews also indicate that there were budget 
rigidities or budget constraints requiring the fulfilment of operational budgets and 
mandatory budgets before budgets were allocated for other activities. In addition, 
there is an indication of the existence of incremental budgeting practice, such as the 
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use of past budget allocations and the use of same percentage in budget allocations of 
line ministries/agencies.  
 
5.4 Analysis of Factors Affecting Budget Allocations  
This section discusses findings related to factors affecting budget allocations. The 
findings are collected by examining the regulations related to the budgeting process, 
interviews with government officials from the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of 
Finance, line ministries/agencies, and survey to government practitioners from line 
ministries/agencies. This section is not only focuses on the use of performance 
information as one factor affecting budget decisions but also identifies other factors 
affecting budget decisions. In addition, this section also examines the practice of 
incremental budgeting by looking at the whole ranges of factors affecting budget 
allocations. 
 
The Examination of the Regulations Related to the Budgeting Process 
 
We examined Government Regulation 90/2010 and various Minister of Finance 
decrees, for example the Ministry of Finance decree 94/2013, concerning the 
guidelines for preparing and reviewing the work plans and budget documents of line 
ministries/agencies (RKAKL) to identify factors that should be used by the Ministry 
of Planning and the Ministry of Finance in determining the indicative budget ceilings, 
the budget ceilings, and the budget allocations.   
 
In preparing the indicative budget ceilings, these regulations and decrees specify that 
the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance should consider the policies of 
the President, the national development priorities that stated in the government work 
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plan (RKP), and the fiscal capacity. The Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance then evaluate the current programmes and activities; analyse the new 
initiatives proposed by line ministries/agencies; adjust the baseline budget; and 
consider fiscal capacity. The indicative budget ceilings are determined based on a 
consideration of these factors and a combination of the forward estimates, the baseline 
budget adjustment, and the new initiatives. The baseline budget is defined as the 
budget indication that should be provided to implement programmes/activities that 
aligned with the government policies and expected targets (Directorate of the State 
Budget Preparation, 2014, p. 216). 
 
In preparing the budget ceilings, the Ministry of Finance considers the following 
factors: the fiscal capacity; the indicative budget ceilings; the work plans and budget 
documents of line ministries/agencies (RKAKL); the results of performance 
evaluation; and the directives of the President. The budget ceilings are decided based 
on a consideration of these factors and a combination of the indicative budget 
ceilings, the baseline budget adjustment, and the new initiative proposal.  
 
The Ministry of Finance prepares the budget allocations based on the agreement 
between the government and the Parliament regarding the draft of the state budget 
(APBN), the baseline budget adjustment, and the new initiatives. 
 
In summary, with regards to the use of performance information for budget decisions, 
these regulation and decrees imply that the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance should use the results of performance evaluation, in the form of RKAKL 
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performance scores, for determining the indicative budget ceilings and the budget 
ceilings.   
 
The Examination of the Minister of Planning and the Minister of Finance’s Letters 
Related to the Indicative Budget Ceilings, the Budget Ceilings, and the Budget 
Allocations for the Period 2011-2014    
 
We continue examining the letters/decrees of the Minister of Planning and the 
Minister of Finance related to the issuance of the indicative budget ceilings, the 
budget ceilings, and the budget allocation for the budget year of 2011-2014. The 
examination reveals that although factors affecting the three resource allocations are 
varied from year to year they can nevertheless be classified into six groups as 
summarised in Table 5.1.   
Table 5.1: Factors Affecting Budget Allocations: the Evidence from the 
Examination of the Minister of Planning and the Minister of Finance’s Letters 
2011-2014 
 
No. Factors Affecting Budget 
Allocations 
2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 
IBC BC BA IB BC BA IB BC BA IB 
1. The decision of the Minister of 
Planning and the Minister of 
Finance based on the policies of 
the President, the agreement in 
cabinet meetings, and budget 
priorities. 
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
2. The new initiative proposals    Yes   Yes   Yes 
3. The proposals from 
ministries/agencies to revise 
budget priorities 
 Yes   Yes   Yes   
4. The forward estimates which 
documented in the previous 
year’s budget allocations 
      Yes   Yes 
5. The previous year’s budget 
spending estimation 
      Yes   Yes 
6. The agreement between the 
government and the parliament 
related to: 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
 a. Budget reallocations from 
other budgets. 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes   Yes  
 b. Budget adjustments from the 
loan and grant budget and the 
non-tax revenues budget 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes   
 c. The education budget   Yes   Yes   Yes  
 d. Other budget adjustments  Yes Yes   Yes   Yes  
 e. Adjustment for personnel 
budgets (salary and allowances) 
    Yes   Yes   
 Note *: IBC is the indicative budget ceilings; BC is the budget ceilings; and BA is the budget allocations. The 
researcher did not examine the letters of the Minister of Finance concerning the budget ceilings of 2014 and the 
budget allocations of 2014. 
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As can be seen from Table 5.1, every budget year, the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance determine the indicative budget ceiling of each line 
ministry/agency based on the policies of the President, agreement in cabinet meetings 
and the budget priorities.  The indicative budget ceilings are also affected by the new 
initiatives proposed by ministries/agencies that have been approved by the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance. After receiving the indicative budget ceiling, 
each line ministry/agency might propose the change of budget allocated for each 
programme but it cannot propose the change of its whole budget that exceeds the 
indicative budget ceilings. They can only propose any additional budgets using other 
mechanism such as proposing new initiatives before the issuance of the budget 
ceilings.  
 
Starting from the budget year of 2013, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance also determine the indicative budget ceilings based on the forward estimates 
as reported by all line ministries/agencies in their previous year’s budget documents. 
For example, when determining the indicative budget for budget year 2013, the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance also considered the forward 
estimates for that year as recorded in the budget documents of fiscal year 2012.  In 
addition, the indicative budget ceilings are also determined using the estimate of 
previous year’s budget spending. However, two government officials at the 
Directorate of Budget I and II in the Directorate General of Budget (Interview 24 and 
28) argued that their office could not use the forward estimates recorded in budget 
documents of line ministries/agencies because these forward estimates were not 
accurate.   
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With regards to the factors affecting the budget ceilings and the budget allocations, 
our research reveals that there are at least five factors that affect budget change from 
the indicative budget ceilings to the budget ceilings and the budget allocations. These 
factors are: the reallocation from other budgets to particular ministry/agency; budget 
adjustments to cover activities funded by non-tax revenue, loan, or grant; budget 
adjustment to add education budgets as required by law; other budget adjustments; 
and budget adjustment for personnel’s salary and allowances.  
 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.1, both the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance did not use the results of performance measurement and evaluation, or the 
RKAKL performance scores, for determining the indicative budget ceilings, the 
budget ceilings, and the budget allocations. However, it was found that they used 
future performance targets, such as the policies of the President, the new initiative 
proposals, and proposals from line ministries/agencies to revise budget priorities.   
 
The Results of Survey and Interviews with Government Practitioners from Line 
Ministries/Agencies 
 
In the questionnaire to government practitioners from line ministries/agencies, we 
asked whether government officials from the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance used performance information in determining budget allocations. The results 
of the questionnaire can been seen in Figure 5.1. When the respondents were asked 
whether they agreed with the statement, ‘the Ministry of Planning uses my ministry’s 
performance targets as the main consideration to decide the Indicative Budget 
Ceilings for my ministry’, three quarter of respondents (n= 34) strongly agreed/agreed 
and only 16% of respondents (n= 9) strongly disagreed/disagreed with this statement. 
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When they were asked whether ‘the Ministry of Finance uses performance targets as 
the main consideration to decide the Indicative Budget Ceilings, Budget Ceilings, and 
Budget Allocations of their ministry/agency’, 61% of respondents (n= 35) strongly 
agreed/agreed. Almost a quarter of the respondents (23% or n= 10) strongly 
disagreed/disagreed with this statement. It can be concluded that government 
practitioners of line ministries/agencies generally believed that the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance had used performance targets for determining 
budget allocations of line ministries/agencies.   
 
When the respondents were asked about the statement, ‘The Ministry of Planning and 
the Ministry of Finance use RKAKL performance scores as the main consideration to 
decide the Indicative Budget Ceilings, Budget Ceilings, and Budget Allocations of my 
ministry’, only 54% (n= 33) strongly agreed/agreed. One fifth of the respondents (n= 
10) strongly disagreed/disagreed and more than a quarter of the respondents neither 
agreed nor disagreed with this statement. Thus, it is implied that the respondents from 
line ministries/agencies were not certain whether the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance use RKAKL performance scores for determining their budgets. 
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Figure 5.1: The views of government practitioners from line minister/agencies 
about the use of performance information by the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance for determining budget allocations 
 
 
 
The respondents of the survey were also prompted with twelve possible factors that 
might affect budget allocations. The researcher gathered these twelve possible factors 
mainly from an examination of Government Regulation 90/2010, examination of 
various letters of the Minister of Planning/the Minister of Finance related to the 
planning and budgeting process, and the previous experience of the researcher when 
managing the planning and budgeting process in his office.  
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The twelve possible factors are: (1) the previous year(s) budget spending; (2) the 
previous year(s) budget allocations; (3) the annual policies of the President; (4) the 
annual baseline adjustment by line ministries/agencies; (5) the informal discussions 
and negotiations between line ministries/agencies officials and the Ministry of 
Planning and/or the Ministry of Finance officials before the issuance of budget 
allocations; (6) the informal negotiations between line ministries/agencies officials 
and Member(s) of Parliament before the issuance of budget allocations; (7) budget 
proposals for new initiatives from line ministries/agencies; (8) the budget projection 
stated in Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2010-2014; (9) the results 
of the work plan and budget documents (RKAKL) review meetings; (10) the 
agreement between line ministries/agencies and the Parliament in budget meetings; 
(11) the performance targets in line ministries/agencies’ work plan (RENSTRA-KL) 
and RKAKL documents; and (12) RKAKL performance scores based on the Minister 
of Finance Regulation 249/2011. Factors number 11 and 12 are regarded as 
performance information. The researcher then asked respondents to rank these factors 
from most important to least important. They were also invited to add other factors 
that might affect budget allocations.   
 
Fifty-six respondents answered this question and their answers were varied. From the 
responses, the researcher summarised and ranked the factors as perceived by the 
respondents. The summary of the analysis is set out in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2: Ranking of factors affecting budget allocations: The Evidence from 
government practitioners of line ministries/agencies 
  
Factors affecting budget allocations 
 
Total 
Scores 
 
Rank 
(3) The annual policies of the President. 176 1 
(4) The annual baseline adjustment by line ministries/agencies. 250 2 
(2) The previous year(s) budget allocations. 278 3 
(8) The budget projection stated in Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) 2010-2014. 300 4 
(1) The previous year(s) budget spending. 301 5 
(11) The performance targets in line ministries/agencies’ work plan (RENSTRA-
KL) and RKAKL documents. 304  6 
(7) Budget proposals for new initiatives from line ministries/agencies 
373 7  
(9) The results of the work plan and budget documents (RKAKL) review 
meetings 422  8 
(12) RKAKL performance scores based on the Minister of Finance Regulation 
249/2011. 446  9 
(10) The agreement between line ministries/agencies and the Parliament in 
budget meetings. 467  10 
(5) The informal discussions and negotiations between line ministries/agencies 
officials and the Ministry of Planning and/or the Ministry of Finance officials 
before the issuance of budget allocations 481  11 
(6) The informal negotiations between line ministries/agencies officials and 
Member(s) of Parliament before the issuance of budget allocations. 567  12 
 (Source: Author analysis from the questionnaire results). 
 
 
In addition, we also summarised and analysed which factors were selected by the 
respondents as the number one factor affecting budget allocations. The summary of 
the analysis is set out in Table 5.3.  
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Table 5.3: The most important factors affecting budget allocations: The 
Evidence from government practitioners of line ministries/agencies 
 
Factors affecting budget allocations Number of respondents who ranked this factor as number one factor 
(1) The previous year(s) budget spending. 17 (30%) 
(3) The annual policies of the President 10 (18%) 
(4) The annual baseline adjustment by line 
ministries/agencies 
9 (16%) 
(8) The budget projection stated in Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2010-
2014 
7 (13%) 
(2) The previous year(s) budget allocations. 6 (11%) 
Other factors 7 (12%) 
Total respondents answered this question 
56 (100%) 
(Source: Author analysis from the questionnaire results). 
 
In summary, as can be seen from Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 (above), the respondents 
from line ministries/agencies thought that performance information, in the form of 
performance targets and performance scores, was not considered as being one of the 
top five factors affecting budget allocations by government officials in the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance. However, if we consider annual policies of the 
President as planned or future performance targets then the respondents believed that 
the officials in the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance considered this 
one of the most important factors affecting budget allocation. Interestingly, past 
budget decisions, in the form of the previous year’s budget allocations, were still 
regarded as an important factor affecting budget allocations. It can be concluded that, 
from this part of the intrerview research, performance information is not in practice 
being used in determining budget allocations, and that it might be expected that the 
practice of incremental budgeting still affects budget allocation decisions. We turn to 
this question next.  
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The Results of Interviews with Government Officials/Practitioners from the Ministry 
of Planning and the Ministry of Finance 
 
In the interviews with government officials from the Ministry of Planning and the 
Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance, the researcher prompted 
officials with twelve possible factors that might affect budget allocations. This is the 
same list of possible factors that was prompted to the survey’s respondents from line 
ministries/agencies.  The researcher then asked them to rank these factors from most 
important to least important. The interviewees were also invited to add other factors 
that might affect budget allocations. Because of time limitation, not every official 
could answer fully. Most interviewees only provided the ranking from number 1 to 5.  
Some interviewees also suggested other factors that they thought affect budget 
allocations. We then took into account of these new factors for analysis. Therefore, in 
analysing the results, the researcher decided to take only the first five factors they 
thought are significant factors in deciding budget allocations. All remaining factors 
were given the rank number 6. The results of analysis can be seen in Table 5.4 for the 
evidence gathered from government officials of the Ministry of Planning and Table 
5.5 for the evidence gathered from the government officials of the Directorate General 
of Budget in the Ministry of Planning. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.4, according to the evidence from the Ministry of Planning, 
the five most important factors affecting the indicative budget ceilings are: (1) the 
annual policies of the President; (2) the previous year(s) budget allocations; (3) the 
budget projection stated in Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2010-
2014; (4) the results of trilateral meeting; and (5) the previous year(s) budget 
spending. Performance information (i.e. in the form of performance targets and 
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RKAKL performance scores) was not included in the five most important factors 
affecting budget allocations. However, performance targets in line 
ministries/agencies’ work plans (RENSTRA-KL) and RKAKL documents are in rank 
6 as the factor affecting budget allocations. As the Ministry of Planning is only 
responsible for issuing the indicative budget ceilings, in their case, government 
officials from the Ministry of Planning considered performance targets when 
determining the indicative budget ceilings. However, government of officials of the 
Ministry of Planning made less consideration of the RKAKL performance scores 
when they allocated the indicative budget ceilings of line ministries/agencies (ranked 
9 in Table 5.4).  
Table 5.4: Ranking of factors affecting budget allocations: The Evidence from 
the Ministry of Planning Officials 
Factors 
The Ministry of Planning 
Officials Interviewee Number 
and Ranking of Each Factor 
 
  
 
Total 
Scores 
 
Rank 
07 15 19 20 52 
(3) The annual policies of the President. 6 1 1 2 1 11 1 
(2) The previous year(s) budget allocations. 1 5 5 4 2 17 2 
(8) The budget projection stated in Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) 2010-2014. 3 2 6 1 6 18 3 
Other factor: The results of trilateral meeting 6 4 3 6 4 23 4 
(1) The previous year(s) budget spending. 5 6 6 3 5 25 5 
(11) The performance targets in line ministries/agencies’ work plan 
(RENSTRA-KL) and RKAKL documents. 6 3 4 6 6 25  6 
(4) The annual baseline adjustment by line ministries/agencies. 
2 6 6 6 6 26 7  
(5) The informal discussions and negotiations between line 
ministries/agencies officials and the Ministry of Planning and/or 
the Ministry of Finance officials before the issuance of budget 
allocations 6 6 2 6 6 26  8 
(12) RKAKL performance scores based on the Minister of Finance 
Regulation 249/2011. 4 6 6 5 6 27  9 
(7) Budget proposals for new initiatives from line 
ministries/agencies 6 6 6 6 3 27  10 
(6) The informal negotiations between line ministries/agencies 
officials and Member(s) of Parliament before the issuance of 
budget allocations. 6 6 6 6 6 30  11 
(9) The results of the work plan and budget documents (RKAKL) 
review meetings 6 6 6 6 6 30  12 
(10) The agreement between line ministries/agencies and the 
Parliament in budget meetings. 6 6 6 6 6 30  13 
Note: The evidence from the Ministry of Planning officials are for the indicative 
budget ceilings only.  (Source: Author analysis from the interview results). 
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Turning to Table 5.5, according to the evidence from the Directorate General of 
Budget officials in the Ministry of Finance, the five most important factors affecting 
the budget ceilings are: (1) the annual policies of the President; (2) the previous 
year(s) budget spending; (3) the previous year(s) budget allocations; (4) budget 
proposals for new initiatives from line ministries; and (5) the annual baseline 
adjustment by line ministries/agencies. Again, similar to evidence from the Ministry 
of Planning, performance information (i.e. in the form of performance targets and 
RKAKL performance scores) is not included in the five most important factors 
affecting budget allocations. Performance targets in the line ministries/agencies’ work 
plan (RENSTRA-KL) and RKAKL documents, and RKAKL performance scores 
based on the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011 are only ranked in position 11 
and 12 respectively. Therefore, as the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry 
of Finance is responsible to determine the three resource allocations (indicative 
budget ceilings, the budget ceilings, as well as the budget allocations), performance 
information (both performance targets and performance scores) is least considered by 
the government officials in that ministry for determining budgets of line 
ministries/agencies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 189 
Table 5.5: Ranking of factors affecting budget allocations: The Evidence from 
the Ministry of Finance Officials 
 
Factors affecting budget allocations 
 
The Ministry of Finance Officials  
Interviewee Number and Ranking of Each Factor 
  
 
Total 
Scores 
 
Rank 
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
(3) The annual policies of the President. 1 4 3 2 2 6 4 3 1 26 1 
(1) The previous year(s) budget spending. 6 1 1 6 5 2 1 6 3 31 2  
(2) The previous year(s) budget allocations. 6 2 2 6 6 3 2 5 2 34 3 
(7) Budget proposals for new initiatives 
from line ministries/agencies 3 6 6 3 3 4 6 4 4 39  4 
(4) The annual baseline adjustment by line 
ministries/agencies.   6 3 6 1 6 1 6 6 6 41  5 
(10) The agreement between line 
ministries/agencies and the Parliament in 
budget meetings. 
4 6 6 4 6 6 6 2 6 46  6 
(6) The informal negotiations between line 
ministries/agencies officials and Member(s) 
of Parliament before the issuance of budget 
allocations. 
6 6 6 6 6 6 3 1 6 46 7  
Other factor: The Directorate General of 
Budget adjusted the baseline budget. 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 49  8 
Other: The review of existing outputs by the 
Directorate General of Budget. 6 6 6 6 1 6 6 6 6 49  9 
(9) The results of the work plan and budget 
documents (RKAKL) review meetings 5 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 52  10 
(11) The performance targets in line 
ministries/agencies’ work plan (RENSTRA-
KL) and RKAKL documents. 
6 6 6 6 4 6 6 6 6 52 11 
(12) RKAKL performance scores based on 
the Minister of Finance Regulation 
249/2011. 
6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 53 12  
Other: The results of trilateral meeting. 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 53 13  
(8) The budget projection stated in Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
2010-2014. 
6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 53  14 
(5) The informal discussions and 
negotiations between line 
ministries/agencies officials and the 
Ministry of Planning and/or the Ministry of 
Finance officials before the issuance of 
budget allocations 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 54  15 
Note: The evidence from the Ministry of Finance officials is not necessarily for the 
indicative budget ceilings, but also covers the budget ceilings and the budget 
allocations. (Source: Author analysis from the interview results). 
 
 
Table 5.6 summaries the five most important factors affecting budget allocations as 
suggested by the interviewees from the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate 
General of Budget. As can be seen in this table, the past budget decisions (i.e. 
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previous year(s) budget allocations) still play important roles in affecting budget 
allocations. According to the interviewees from the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance, the previous year(s) budget allocations are the second and the 
third most important factor respectively used by them for determining budget 
allocations. This evidence indicates that incremental budgeting still plays an 
important role in the Indonesian planning and budgeting process. 
 
Table 5.6. The Five Most Important Factors Affecting Budget Allocations 
Rank Evidence from the Ministry of 
Planning Officials  
Evidence from of the Ministry of 
Finance Officials  
1 
The annual policies of the 
President. 
The annual policies of the President. 
2 
The previous year(s) budget 
allocations. 
The previous year(s) budget spending. 
3 
The projected budget as stated in 
the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) 2010-2014 
The previous year(s) budget 
allocations. 
4 Other: The results of trilateral 
meeting 
Budget proposals for new initiatives 
from line ministries/agencies 
5 The previous year(s) budget 
spending. 
The annual baseline adjustment by line 
ministries/agencies. 
Note: The evidence from the Ministry of Planning officials is for the indicative budget 
ceilings only. The evidence from the Ministry of Finance officials are not necessarily 
for the indicative budget ceilings, but also for the budget ceilings and the budget 
allocations. (Source: Author analysis from the interview results). 
 
 
In summary, as shown in Table 5.6, the interviewees from the Ministry of Planning 
and the Ministry of Finance, suggested that performance information, both 
performance targets and RKAKL performance scores, were not included in top five 
factors affecting budget allocation decisions. Therefore, the opinion of government 
practitioners from line ministries/agencies is parallel with the opinion of officials 
from the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance. The finding also indicates 
that previous year(s) budget allocations still play an important role in determining 
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budget allocations of line ministries/agencies. It can be concluded that our interview 
work indicates that incremental budgeting practice still has a role in the performance-
based budgeting environment in Indonesia.  
  
5.5. Statistical Analysis of the Effect of RKAKL Performance Scores on Budget 
Allocations 
As shown in the previous sections, there is aspiration in the government regulations 
towards using the result of performance evaluation (RKAKL performance scores in 
this case), as one of many factors, in determining the indicative budget ceilings and 
the budget ceilings. However, the interviews in the qualitative analysis, in the 
previous sections, found that RKAKL performance scores had not been used by 
government officials in either the Ministry of Planning or the Ministry of Finance in 
the process of determining budget allocations. Results indicated that they did not use 
RKAKL performance scores for determining either the indicative budget ceilings or 
the budget ceilings. In this section, we use basic statistical analysis to see whether it 
confirms this lack of influence of RKAKL performance scores on which budget 
allocations.   
 
We therefore examine the relationship between RKAKL performance scores and 
resource allocations using simple statistical analysis. Our model relies on annual 
budgetary data at the ministry level and at the lower programme level over the period 
of 2012-2014 and RKAKL performance scores for the period of 2011 and 2012.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, there is a strong conclusion from the interviews 
with government officials of the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of 
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Budget that the indicative budget ceilings are of greater importance than the other two 
budget decision stages: the budget ceilings and the budget allocations. Therefore, in 
examining the relationship between RKAKL performance scores and budget 
allocations, we focus on on the indicative budget ceilings looking at their the 
percentage change as compared to the budget allocations in the previous year.  
 
For this analysis, we use budget data of the percentage change in the indicative budget 
ceilings of 2013 and 2014 on the previous year’s budget allocations as the dependent 
variable, and RKAKL performance scores 2011 and 2012 as the independent variable.  
These correlation between the variables should reflect the impact of performance 
scores on resource allocations.  
 
We now set out our discussion of the impact of RKAKL performance scores on the 
indicative budget ceilings 2013-2014 at the ministry level and at the programme level.  
 
The Impact of RKAKL Performance Scores on the Indicative Budget Ceilings 2013-
2014 at the Ministry/Agency Level 
 
In total, we have 165 observations of the percentage change in the indicative budget 
ceilings in relation to the previous year’s budget allocations from two budget years, 
79 observations from 2013 and 86 observations from 2014.  The highest budget 
change from these two years is 114.22% and the lowest is -89.20% with an average 
change of -0.16%. The highest budget change for the indicative budget ceilings 2013 
is 114.22%, the lowest change is -30.58%, with an average change of 10.18%. In the 
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indicative budget ceilings 2014, the highest budget change is 101.29%, the lowest is -
89.20% with an average change of -9.66%.   
 
The independent variable is total RKAKL performance score for each line 
ministry/agency. We hypothesise that the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance used performance scores of 2011 for determining the indicative budget 
allocations for 2013. We also hypothesise that the budget authorities used those 
performance scores 2012 in 2013 for determining the indicative budget allocations for 
2014. 
 
For both RKAKL performance scores 2011 and 2012, the highest and the lowest 
scores of the full sample of 165 cases are 142.51 and 20.29 respectively, with an 
average score of 78.49. The highest and the lowest performance scores in 2011 are 
99.52 and 29.57 respectively, with an average score of 74.53. Whereas the highest 
and the lowest scores in 2012 are 142.51 and -20.29 respectively, with an average 
score 82.12. From these performance scores data we know that there are line 
ministries/agencies that achieved scores of more than 100. This condition is 
somewhat surprising because the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011 specifies 
that the ranges of total RKAKL performance scores are between 0 and 100. In our 
analysis we include all cases even though some have performance scores greater than 
100.  
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The histogram of the percentage change in the indicative budget ceilings 2013-2014 
can be seen in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Histogram of the Indicative Budget Ceilings Changes 2013-14 to the 
Budget Allocations 2012-13 (Full Sample at Ministry/Agency Level) 
 
 
 
As shown in histogram in Figure 5.2, there are several outlier cases in our data.  
Gilmour and Lewis (2006, p. 176) made a choice of excluding cases where budget 
changes are greater than 100%. They also suggested excluding cases with changes 
greater than 50% of a ministry’s budget. However, we make an arbitrary choice to 
exclude budget changes that are greater than 75%. There are five cases where are 
greater than 75% and we excluded these, leaving 160 cases in our statistical analysis. 
The histogram after we excluded five outliers can be seen in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Histogram of the Indicative Budget Ceilings Changes 2013-14 to the 
Budget Allocations 2012-13 (Truncated Sample at Ministry/Agency level) 
 
 
 
 
The histogram in Figure 5.3 looks less skewed and more normal than the histogram 
with full sample in Figure 5.2. We continue our analysis by looking the Pearson 
correlation between the budget change and performance scores. In Figure 5.4 we 
graph the bivariate relationship between total RKAKL performance score and 
percentage change of the indicative budget ceilings in 2013 and 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196 
Figure 5.4: Impact of RKAKL performance scores 2011-12 on the indicative 
budget ceilings 2013-14 (at Ministry/Agency level) 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5.4, RKAKL performance scores do not appear influence the size 
of the indicative budget ceilings change for a ministry/agency in 2013 and 2014.  In 
fact the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two variables is negative (r = -
0.136) and is not significant (p < 0.05). We report the Pearson correlation coefficient 
because it is equal to the standardised regression coefficient in a bivariate regression. 
The standardised regression coefficient is more useful than the unstandardized 
regression coefficient as it is independent of the units of measurement. The units of 
measurement do not enhance understanding in these regressions, so the standardised 
variable is used.   
 
In summary, the statistical analysis of percentage change of the indicative budget 
ceilings indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that RKAKL performance 
scores do not influence the change of indicative budget ceilings at ministry/agency 
level. This is not a strong result as classical inference means that strong evidence is 
needed to reject the null of no effect. What we have found is an absence of evidence 
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that RKAKL performance scores influence changes in budgets.  In this weak sense, 
this finding is consistent with our findings from the interviews with government 
officials from the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and line 
ministries/agencies.  
 
We continue examining the impact of RKAKL performance scores on the indicative 
budget ceilings at sub ministry/agency programme level.  
 
The Impact of RKAKL Performance Scores on the Indicative Budget Ceilings 2013-
2014 at Programme Level 
 
As discussed earlier in the previous chapters, there are 86 line ministries/agencies in 
Indonesian central government that receive budget allocations. Each ministry/agency 
manages at least one programme. For analysis, we use budget and performance data 
from 837 programmes over the period 2011-2014.  
 
Consistent with our previous analysis at ministry/agency level, the dependent variable 
of this analysis is the percentage change in the indicative budget ceilings from the 
previous year’s budget allocations. We examine the indicative budget ceilings from 
two budget years, 2013 and 2014. From the total of 837 programmes, the highest and 
the lowest budget changes are 3,419.82% and -100%, with an average change of 45%. 
The highest and the lowest budget changes in 2013 are 3,419.82% and -100%, with 
the average change of 26.24%. The highest and the lowest budget changes in 2014 are 
1,023.96% and -100%, with an average of -8.30%. If we compare with the budget 
changes at ministry/level, the budget changes at programme level are more volatile.  
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Turning to the independent variable of RKAKL performance scores in 2011 and 
2012, the highest and the lowest scores of the full sample of 837 programmes are 
139.91 and zero, with an average score of 76.48.  The highest and the lowest 
performance scores in 2011 are 106.18 and zero, with an average score of 74.83. The 
highest and the lowest scores in 2012 are 139.91 and 11.50, with an average of 76.84. 
 
We can graph the histogram of the percentage change in the indicative budget ceilings 
2013-14 at programme level from the full sample of 837 programmes, as shown in 
Figure 5.5.  
 
Figure 5.5: Histogram of the Indicative Budget Ceilings Changes 2013-14 to the 
Budget Allocations 2012-13 (Full Sample at Programme Level) 
 
 
 
Looking at Figure 5.5, there are outlier observations so that the distribution looks 
skewed and abnormal. We then exclude all cases with budget changes greater than 
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75%. The histogram of truncated sample can be seen in Figure 5.6. We excluded 63 
cases in this histogram., leaving 774 cases in our sample.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Histogram of the Indicative Budget Ceilings Changes 2013-14 to the 
Budget Allocations 2012-13 (Truncated at Programme Level) 
 
 
 
The distributions in histogram in Figure 5.5 look less skewed and more normal than 
the histogram with full sample in Figure 5.4. We continue our analysis by looking the 
correlation between the budget change and performance scores. We graph the 
bivariate relationship between total RKAKL performance score and percentage 
change of the indicative budget ceilings in 2013 and 2014, as can be seen in Figure 
5.7.  
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Figure 5.7: Impact of RKAKL performance scores 2011-12 on the indicative 
budget ceilings 2013-14 (at Programme level) 
 
 
 
As shown in the Figure 5.7, the relationship between total RKAKL performance 
scores and the indicative budget ceilings look scattered. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient (equal to the standardised regression coefficient) between the two 
variables is positive (r = 0.053) and is not significant (p < 0.05). In summary, this 
analysis indicates that at the programme level we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that RKAKL performance scores have no influence the indicative budget 
ceilings. This finding is consistent with our findings on the statistical analysis of 
budget changes at ministry/level. Again, as at the ministry/agency level before, what 
we have found is an absence of evidence that RAKL performance scores influence 
changes in budgets.  Again this weak sense, this finding is consistent with our 
findings from the interviews with government officials from the Ministry of Planning, 
the Ministry of Finance, and line ministries/agencies.   
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The Impact of RKAKL Performance Scores on the Indicative Budget Ceilings 2013-
2014 at Ministry/Agency Level using the Previous Year’s Budget Spending as a Base 
 
In the previous analysis, we used the percentage change in the indicative budget 
ceilings in a particular year to the budget allocations in the previous year as the 
dependent variable. In this section, we expand our analysis using the percentage 
change in the indicative budget ceilings in a particular year to the budget spending in 
the previous year as the dependent variable. In practice, the indicative budget ceilings 
2013 were determined in the beginning of 2012. Hence, we hypothesise that 
government officials from the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance used 
the budget spending of 2011 as a consideration to determine the indicative budget 
ceilings of 2013. Similarly, we hypothesise that those budget authorities used the 
budget spending of 2012 as a consideration to determine the indicative budget 
ceilings of 2014. For this analysis, we use audited budget spending data of 2011 and 
2012.  We use performance scores data RKAKL performance scores 2011 and 2012 
as the independent variable.   
 
It is worth noting that in this particular analysis, we can only analyse the impact of 
RKAKL performance scores on the indicative budget ceilings 2013-2014 at 
ministry/agency level because we do not have budget spending data at programme 
level. 
 
In total, we have 165 observations of the percentage change in the indicative budget 
ceilings to the previous year budget spending from two budget years, 79 observations 
from 2013 and 86 observations from 2014.  The highest budget change from these 
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two years is 514.38% and the lowest is -52.08% with an average change of 38.10%. 
The highest budget change for the indicative budget ceilings 2013 is 477.44%, the 
lowest change is -52.08%, with an average change of 48.59%. In the indicative budget 
ceilings 2014, the highest budget change is 514.38%, the lowest is -50.41% with an 
average change of 28.46%.   
 
The histogram of the percentage change in the indicative budget ceilings 2013-2014 
can be seen in Figure 5.8. 
Figure 5.8: Histogram of the Indicative Budget Ceilings Changes 2013-2014 to 
the Budget Spending 2011-2012 (Full Sample at Ministry/Agency Level) 
 
 
 
As shown in histogram in Figure 5.8, there are outlier observations so that the 
distribution looks skewed and abnormal. We then exclude all cases with budget 
changes greater than 75%. The histogram of truncated sample can be seen in Figure 
5.9. We excluded 19 cases in this histogram hence leaving 146 observations in our 
sample..  
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Figure 5.9: Histogram of the Indicative Budget Ceilings Changes 2013-2014 to 
the Budget Spending 2011-2012 (Truncated Sample at Ministry/Agency Level) 
 
 
Histogram in Figure 5.9 look less skewed and more normal than the histogram with 
full sample in Figure 5.8. We continue our analysis by looking the correlation 
between the budget changes and performance scores. We graph the bivariate 
relationship between total RKAKL performance score and percentage change of the 
indicative budget ceilings in 2013 and 2014, as can be seen in Figure 5.10.  
Figure 5.10: Impact of RKAKL performance scores 2011-12 on the indicative 
budget ceilings 2013-14 (at ministry/agency level) 
 
 204 
As shown in the Figure 5.10, the relationship between total RKAKL performance 
scores and the indicative budget ceilings look scattered. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is negative (r = -0.070) and is not significant (p 
< 0.05). In summary, this analysis indicates that we are again unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that RKAKL performance scores do not influence the indicative budget 
ceilings at ministry/agency level. In the weak sense described above, this finding is 
consistent with our previous analysis.   
 
What can we say overall about the relation between performance scores and changes 
in budgets? We recall that our interview work led us to the conclusion that officials 
did not believe that performance scores had an influence on changes in budgets. In 
our statistical analysis we set out to test an alternative hypothesis that there was a 
statistical relation against a null of no effect. We were unable to reject the null of no 
effect. Our statistical analysis therefore provides no evidence to reject the evidence 
from our interviews.  Overall, the results of statistical analysis and the interview work 
suggest that we have strong indications of a lack of relationship between total 
RKAKL performance scores and percentage changes of the indicative budget ceilings 
and that our statistical work was unable to reject a null hypothesis that RKAKL 
performance scores are not being used in determining budget allocations. There is 
therefore evidence consistent with the interview work that there is cause for worry 
that performance budgeting is not yet operating in practice in Indonesia. 
 
5.6. Statistical Analysis of the Existence of Incremental Budgeting 
The interviews study has indicated that government officials in the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance still use past budget decisions, by looking at the 
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previous year’s budget allocations, for determining budget allocations of line 
ministries/agencies. Although they also use many other factors for determining budget 
allocations, this finding suggests that incremental budgeting still operates in the 
performance-based budgeting environment.  
 
We now use statistical analysis to examine the extent of existence of incremental 
budgeting. We use the budget data of 2011-2014 at ministry/agency level and at 
programme level.  To examine a possible incremental pattern, we use the following 
approaches: (1) the magnitude of change; and (2) stability of allocations: incremental 
trend model.  
 
Firstly, we analyse the magnitude of change in budget allocations over the period 
2012 to 2014. Similarly to the analysis in the previous section, we analyse the change 
in the indicative budget ceilings as a percentage of the previous year’s budget 
allocations. At the ministry/level, there are 247 observations over the period of 2012-
2014. The highest percentage change is 532.14% and the lowest change is -89.20% 
with an average change of 2.92%. At programme level, there are 1210 observations 
from 2012-2014. The highest and the lowest percentage change of these observations 
are -98.99% and 3419.82% respectively, with an average percentage change of 
11.62%.  
 
Can we summarise these data to determine whether the budgeting process has been 
incremental? The question is, “how much does the budget need to change for the 
change to be considered non-incremental?” Bailey and O’Connor (1975) review the 
work of earlier authors (Wildavsky, 1964, Fenno, 1966, Sharkansky, 1968 and Dye, 
1972) and find their definitions of what changes would be considered incremental to 
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be overly broad. We follow Bailey and O’Connor in adopting the following 
classification  criteria for defining incremental, intermediate, and non-incremental 
changes are:  
• 0-10 per cent change in the budget year-on-year is defined as incremental; 
• 11-30 per cent intermediate; 
• +31 per cent non-incremental. 
Since Bailey and O’Connor wrote, budgeting has needed to adjust to the greater 
possibility of decrements as well as increments (Schick, 1983) so we expand these 
catagories in a negative direction to include decrements of the same size. On this basis 
we graph two charts of the number of budget changes to identify incremental 
budgeting at ministry/agency level as well as at programme level, as shown in Figure 
5.11 and Figure 5.12.  
 
 
Figure 5.11: Number of Percentage Changes 2012-14 at Ministry/Agency Level   
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34% of the observations (85 out of 247) fall within -11 to -30% and 11 to 30% ranges 
of change. The rest, 13%  (33 out of 247) fall within less than -30 per cent and more 
than 30 per cent. Therefore, there is a moderate conclusion that much incremental 
budgeting occurs in budget allocations for line ministries/agencies in Indonesia.  
 
 
Figure 5.12: Number of Percentage Changes 2012-14 at Programme Level   
 
 
 
At the programme level in Figure 5.12, there are 46% observations (557 out of 1210) 
which fall within the -10 and 10% range of percentage change, while 35% of the 
observations fall within -11 to -30% and 11 to 30% ranges. The rest, 20% fall within 
less than -30 per cent and more than 30 per cent ranges. These results are slightly 
different to the results of ministry/level. The budget change at programme level is less 
incremental than the budget change at ministry/agency level. These findings are 
consistent with Anderson and Harbridge (2010) who find budgeting is less 
incremental at the sub-agency level and cite LeLoup’s (1978, p. 498) argument that 
“gains and losses by competing programs cancel each other out in the totals”.  
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Our examination of incremental budgeting continues using a stability model along the 
lines of that discussed above in Chapter 2 (Danziger, 1976, Ibrahim and Proctor, 
1992). The stability model focuses on evaluating the pattern of budget allocations 
over time using a linear regression. To assess whether the budgetary process of each 
ministry/agency is incremental, this analysis can use  fit of the data to the regression 
line, the R2 value. A low R2 value indicates a low degree of stability of budget 
allocations. In contrast, a high R2 indicates a high level of allocations stability. An 
alternative but equivalent way of presenting the results, compatible with our statistical 
work on performance budgeting above is to present the standardised regression 
coefficient which is equal to the Pearson correlation coefficient r as an indication of 
the strength of an incremental relationship between budgets. Our null hypothesis is 
that the correlation is zero and the alternative hypothesis is that it is significantly 
greater than zero. Using this approach, we examine the stability of each budget 
allocation stage compared to the previous budget stage at ministry/agency level as 
well as at programme level over the three annual budget cycles from 2012-2014. The 
number of cases for ministry/agency level and programme level are 247 and 1309 
cases respectively. The results of R2 and the Pearson correlation coefficient r can be 
seen in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7: Coefficient Determination (R2) and Coefficient Correlation (r) of All 
Budget Allocations Stages for the Period 2012-2014 
 
Case/Observation Level 
 
 
The indicative 
budget ceilings 
The budget 
ceilings 
The budget 
allocations 
 
R2 
 
r 
 
R2 
 
r 
 
R2 
 
R 
 
Ministry/Agency Level 
 
0.983 
 
0.992 
 
0.987  
 
0.994 
 
0.996  
 
0.998 
 
Programme Level 
 
0.950  
 
  0.975  
 
0.968  
 
  0.984  
 
0.971  
 
 0.985  
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Looking at the r values in Table 5.7, we can see that the correlation r between 
successive years for both ministry/agency and programme level at every stage of 
allocations is extremely high. All these correlation coefficients (r) between each 
budget allocation and the previous budget stage are positive and significant with the 
null of no effect rejected (p < 0.001).  Our results indicate the stability implicit in an 
incremental pattern.  We can conclude that our budget data are “descriptively 
incremental” as defined by Berry (1986, p. 602). Going beyond that to infer an 
explanation of this pattern from our limited data is hazardous and might be subject to 
problems of spurious correlation (Yule, 1926).  
 
To summarise, the results of analysis by the magnitude change in budget allocations 
and by the incremental trend model indicate that incremental practice of budgetary 
allocation decisions is still in place in Indonesia. These findings correspond with the 
results of interviews suggesting that the previous year’s budget allocations still 
strongly influence the budget decision of the following year or in our study the 
previous year’s allocation still affect the indicative budget ceiling decisions. 
 
5.7 Underspending of Budget Allocations 
Looking at the budget allocations and spending data of line ministries/agencies over 
the period of 2011-2014, it was revealed that line ministries/agencies typically do not 
fully use all of their budget allocations. Table 5.9 shows that between 2011 and 2014, 
line ministries only spent their annual budget allocations between 89 to 96 per cent. It 
appears that this underspending pattern is not limited to this period only. For example, 
Blondal, Hawkesworth, and Choi (2009, p. 11) found that most recently line 
ministries/agencies only spent about 88% of budget allocations. 
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Table 5.8: Total Budget Allocations and Spending of Line Ministries/Agencies 
2011-2014 
Year Budget Allocations  
(in Rupiah) 
Budget Spending  
(in Rupiah) 
  Spending as a 
percentage of budget 
allocations 
2011 461,508,010,946,000 418,873,569,684,628 91% 
2012 548,317,746,116,000 490,066,765,386,899 89% 
2013 622,008,671,596,997 583,337,768,376,763 94% 
2014 602,291,956,299,000 577,164,824,476,978 96% 
Note: Number of line ministries/agencies in 2011: 79, other years: 86 
(Source: Author’s compilation from the Audit Report of BPK 2011-2014) 
 
We continue examining the number of ministries/agencies that spend less than 90% of 
their budgets over the period 2011-2014. The total number of line ministries/agencies 
in 2011 was 79 and the total number of line ministries/agencies in 2012, 2013, and 
2014 were 86. Figure 5.13 shows the number of line ministries/agencies that spent 
less than 90% of their budget allocations over the period 2011-2014. 
 
Looking at Figure 5.13, forty-two (54% of 79 ministries/agencies) ministries/agencies 
spent less than 90% of their budget allocations in 2011. In fact, twenty-five 
ministries/agencies (32%) only spent maximum 80% of their budgets during the year. 
In 2012, the number of ministries/agencies that spent less than 90% of their budget 
allocations was decreased. It was 36 out of 86 (42%) ministries/agencies.  Thirteen (or 
15%) ministries/agencies spent less than 80% of their budgets.  
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Figure 5.13 Number of Line Ministries/Agencies that Spent Less Than 90% of 
Their Budgets in 2011-2014 
 
 
(Source: Author’s compilation from the Audit Report of BPK 2011-2014) 
 
The number of ministries/agencies that spent less than 90% of their budgets fell again 
in 2013. There were only 27 ministries/agencies (31%) that spent less than 90% of 
their budgets. However, the number of line ministries/agencies that spent less than 
90% of their budgets increased in 2014. Thirty-five ministries/agencies (40% out of 
86 ministries/agencies) spent less than 90% of their budget. Overall, Table 5.10 shows 
that the number of line ministries/agencies that spent less than 90% of their budgets is 
relatively large. There is a challenge for the government to encourage line 
ministries/agencies to execute their budgets as planned.  
 
Blondal, Hawkesworth, and Choi (2009, p. 11) suggest the explanations of why 
budget underspending occurred in Indonesia. Firstly, the carry-forward facilities in 
Indonesia have only been used to a very limited extent. Most budget allocations 
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cannot be carried forward to the following year so that the budgets that cannot be 
disbursed at the end of fiscal year (31 December) are considered as unspent budgets. 
Secondly, there were rigidities in the process of procurement of goods and services 
that delayed the disbursements of funds during the year. In addition, 
ministries/agencies found difficulties in recruiting government officials who have the 
required competencies for conducting the procurement processes. Thirdly, the delays 
of procurement process were related to the cautious approach of government officials. 
Procurement has been identified as high risk for corruption and stiff punishment are 
applied for government officials convicted of corruption in procurement-related 
activities. Thus, many government officials were cautions and reluctant to be involved 
in procurement activities.  
 
The Government undertook several initiatives to increase the budget spending, such 
as revising a regulation related to procurement process, conducting training for staff 
to improve their capacity to do procurement process and financial management, and 
performing more intensive monitoring and evaluation (Antara, 2013).  
 
It appears that the problem of budget underspending was still in place in 2014. The 
problem may relate to the extent of incremental budgeting practice in Indonesia. Line 
ministries/agencies may always ask for more budgets and the central budget office 
(the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance) did not review the base so that 
the budget allocations given to ministries/agencies might be greater than their real 
needs.  
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the extent of the use of performance information in 
determining budget allocations. The interviews with government 
officials/practitioners from the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and line 
ministries/agencies indicated that performance information, in the form of both 
performance targets and RKAKL performance scores, was not considered as 
important as other factors in determining budget allocation decisions. In fact, RKAKL 
performance score was not included in the five most important factors affecting 
budget decisions. The interviews also indicated that the previous year(s) budget 
allocations still play an important role in determining budget allocations of line 
ministries/agencies. It can be concluded from the interviews that incremental 
budgeting practice still has a strong role in the budgeting environment in Indonesia. 
Performance-based budgeting is strongly put in place by the government regulations, 
but as yet, it has not achieved a strong influence in the actual practices of budgeting in 
Indonesia.  
  
This chapter has also discussed the importance of the indicative budget ceilings stage 
in the budgetary decision stages. Although adjustments of the indicative budget 
ceilings may occur in the next budget stages. The interviews suggested that any 
changes from the indicative budget ceilings to the budget ceilings and the budget 
allocations are marginal. Therefore, in the statistical analysis of the influence of 
performance scores on budget allocations and the existence of incremental budgeting, 
this study places the most attention on the indicative budget ceilings decision.  
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The results of statistical analysis of the relationship between total RKAKL 
performance scores and percentage changes of the indicative budget ceilings indicate 
that we cannot reject a null hypothesis that RKKAL performance scores are not, in 
practice, being used in determining budget allocations. Although rejection of the null 
is not a strong statistical finding, these results are consistent with our findings from 
the interviews with government officials from the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry 
of Finance, and line ministries/agencies.  
 
The statistical analysis of testing the existence of incremental budgeting has indicated 
that incremental practice of budgetary allocation decisions is still in place in 
Indonesia. Here a null hypothesis of no effect is strongly rejected. The bivariate 
statistical analysis carried out is possibly over simple and subject to possible omitted 
variable bias, but these findings correspond with the results of interviews suggesting 
that the previous year’s budget decisions still affect next year’s budget decisions and 
that incremental budgeting practices are still in place.   
  
Overall we may conclude that we have found that there is strong evidence that 
regulations are in place to require performance-based budgeting in Indonesia. 
However, our interview and statistical research has demonstrated that these official 
requirements to take performance into account are not, as yet, being translated into the 
actual substance of budgeting in Indonesia.  
 
In the next chapter the extent of use of performance information in the planning and 
budgeting process and in the broader management purposes will be discussed.    
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Chapter 6 – The Extent of the Use of Performance 
Information by Government Practitioners    
 
6.1 Introduction   
This chapter focuses on reporting the findings related to Research Question Number 
Three ‘How, in practice, do government practitioners use performance information in 
the Indonesian planning and budgeting process?’ The extent of the use of 
performance information is a key issue that arises from the experience of performance 
budgeting in other countries. Therefore, this research asked budget officials about 
their use of performance information in various stages of the planning and budgeting 
process. The findings are gathered from the interviews and the questionnaire 
responses from budget officials and government practitioners. The interviews were 
conducted with officials from the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate General of 
Budget (DG Budget) within the Ministry of Finance, Members of Parliament, and line 
ministries/agencies. The questionnaire was distributed to officials from the remaining 
line ministries/agencies that were not included in the interviews.  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections - each section presenting findings on the use 
of performance information from four different government institutions involved in 
the planning and budgeting process. The first section presents findings on how 
government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General 
of Budget within the Ministry of Finance use performance information in the planning 
and budgeting process. The second section presents findings on the use of 
performance information by Members of Parliament. The third section reports 
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findings on how government practitioners from line ministries/agencies use 
performance information in the planning and budgeting process and for other 
managerial purposes such as for accountability, mobilisation, and improvement. 
Although each section focuses on reporting the use of performance information by 
each institution, the views of practitioners from other institutions, where also 
gathered, are similarly presented and compared. For example, in section one, when 
the findings are presented on how government practitioners from the Ministry of 
Planning use performance information, opinions of practitioners from other 
institutions, in this case the officials from the Directorate General of Budget and line 
ministries/agencies, are also presented and compared.   
 
6.2 How Government Practitioners from the Ministry of Planning and the 
Directorate General of Budget within the Ministry of Finance Use Performance 
Information  
 
The first part of this section reports the findings from the questionnaire regarding the 
views of government practitioners from line ministries/agencies on how government 
practitioners in the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget use 
performance information. The questionnaire focused on the use of performance 
information for the entire planning and budgeting process rather than on how officials 
use performance information in each activity in the planning and budgeting process.    
 
The second part reports the interviewee’s views from the Ministry of Planning and the 
Directorate of General of Budget, as well as opinions from government practitioners 
from line ministries. This part focuses particularly on promises in the planning and 
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budgeting process, that officials would use performance information in preparing in 
trilateral meetings, in RKAKL review meetings, and in monitoring and evaluation.  
 
6.2.1 The Views of Government Practitioners From Line Ministries/Agencies   
The views of questionnaire respondents from line ministries/agencies regarding the 
use of performance information by officials in the Ministry of Planning are reported 
in Figures 6.1 to 6.3.  The respondents were asked to give their views on five different 
categories of the use of performance information by the Ministry of Planning.  
 
Out of 60 respondents, 80% (n = 48) of the respondents strongly agreed/agreed that 
the officials from the Ministry of Planning actively used performance targets in 
examining and reviewing the budgets proposed by ministries/agencies.  Only 5% (n = 
3) of the respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed with this statement. When asked 
whether officials from the Ministry of Planning actively used performance 
scores/results to review the budgets proposed by ministries/agencies, 69% (n = 41) of 
the respondents strongly agreed/agreed with the statement. Only 7% (n = 4) of the 
respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed with it (See Figure 6.1). Therefore, a large 
majority of respondents thought that officials from the Ministry of Planning actively 
used both performance targets and performance scores when reviewing budget 
proposals. 
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Figure 6.1: The Use of Performance Information by the Ministry of Planning 
(Part 1) 
 
The answers of the respondents were rather different when they were asked to give 
their views on the statement, ‘Budget officials in the Ministry of Planning actively use 
performance information to make budget cuts and budget increases, as proposed by 
my ministry/agency.’ Out of 59 respondents, the number of respondents who strongly 
agreed/agreed and the number of respondents who strongly disagreed/disagreed with 
that statement were identical (n = 17 or 29% each). There were 25 (42%) respondents 
who neither agreed nor disagreed with it (See Figure 6.2). It can be inferred that the 
respondents were not certain that officials in the Ministry of Planning actively used 
performance information in making budget cuts or budget additions.  
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Figure 6.2: The Use of Performance Information by the Ministry of Planning 
(Part 2) 
 
 
Turning to the results in Figure 6.3, a small majority of respondents (54% or n = 32) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed that officials in the Ministry of Planning used 
performance information in order to fulfil formal requirements and focused more on 
the aggregate amount of the budget other than performance targets in reviewing 
budget proposals. However, one fifth of respondents (22% or n = 13) strongly 
agreed/agreed and a quarter of respondents (24% or n = 14) neither agreed nor 
disagreed with this statement. Thus, the views of respondents were rather varied. To 
some extent, quite a large number of respondents from line ministries/agencies 
thought that budget officials in the Ministry of Planning focused more on reviewing 
the aggregate amount of the budget proposals rather than on performance targets. 
Other respondents considered that officials in the Ministry of Planning were not only 
interested in the budget amount, but also in the performance targets proposed by line 
ministries/agencies. 
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Figure 6.3: The Use of Performance Information by the Ministry of Planning 
(Part 3) 
 
 
The respondents were quite positive when replying to the statement ‘Budget officials 
in the Ministry of Planning actively use performance information as a basis to conduct 
regular reviews of the ministry’s performance using performance evaluation results’ 
(See Figure 6.3).  Three quarters of respondents (76% or n = 45) strongly agreed/ 
agreed with this statement. Only a small number of respondents (3% or n = 2) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed. One fifth of respondents (20% or n = 12) neither agreed 
nor disagreed. It can be deduced that the majority of respondents believed that 
performance results were used regularly by officials in the Ministry of Planning for 
reviewing the performance of line ministries/agencies. 
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From the open question of the questionnaire, four respondents gave their views on 
how government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning used performance 
information. The results were varied. Three respondents commented on a limited use 
of performance information in the planning and budgeting process. One of them noted 
that performance information had not been fully used as a basis for determining the 
budget.  Another respondent identified “limited fiscal capacity” as the reason why the 
Ministry of Planning had not fully implemented performance-based budgeting. 
Another respondent noted that officials in the Ministry of Planning did to some extent 
use performance information in the planning and budgeting process.  Performance 
information was used as a basis for evaluating the achievement of a line ministry. The 
officials in the Ministry of Planning have a tendency to use future performance 
information or performance targets as stated in the annual government work plan 
(RKP) and the directives of the President.   
 
 
With regards to the views of respondents regarding the use of performance 
information by budget officials in the Directorate General of Budget within the 
Ministry of Finance, Figures 6.4 to 6.6 report the results of the section of the 
questionnaire that asked respondents from line ministries/agencies to give their views 
on the use of performance information by officials from the Directorate General of 
Budget within the Ministry of Finance.  
 
A large number of respondents considered that budget officials in the Ministry of 
Finance used performance targets in reviewing and examining budget proposals. 
Almost a quarter of respondents (71% or n = 41) strongly agreed/agreed with the 
statement ‘Budget officials in the Ministry of Finance actively use performance 
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information to review and examine the relationship between the budget proposed by 
my ministry/agency and the performance targets planned by my ministry/agency’. 
Only 10% of respondents (n = 6) strongly disagreed/disagreed with this statement. 
Approximately a fifth of respondents (n = 11) neither agreed nor disagreed (See 
Figure 6.4). The majority of budget officials from line ministries and agencies (74% 
or n = 43) also strongly agreed/agreed that budget officials in the Ministry of Finance 
actively used performance scores/results in reviewing the budget proposals of line 
ministries/agencies. Only five respondents (9%) strongly disagreed/disagreed and the 
remaining 10 respondents (17%) neither agreed nor disagreed. Thus, a large number 
of respondents believed that officials in the Directorate General of Budget actively 
used both performance targets and performance scores in reviewing budget proposals. 
The results were rather similar to the results for budget officials in the Ministry of 
Planning. 
Figure 6.4: The Use of Performance Information by the Ministry of Finance 
(Part 1) 
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In relation to the statement, ‘Budget officials in the Ministry of Finance actively use 
performance information to make budget cuts and budget increases, as proposed by 
my ministry/agency’, just under half of the respondents (48% or n = 28) strongly 
agreed/agreed that budget officials from the Directorate General of Budget actively 
used performance information in making decisions about budget cuts or budget 
additions of budget proposals from line ministries/agencies. On the other hand, a 
quarter of the respondents (24% or n = 14) strongly disagreed/disagreed with it, the 
remaining 28% of respondents (n = 16) neither agreeing nor disagreeing (See Figure 
6.5). It can be concluded that the use of performance information for making budget 
cuts or budget additions by the Directorate General of Budget was not extensive.  
 
Figure 6.5: The Use of Performance Information by the Ministry of Finance 
(Part 2) 
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quarter of respondents (n = 14) strongly agreed/agreed that budget officials in the 
Directorate General of Budget used performance information to fulfil formal 
requirements. The remaining quarter of respondents (n = 15) neither agreed nor 
disagreed. So it is revealed that to some extent budget officials used performance 
information to fulfil formal requirements and they focused more on the aggregate 
amount of budget, than on performance targets.  
Figure 6.6: The Use of Performance Information by the Ministry of Finance 
(Part 3) 
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the statement ‘Budget officials in the Ministry of Finance actively use performance 
information as a basis to conduct regular reviews of the ministry’s performance using 
performance evaluation results.’ Fewer than one tenth of respondents (n = 5) strongly 
disagreed/disagreed with it and a quarter of respondents (n = 15) neither agreed nor 
disagreed (See Figure 6.6). Therefore, a large majority of respondents thought that 
officials from the Directorate General of Budget used performance evaluation results 
as a basis for reviewing the performance of ministries/agencies.  
 
In summary, considering all the results from the questionnaire, it can be perceived 
that practitioners from both the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of 
Budget within the Ministry of Finance had initiated the use of performance 
information in the planning and budgeting process. According to the respondents, 
officials from both institutions regularly used performance information to review 
budget proposals. However, the use of performance information did not necessarily 
affect budget allocations (budget cuts and or budget additions). 
 
The following sections report findings on the use of performance information by 
government practitioners in three annual budget preparation activities: in trilateral 
meetings, in RKAKL review meetings, and in monitoring and evaluation.  
 
6.2.2 The Use of Performance Information in Trilateral Meetings by 
Government Practitioners   
Trilateral meetings are the annual meetings between government practitioners from 
the three institutions (the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate General of Budget in 
the Ministry of Finance, and the line ministries/agencies) that are responsible for the 
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planning and budgeting process. The meetings are held after the Minister of Planning 
and the Minister of Finance have issued the circular letter regarding the indicative 
budget ceilings of line ministries/agencies. The meetings are hosted by the Ministry of 
Planning and are held separately for every line ministry/agency. The Government 
practitioners from the three institutions who attend the meetings are officials from 
every sector directorate within the Ministry of Planning, officials from each 
directorate in the Directorate General of Budget, and officials from the planning 
and/or finance bureau of each line ministry/agency. This section presents findings 
regarding performance information used by government practitioners from the 
Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget in the meetings. 
 
The Use of Performance Information in Trilateral Meetings by Government 
Practitioners in the Ministry of Planning 
The interviews highlighted the range of performance information used by government 
officials from the Ministry of Planning in the trilateral meetings. Most interviewees 
commented that they used performance information in the meetings.  
 
One practitioner from the Directorate of Forestry in the Ministry of Planning 
described how the meetings worked. He said that they intensively discussed   
programmes and activities that will be executed by the line ministries. However, it 
was emphasised that the cost structures of programmes or other such activities were 
not normally discussed. The focus was rather on actions. Another practitioner from 
the Directorate of State Apparatus commented that the role of the Ministry of 
Planning in the meeting was to ensure that line ministries/agencies had included the 
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national priorities and the priority activities in their annual work plan document 
(RENJA-KL).  
 
Another practitioner from the Directorate of Water and Irrigation in the Ministry of 
Planning argued that during the meetings he reviewed the performance targets of a 
line ministry/agency in the activity level. He also reviewed multi-year activities to be 
budgeted and new initiatives to be implemented in the particular budget year. One 
practitioner from the Directorate of Transportation also noted that he relied on the 
presentation from line ministries in the meetings. 
In the meetings, we relied on the presentation from the line ministry. We saw its 
evaluation of its own performance. We saw performance targets in RPJMN [the 
National Medium Term Development Plan], the accumulation of past 
achievements up to the most current budget year, and the remaining targets that 
must be achieved by the line ministry. We evaluated its performances as simply 
as that. (Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of Transportation, the 
Ministry of Planning, Interview 20). 
 
When asked whether government practitioners used performance information based 
on the Minister of Finance Regulation number 249/2011, it was interesting to hear 
from one official who indicated that he did not use the performance evaluation 
reports. He commented: “I don’t see the trilateral meeting is regulated by the Minister 
of Finance Regulation 249/2011. It is regulated by our ministry (the Ministry of 
Planning)” (Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of Water and Irrigation, the 
Ministry of Planning, Interview 46). 
 
The Use of Performance Information in Trilateral Meetings by Government 
Practitioners in the Directorate General of Budget 
The interviews revealed that government practitioners from the Directorate General of 
Budget did not use performance information in the trilateral meetings. Their focus, it 
was suggested, was wholly on ensuring that the budget amount proposed by line 
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ministries/agencies followed the budget amount stated in the circular letter concerning 
the indicative budget ceilings.  
 
An official from the Directorate of State Apparatus within the Ministry of Planning 
noted that practitioners from the Directorate General of Budget were focused more on 
ensuring that line ministries had allocated operational budgets such as personnel 
expenditures and other office expenditures.  
They [government practitioners from the Directorate General of Budget] 
weren’t concerned with the substantive dimension of performance information, 
they were more concerned with ensuring the fulfilment of the operational 
budget, such as personnel expenditures and other office expenditures by line 
ministries/agencies. (Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of State 
Apparatus, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 19) 
 
One government practitioner from the Government Procurement Policy Agency 
(LKPP) commented that in the trilateral meetings, the Directorate General of Budget 
was responsible for ensuring that the proposed-budget of a line ministry conformed to 
the indicative budget ceilings that had been decided by the Minister of Planning and 
the Minister of Finance. Another practitioner from the Directorate of Water and 
Irrigation within the Ministry of Planning also emphasised that in the trilateral 
meetings government practitioners from the Directorate General of Budget were more 
focused on the specific type of budget than in reviewing performance targets 
proposed by line ministries/agencies. 
In the trilateral meeting, I didn’t see substantial roles of our partners from the 
Directorate General of Budget. They were concerned to review the availability 
of the specific type of budget. They didn’t review how a line ministry/agency 
tried to achieve its performance indicators [targets]. (Head of Sub Directorate at 
the Directorate of Water and Irrigation, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 46) 
 
The perspectives of government practitioners from line ministries/agencies and the 
Ministry of Planning were confirmed by an official from the Directorate General of 
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Budget. He noted that performance information would be discussed in RKAKLs’ 
review meetings rather than in the trilateral meetings. 
We didn’t use performance information in the trilateral meetings. We only 
talked about the indicative budget ceilings. We only talked about the budget 
amount. Performance information would be discussed during RKAKLs’ review 
meetings. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget II, the Directorate 
General of Budget, Interview 32). 
 
In summary, these results show that to some extent government officials from the 
Ministry of Planning used performance information in trilateral meetings. They were 
responsible to ensure that the performance targets regarded as national priorities had 
been included in the annual work plan of line ministries/agencies (RENJA). In 
contrast, the role of government officials from the Directorate General of Budget in 
the meetings was to ensure that the budget amount proposed by line 
ministries/agencies followed the budget amount stated in the circular letter concerning 
the indicative budget ceilings. Government officials from the Directorate General of 
Budget were more focused on the specific type of budget, such as personnel 
expenditures and other operational expenditures, than reviewing performance targets 
proposed by line ministries/agencies.  
 
6.2.3 The Use of Performance Information in RKAKL Review Meetings 
The Directorate General of Budget has the responsibility to arrange the RKAKL 
review meetings. Each year, the RKAKL review meetings are held twice, one after 
the issuance of the budget ceilings and the other after the issuance of the budget 
allocations.  Similar to the trilateral meetings, these meetings are also attended by 
government practitioners from three institutions, the Directorate General of Budget, 
the Ministry of Planning, and line ministries/agencies. This section reports findings 
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about the use of performance information by government practitioners from the 
Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget. 
 
The Use of Performance Information by Government Practitioners from the Ministry 
of Planning in RKAKL Review Meetings  
One practitioner from the Directorate of Budget II within the Directorate General of 
Budget noted that government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning came to the 
RKAKL Review meetings but they did not know what they had to do in the meetings. 
I didn’t see the Ministry of Planning having a role during the RKAKL reviews. 
They just came but they didn’t know their roles. In my opinion, they should 
check national priority activities on the RKAKLs. But in practice, they relied on 
us. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget II, the Directorate General of 
Budget, Interview 32). 
 
Meanwhile, a practitioner from the Directorate of State Apparatus within the Ministry 
of Planning acknowledged that the involvement of officials from the Ministry of 
Planning in the meetings was not intensive. He commented that since 2013 the 
Ministry of Finance was more concerned with the involvement of the Ministry of 
Planning in the RKAKL Review meetings. 
Only the last year the Ministry of Finance was more concerned to involving the 
Ministry of Planning in the meetings. Probably there was a policy change in 
there. Previously, the Ministry of Finance didn’t see the importance of the 
Ministry of Planning in this process, merely as a formality. Last year, they 
started to be interested in performance information. Relatively, we didn’t take 
part intensively in these meetings. (Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate 
of State Apparatus, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 19). 
 
Another practitioner from the Directorate of Transportation within the Ministry of 
Planning stated that he had never attended an RKAKL review meeting. He noted that 
he only met the officials from the Directorate General of Budget if there was a 
particular issue that needed to be discussed.  
We’ve never attended RKKALs review meetings. I do not know why we didn’t 
take part in the meetings. We attended a meeting with the Directorate General 
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of Budget if there was any problem or special issues. (Head of Sub Directorate 
at the Directorate of Transportation, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 20) 
 
Several officials from the Ministry of Planning indicated their reluctance to be 
involved in the meetings feeling that the regulation that instructed them to do so was 
inappropriate. The Minister of Finance was the one who issued the regulation, not the 
Minister of Planning. One interviewee from the Directorate of Religion, Culture, 
Youth, and Sport noted that, in practice, not all practitioners from the Ministry of 
Planning attended the RKAKL Review meetings. However the regulation required 
them to give comments and to sign the minutes of the meeting, they nevertheless were 
obliged to attend. In conclusion, we can see that the role of government practitioners 
from the Ministry of Planning in the RKAKL review meetings was merely to fulfil 
the formal obligation. 
I am a bit confused why we were asked to be involved in the RKAKL review 
meetings. I always said to my colleagues: “By what regulations we were 
involved (in the RKAKLs reviews)? How far we can make revisions? If this is 
not clear, it is better if we don’t take part”. (Head of the Directorate of Forestry, 
the Ministry of Planning, Interview 7) 
 
To be honest, in my opinion, probably my opinion was different from my 
colleagues, I doubted that I needed to be involved in RKKAL review meetings 
because the regulation that demanded us to be involved is not strong enough. In 
reality, not all staff from our ministry (the Ministry of Planning) did take part in 
these particular review meetings. I have never attended those meetings. But in 
the end, we had to sign the minutes of meeting. So, reluctantly, we had to fill in 
the minutes of meeting by giving some comments. (Head of Sub Directorate at 
the Directorate of Religion, Culture, Youth, and Sport, the Ministry of Planning, 
Interview 43) 
 
One practitioner from the Directorate of Forestry also suggested that at a minimum 
there should be a regulation signed by both the Minister of Planning and the Minister 
of Finance for this mechanism. It appears that this institutional problem needs to be 
solved first before government practitioners can do their job as intended.  
If we are asked to be involved in the RKAKLs review, at least there must be a 
regulation that is signed by two ministers (Minister of Planning and Minister of 
Finance) that instructed this duty….If in the review we only “sit” and “see”, 
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what’s the point? It’s only wasting our time because we have many other jobs to 
do. (Head of the Directorate of Forestry, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 7) 
 
 
An official from the Corruption Eradication Commission commented that neither 
government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning nor the Directorate General of 
Budget use performance scores in evaluating budget proposals (RKAKLs). They 
focused more on performance targets rather than on past achievements.  
They (officials from the Ministry of Planning and MOF) did not use the 
RKAKL performance scores in the budget meeting. They focused on reviewing 
the performance targets stated in the RKAKL and the budget to achieve the 
targets. (Head of Division at the Corruption Eradication Commission, Interview 
40) 
 
 
The Use of Performance Information by Government Practitioners from the 
Directorate General of Budget in RKAKL Review Meetings  
The results of interviews with line ministry/agency officials regarding the use of 
performance information by the Directorate General of Budget were mixed. One 
interviewee from the Audit Board of Indonesia stated that both officials from the 
Directorate General of Budget and the Ministry of Planning only use performance 
information to fulfil requirements demanded by regulations. Three other government 
practitioners from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Forestry, and the Audit 
Board of Indonesia made similar comments, arguing that in RKAKL (work plans and 
budget document of line ministries/agencies) review meetings officials from the 
Directorate General of Budget focused on administrative completeness as required by 
the regulations rather than on performance. Two interviewees noted that when 
reviewing RKAKL documents, officials from the Directorate General of Budget still 
focused on the inputs or the cost needed for the activities being planned. They 
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appeared not to examine performance indicators/targets proposed by line 
ministries/agencies. This is a comment from one of them.  
In reviewing RKAKL documents, officials from the Directorate General of 
Budget still focused on the input/cost of the activities. We thought that they 
might review the relationship between proposed-inputs and performance targets 
(outputs), and they could compare them with past budgets and performance 
results. (Head of Section at the Audit Board of Indonesia, Interview 02) 
 
However, according to an official from the Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform, government practitioners from the Directorate General of 
Budget had used some performance information in RKAKL review meetings. 
Another practitioner from the Corruption Eradication Commission confirmed that 
practitioners from the Directorate General of Budget had reviewed performance 
information, particularly performance targets, in the meetings. 
Yes, officials from the Ministry of Finance used performance information in the 
budget meetings. They asked for our performance targets that are documented 
in the RKAKL. (Head of Division at the Corruption Eradication Commission, 
Interview 40) 
 
When asked whether government practitioners used the RKAKL performance scores 
when reviewing RKAKL documents, one practitioner from the Ministry of Forestry 
commented that he never saw the RKAKL performance scores were being discussed 
in the meetings. 
 
I never saw that they had the RKAKL performance scores in their hands when 
reviewing our budget proposals. (Head of Division at the Ministry of Forestry, 
Interview 36) 
 
Turning to the viewpoints from government practitioners of the Directorate General 
of Budget, an official from the Directorate of Budget III within the Directorate 
General of Budget explained that in his opinion the aim of RKAKL reviews is to 
examine whether the budgets proposed by line ministries in their RKAKLs conformed 
to the budgets issued by the Minister of Finance. As trilateral meetings, the RKAKL 
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reviews meetings are attended by officials from the Ministry of Planning, line 
ministries/agencies, and the Directorate General of Budget (DGB). The officials from 
the Directorate General of Budget examined the RKAKLs from the fiscal side. The 
role of officials from the Ministry of Planning was to examine the relationship 
between performance targets and the budget. However, according to him, officials 
from the Ministry of Planning did not in fact do the job. All functions were carried out 
by officials from the Directorate General of Budget (DGB). 
They should examine whether the RKAKL was relevant to the RKP [the annual 
government work plan]. However, all those roles were carried out by the DGB, 
with the reason just because we were “the final gate” to release the budget 
execution documents (DIPA). Everyone pretended that the DGB guaranteed that 
everything matched, such as performance targets, costs standards, and the 
budget. Actually, the DGB couldn’t make such guarantee… (Head of Section at 
the Directorate of Budget III, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 29) 
 
He argued that the Directorate General of Budget has no authority to examine the 
relationship between performance targets and the proposed budget. He further 
commented that the Directorate General of Budget has handed over the accountability 
for preparing RKAKL documents to line ministries/agencies.   
One of the principles of performance budgeting is let the managers manage, 
right? Let them handle this. We required them to be responsible to the budget 
they proposed. Our duty is rather to assist them (in preparing RKAKLs).  
(Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget III, the Directorate General of 
Budget, Interview 29) 
 
His argument was supported by his colleague from the Directorate of Budget I. 
However, he hoped that the Directorate General of Budget would be given more 
power to review the RKAKL documents. 
We did not have enough authority to review the relationship between proposed-
budget and performance targets. We simply focused on whether each ministry 
has fulfilled its administrative requirements. I hoped we would be given more 
authority to review the RKAKLs. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget 
I, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 24). 
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He explained that, previously, in reviewing RKAKLs, officials from the Directorate 
General of Budget did it in great detail, ranging from their terms of reference to their 
cost structures. They reviewed the correlation between inputs and outputs. With 
regard to the cost structures, they also reviewed the use of cost standards, the steps in 
implementing activities, and so on. Since 2013, the Directorate General of Budget has 
not reviewed the terms of reference and the cost structures of activities.  
Previously we could examine the terms of reference and the budget details of 
RKAKLs. However, we no longer now read the terms of reference and the 
budget details. As a consequence, we didn’t discuss the performance targets of 
line ministries. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget I, the Directorate 
General of Budget, Interview 24). 
 
Another official from the Directorate of Budget I made a similar comment. However, 
he noted that although previously he could review RKAKL documents in detail, he 
still did not review the relationship between the performance targets and the 
proposed-budgets, having insufficient time to do so.   
Before the budget year of 2014, we needed to review the RKAKLs in detail. 
However we did not review the relationship between the performance targets 
and the proposed-budgets. We did not have enough time to do that. (Head of 
Section at the Directorate of Budget I, the Directorate General of Budget, 
Interview 31). 
 
It is worth noting that another practitioner from the Directorate of Budget II had a 
different view of this matter. He argued that the current procedure is better than the 
previous one. As he did not have to examine RKAKLs in detail, so that he could 
review performance indicators and performance targets in the RKAKL documents.  
We review the RKAKL by examining the targeted-outputs. I think the current 
process is better than the previous one. For example, in the last budget year 
(2014), we didn’t have to examine details. We towards reviewing the 
performance indicators and targets stated in the RKAKL. (Head of Section at 
the Directorate of Budget II, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 26) 
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Another practitioner from the Directorate of Budget II agreed that to some extent he 
reviewed performance information in RKAKL documents. He focused on reviewing 
performance targets in RKAKLs. 
In reviewing RKAKLs, we were mainly concerned to review the agreed-
performance targets, particularly the national prioritised-activities that have 
been stated in other documents, such as the annual government work plan 
(RKP) and the agreement made in the trilateral-meeting. (Head of Section at the 
Directorate of Budget II, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 27) 
 
When asked whether budget officials in the Directorate General of Budget have 
authority to increase or to cut budgets if there was no connection between the 
performance target and the proposed-budget, another interviewee from the Directorate 
of Budget II responded negatively.  
In the meeting, we asked line ministries/agencies whether their performance 
targets in the RKAKL documents could be achieved or not. But we don’t have 
authority to ask them to increase their targets or cut their budgets. Line 
ministries/agencies have full responsibility for the use of their allocated budget. 
(Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget II, the Directorate General of 
Budget, Interview 32). 
 
 
Overall, theses results indicated that the involvement of officials from the Ministry of 
Planning in the RKAKL review meetings was not intensive. Several officials from the 
Ministry of Planning indicated their reluctance to be involved in the meetings feeling 
that the regulation that instructed them to do so was inappropriate. They argued that 
the Minister of Finance was the one who issued the regulation, not the Minister of 
Planning. It appears that this institutional problem needs to be solved first before 
government practitioners can do their job as intended. Therefore, the role of 
government officials from the Ministry of Planning in the RKAKL review meetings 
was merely to fulfil the formal obligation. The officials from the Directorate General 
of Budget had more control in these meetings but the findings were varied. Some 
government officials from line ministries/agencies argued that officials from the 
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Directorate General of Budget still focused on the inputs or the cost needed for the 
activities being planned rather examined performance indicators/targets proposed by 
line ministries/agencies. Several other practitioners from line ministries/agencies and 
the Directorate General of Budget stated that that to some extent the Directorate 
General of Budget reviewed performance targets in budget documents (RKAKLs). It 
was worth noting that past performance/performance results had never been discussed 
in the meetings. In addition, officials from the Directorate General of Budget had no 
authority to increase or to cut budgets if there was no connection between the 
performance targets and the proposed-budget by line ministries/agencies.   
 
 
6.2.4 The Use of Performance Information in Monitoring and Evaluation 
This section aims to examine the extent of use of performance information by 
government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General 
of Budget for the purposes of monitoring and evaluation. 
 
The Use of Performance Information in Monitoring and Evaluation by Government 
Practitioners in the Ministry of Planning 
The majority of interviewees from the Ministry of Planning commented that they did 
perform a monitoring and evaluation process. One official from the Directorate of 
Water and Irrigation explained in detail how he carried out the monitoring and 
evaluation process. 
Alongside coordination, our main duty is to do monitoring and evaluation. For 
example, this year [2014] our duty is evaluating the achievement of targets that 
were included in the government work plan document (RKP) of 2013. How 
much is the (implementation) gap (from the plan in RKP)? We’ll determine this 
gap. The gap we found then becomes feedback for us to find any problems. If 
there is an implementation gap, the planned targets [in the RKP] for the 
following year should also be adjusted. We are comparing the achievement of 
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the annual targets with the targets stated in the national five-year planning 
document (RPJMN). We’ll inform line ministries/agencies under our 
responsibility of the results of our evaluation. (Head of Sub Directorate at the 
Directorate of Water and Irrigation, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 46) 
 
 
It appeared that the Ministry of Planning only monitored the achievement of 
performance targets that had been stated in the national medium term development 
plan (RPJMN). Another practitioner from the Directorate of State Apparatus 
explained how he monitored the achievement of priority programmes. He noted that 
that the Ministry of Planning did not monitor and evaluate every component in the 
budget documents. It also did not monitor the budget spending.   
We asked line ministries to submit the report every three-months. In addition, 
we have coordination meetings that include evaluation meeting. However, in 
this evaluation we only focused on the policy level. We didn’t do on detailed 
evaluation, such as budget spending of every component of activities, what 
activities had been covered and so on. Our focus is to see their performance, not 
their budget spending. (Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of State 
Apparatus, the Ministry of Planning, Interview 19) 
 
One interviewee from the Directorate of Religion, Culture, Youth, and Sport 
acknowledged that there was a difficulty in monitoring and evaluation. 
Although every three months we conduct monitoring and evaluation, our 
monitoring and evaluation couldn’t be thorough enough. This happened because 
line ministries/agencies didn’t submit the data as required. (Head of Sub 
Directorate at the Directorate of Religion, Culture, Youth, and Sport, the 
Ministry of Planning, Interview 43) 
 
The Use of Performance Information in Monitoring and Evaluation by Government 
Practitioners in the Directorate General of Budget 
A practitioner from the Directorate of Budget III explained that the monitoring and 
evaluation had been introduced in the Directorate General of Budget after the 
establishment of the performance evaluation division. Then the Minister of Finance 
Regulation Number 249/2011 regarding performance evaluation was issued. 
However, he noted that they were still in the learning stages; they tried to implement 
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the process, and progressed by trial and error. A practitioner from the Directorate of 
Budget II acknowledged that his division performed monitoring and evaluation. He 
used the performance report to calculate reward or punishment to be given to line 
ministries/agencies under his responsibility. He also frequently asked the 
ministries/agencies about progress in achieving performance targets. Another 
practitioner from the Directorate of Budget I commented that he did not perform 
evaluation because he was too busy with other routine tasks such as processing budget 
amendments proposed by line ministries/agencies under his responsibility. He also 
stated that he did not have time to read performance reports submitted by line 
ministries/agencies.  
 
When asked what kind of performance measures they used for monitoring purposes, 
three practitioners stated that they only used the budget spending data. One of them 
explained why he only used the budget spending data. 
We have a system in our office to monitor performance achievement of line 
ministries/agencies. However, in that system we can only see their budget 
spending, there is no information on outputs achieved. Line ministries/agencies 
don’t update their output achievements regularly. (Head of Section, the 
Directorate of Budget II, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 32). 
 
Another practitioner said that because they did not have a further guideline on the use 
of performance evaluation results they only used budget allocations and budget 
spending data for evaluating line ministries/agencies’ performance. As revealed by 
one practitioner from the Directorate of Budget III, another difficulty in using 
performance information for evaluation is that there is a time lag between the 
performance information and the budget year.   
 
Taken together, the majority of officials from the Ministry of Planning undertook 
monitoring and evaluation process by monitoring the achievement of performance 
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targets stated in the national medium term development plan (RPJMN). However, 
they found difficult to monitor because line ministries/agencies sometime did not 
submit the data as required. In general, government officials from the Directorate 
General of Budget only monitored the budget spending of line ministries/agencies. 
Although they had a system to monitor performance of line ministries, line ministries 
did not update their progress regularly. Officials of the Directorate General of Budget 
did not do evaluation process because there is no guidance for them to do the 
evaluation. It was revealed that they were still in learning stages in monitoring and 
evaluation.  
 
6.3 How the Legislature Uses Performance Information   
This section reports the views of government practitioners on the use of performance 
information by Members of Parliament (DPR). Figure 6.7 reports the results of the 
questionnaire that asked about this issue.  Out of 58 respondents, 59% of respondents 
(n = 34) strongly agreed/agreed with the statement that Members of Parliament used 
performance information to make approvals of budget cuts or budget increases in 
budget meetings. However, a quarter of respondents (26% or n = 15) neither agreed 
nor disagreed with that statement. The remaining 16% of respondents (n = 9%) 
strongly disagreed or disagreed with it. The number of respondents who strongly 
agreed/agreed is higher when responding to the statement that, “Members of 
Parliament use performance information to inform them in making budget decisions 
but they are not necessarily related to budget cuts or budget increases.” Two-thirds of 
respondents (n = 38) strongly agreed/agreed with it. However, the number of 
respondents who strongly disagreed/disagreed was still quite high (n = 10 or 18%). A 
small majority of respondents (57% or n = 33) strongly agreed/agreed with the 
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statement that, “Members of Parliament use performance information to assist them in 
making decisions in non-budgeting meetings that discuss a programme/activity of 
ministry/agency.” A quarter of respondents (26% or n = 15) neither agreed nor 
disagreed and 17% or respondents (n = 10) strongly disagreed/disagreed with this 
statement. Overall, the results of the questionnaire indicate that a small majority of 
respondents viewed that Members of Parliament had used performance information in 
assisting them to make decisions in the budgeting process. 
 
Figure 6.7: Performance Information Use by Members of Parliament 
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Turning now to the interview results with government practitioners from the Ministry 
of Planning, the Directorate General of Budget, and line ministries/agencies. When 
asked whether Members of Parliament used performance information in the budgetary 
process, two practitioners from the Ministry of Planning stated that they did not. One 
practitioner from the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding said that the 
Parliament concentrated more on their political interests, such as their party and 
constituents’ aims, rather than looking at performance information, in making 
decisions. However, one practitioner from the Directorate of Transportation said that, 
based on his experience in budget meetings at the Parliament, to some extent 
Members of Parliament did use performance information.    
 
Six practitioners from the Directorate General of Budget also stated that Members of 
Parliament did not use performance information in budgeting decisions. Three of 
them commented that Members of Parliament were more concerned with their 
political interests and constituents than performance information. However, one 
practitioner from the Directorate of Budget I noted that some Members of Parliament 
were concerned with performance information. They used it for making comparisons 
and evaluations. One practitioner from the Directorate of Budget III argued that the 
reason why Members of Parliament did not use performance information was because 
they play in the political arena. He argued that performance information should be 
used more by ‘technocrats’ in the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and 
line ministries/agencies. He further argued that Members of Parliament still used the 
percentage of budget spending in assessing the government’s performance. Another 
practitioner from the Directorate of Budget II commented that the Parliament was 
more concerned with the fiscal space in allocating budgets for ministries/agencies. 		
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While three practitioners from line ministries/agencies noted that to some extent 
Members of Parliament used performance information in the budgeting process, 
twelve practitioners from seven different ministries/agencies commented that 
Members of Parliament did not use it. One practitioner from the Ministry of Public 
Work explained that although Members of Parliament did not know about 
performance scores, they were concerned with performance targets and programmes 
that would be implemented by ministries. Another practitioner from the same ministry 
stated that Members of Parliament used performance information that they viewed  
important for citizens. One practitioner from the Government Procurement Policy 
Agency also commented that Members of Parliament were only concerned with 
performance information that had a major impact on the public. Three practitioners 
from the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Public Works, and the 
Ministry of Administrative & Bureaucratic Reform, argued that Members of 
Parliament did not use performance information and that they were more concerned 
with budgets for their constituents. Two other practitioners from the Government 
Procurement Policy Agency and the Ministry of Forestry noted that Members of 
Parliament were more concerned about budget spending than performance 
information. According to two practitioners from the Audit Board of Indonesia, one 
reason why Members of Parliament made little use of performance information was 
because the performance information gathered from the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance was very limited. They did not have enough information. A 
practitioner from the Ministry of Public Works also commented that Members of 
Parliament depended on  information given by line ministries/agencies. They did not 
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have any other alternative information that could be used to challenge the information 
given by line ministries/agencies. 
 
One Member of Parliament commented that the implementation of performance-
based budgeting by Members of Parliament was ineffective because it mostly 
depended on the policy of each party in the Parliament. He pointed out that line 
ministries/agencies have a pattern of increasing their budget proposals by around 10% 
every budget year. He also mentioned that performance information could not be 
implemented in certain sectors such as education because the government must 
allocate a fixed percentage for education as obliged by the law. He further mentioned 
that one problem with the use of performance information by Members of Parliament 
was that it was provided infrequently by the government.  
 
The results in this section indicate that generally Members of Parliament did not use 
performance information in budgeting decisions. Members of Parliament were more 
concerned with their political interests and constituents than performance information. 
Members of Parliament still used the percentage of budget spending in assessing the 
government’s performance and more concerned with the fiscal space in allocating 
budgets for ministries/agencies. A Member of Parliament commented that the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting by Members of Parliament was 
ineffective because it mostly depended on the policy of each party in the Parliament. 
He pointed out that line ministries/agencies have a pattern of increasing their budget 
proposals by around 10% every budget year. He further mentioned that one problem 
with the use of performance information by Members of Parliament was that it was 
provided infrequently by the government. 	
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6.4 How Government Practitioners of Ministries/Agencies Use Performance 
Information 
This section reports on the use of performance information in line ministries/agencies 
in three main areas. Firstly, it reports on the use of performance information in the 
budgeting process related to budget authorities, i.e. the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance. In particular, it presents findings on how government 
practitioners in line ministries/agencies use performance information in preparing 
budget proposals/the work plans and budgets documents of line ministries/agencies 
(RKAKLs) to be submitted to those budget authorities. Secondly, it reports findings 
on how government practitioners use performance information in allocating budgets 
within ministries/agencies. Lastly, it reports findings on the use of performance 
information for managerial purposes within ministries/agencies.   
 
6.4.1 How Government Practitioners in Line Ministries/Agencies Use 
Performance Information in Preparing Budget Proposals 
 
Figures 6.8 to Figure 6.10 report findings from the questionnaire related to a variety 
of performance information uses by line ministries/agencies in preparing budget 
proposals to be submitted to the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of 
Budget. A large majority of respondents (82% or n = 49) strongly agreed/agreed with 
the statement that their line ministries/agencies use performance information to fulfil 
formal requirements as requested by the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance.  Only 8% of respondents (n = 5) strongly disagreed/disagreed. The 
remaining one-tenth of respondents (n = 6) neither agreed nor disagreed (See Figure 
6.8).  
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Figure 6.8: The Use of Performance Information by Line Ministries/Agencies 
(Part 1) 
 
With regards to the use of performance information to decide the budget amount 
proposed to the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the Parliament, a 
large majority of respondents (85% or n = 51) strongly agreed/agreed that their 
ministries/agencies adjusted their budget proposals by taking into account the 
performance targets before the proposals were submitted to the Ministry of Planning, 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Parliament.  Only 7% of respondents (n = 4) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed. As expected, a lower percentage of respondents (69% or 
n = 41) strongly agreed/agreed with the statement that their ministries/agencies 
adjusted their budget proposals by taking into account the results of performance 
evaluation or performance scores before the budget proposals were submitted to the 
Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the Parliament. Just over one-fifth 
of respondents (22% or n = 13) neither agreed nor disagreed. The remaining 8% of 
respondents (n = 5) strongly disagreed/disagreed with this statement. In summary, 
when preparing budget proposals, a large majority of respondents acknowledged that 
their ministries/agencies gave attention to the future performances as well as past 
performances before their budget proposals were submitted to the budget authorities.  
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Figure 6.9: The Use of Performance Information by Line Ministries/Agencies 
(Part 2) 
 
 
In relation to performance information use in budget meetings, again, a large majority 
of respondents (87% or n = 52) strongly agreed/agreed with the statement that they 
used performance information to convince government officials from the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in budget meetings that the proposed 
budget amount was appropriate with the performance targets. Only 3% of respondents 
(n = 2) strongly disagreed or disagreed with this statement (See Figure 6.10).  A large 
majority of respondents (80% or n = 48) also strongly agreed/agreed that they used 
performance information to convince government officials from the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in budget meetings that the proposed 
budget amount was related to the past performance scores/results. Only 5% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed and 15% (n = 9) of respondents neither 
Strongly Agree/ 
Agree 
51 
Strongly Agree/ 
Agree 
41 
Neither Agree  
nor Disagree 
5 
Neither Agree  
nor Disagree 
13 Strongly 
Disagree/ 
Disagree 
4 
Strongly 
Disagree/ 
Disagree 
5 
85% 
69% 
8% 
22% 
7% 8% 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
Decide the budget amount proposed to the 
Ministry of Planning, MOF, and the 
Parliament. Adjust its budget proposal by 
taking into account the performance 
targets before it was submitted to the 
Ministry of Planning, MOF, and the 
Parliament.  
Decide the budget amount proposed to the 
Ministry of Planning, MOF, and the 
Parliament. My ministry/agency adjusted 
its budget proposal by taking into account 
the results of performance evaluation or 
performance scores before it was 
submitted to them. 
 248 
agreed nor disagreed with this statement. A large majority of respondents also 
strongly agreed/agreed (83% or n = 50) that their ministries/agencies presented 
performance information in budget meetings in Parliament. They used performance 
information to convince Parliament and to mobilise support regarding the proposed 
budgets (See Figure 6.10). 
 
Figure 6.10: The Use of Performance Information by Line Ministries/Agencies 
(Part 3) 
 
 
Turning to the findings from the interviews, according to comments from government 
practitioners in line ministries/agencies, there is evidence that line ministries/agencies 
use performance information in the budgeting process. Two interviewees noted that 
Strongly Agree/ 
Agree 
48 
Strongly Agree/ 
Agree 
50 
Strongly Agree/
Agree 
50 
Neither Agree  
nor Disagree 
9 
Neither Agree  
nor Disagree 
5 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
5 
Strongly 
Disagree/ 
Disagree 
3 
Strongly 
Disagree/ 
Disagree 
5 
Strongly 
Disagree/
Disagree 
5 
87% 
80% 
83% 
10% 15% 8% 3% 5% 8% 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
Convince government 
officials from the Ministry 
of Planning and MOF in 
budget meetings in relation 
to the proposed budget sum 
and the performance targets. 
Convince government 
officials from the Ministry 
of Planning and MOF in 
budget meetings in relation 
to the proposed budget sum 
and the past performance 
scores/results. 
Be presented in budget 
meetings in the Parliament. 
The objective of presenting 
the performance 
information is to convince 
Parliament and to mobilize 
support regarding the 
proposed budgets. 
 249 
their ministries/agencies considered performance targets when proposing a budget to 
the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance.  
In making a budget proposal, we considered our performance targets. We had a 
reviewing process to consider the relationship between our targets and the 
budget needed. This was done before we met with the Ministry of Planning and 
MOF officials in the trilateral meeting. (Head of Planning Bureau, the Ministry 
of Education and Culture, Interview 04). 
 
We tried to follow the performance targets stated in our strategic plan when 
determining budget allocations within our ministry or submitting budget 
proposals to the Ministry of Planning. (Head of Section, the Ministry of Public 
Work, Interview 11) 
 
However, a government practitioner of the Audit Board of Indonesia commented that 
he could only use performance information, in the form of past achievements and 
performance targets, to review a small number of activities proposed by divisions 
within his agency. For most activities, he still used the budget trend or budget amount 
as a basis to review budget proposals.  
 
These results suggest that the majority of line ministries/agencies used performance 
information in preparing budget proposals and budget documents (RKAKLs) to be 
submitted to the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance. They also used 
performance information to convince budget examiners from those ministries. 
Performance information was also presented during budget meetings in the 
Parliament to get support from them.  
 
6.4.2 How Government Practitioners in Line Ministries/Agencies Use 
Performance Information in Allocating Budgets within Their 
Ministries/Agencies 
 
This section reports the findings of performance information use by line 
ministries/agencies in allocating budgets within their ministries/agencies. Figures 6.11 
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to 6.14 present the results of the questionnaire that asked respondents from line 
ministries/agencies to give their views on how their line ministries/agency used 
performance information in allocating budgets within their ministries/agencies.  
Almost two-thirds of respondents (62% or n = 37) strongly disagreed/disagreed with 
the statement that in allocating budget to each division/department within their 
ministries/agencies, they only used performance information to fulfil formal 
requirements, as requested by the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) in budget documents. However, a quarter of respondents (n = 15) strongly 
agreed/agreed that the use of performance information was used only to fulfil formal 
requirements. The remaining 13% or respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with 
this statement (See Figure 6.11).  
Figure 6.11: The Use of Performance Information by Line Ministries/Agencies 
(Part 4) 
 
In relation to the use of performance information for cutting or increasing budgets 
proposed by each division/department, just above half of the respondents (57% or n = 
34) strongly agreed/agreed that their ministries/agencies used it to cut or increase the 
amount of budget. A quarter of respondents (n = 15) strongly disagreed/disagreed and 
almost one-fifth of respondents (18% or n = 11) neither agreed nor disagreed with this 
statement (See Figure 6.12).  
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Figure 6.12: The Use of Performance Information by Line Ministries/Agencies 
(Part 5) 
  
Figure 6.13 presents the results of the questionnaire that asked whether government 
practitioners from line ministries/agencies still used past budget allocations and past 
budget spending as the main factors, without paying particular attention to 
performance information, in allocating budgets within their ministries/agencies.  Just 
under half of the respondents (47% or n = 28) strongly disagreed or disagreed with 
the statement ‘In allocating a budget to each Divisions/Departments, my 
ministry/agency uses previous year’s budget allocation as a basis to decide the budget 
amount of each Division/Department, without paying particular attention to 
performance information.’ However, one-third of respondents (33%) strongly 
agreed/agreed with this statement, meaning that they still relied on past budget 
allocations in determining a budget. The remaining one-fifth of respondents (n = 12) 
neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement. Asked about the following 
statement, “In allocating a budget to each Divisions/Department, my ministry/agency 
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each Division/Department without paying particular attention to performance 
information,” just under half of respondents (45% or n = 27) also strongly 
disagreed/disagreed with it. However, one-third of respondents (n = 20) strongly 
agreed/agreed and around one-fifth of respondents (22% or n = 13) neither agreed nor 
disagreed that they still used past budget spending in allocating budgets for their 
divisions without paying particular attention to performance information. In response 
to the statement, ‘In allocating budget to each Divisions/Department, my 
ministry/agency uses a combination of the previous year’s budget allocation and the 
previous year’s budget spending to decide the budget amount of each 
Division/Department, without paying particular attention to performance 
information’, just over one-third of respondents (37% or n = 22) strongly agreed/ 
agreed with it.  However, almost the same proportion of respondents (35% or n = 21) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed. The remaining 28% of respondents (n = 17) neither 
agreed nor disagreed. From the mixed responses of respondents to those three 
statements, it can be perceived that to some extent performance information was 
considered by line ministries/agencies in the allocation of budgets for their 
subordinates. However, past budget allocations and past budget spending also still 
played key roles in determining the budgets.  
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Figure 6.13: The Use of Performance Information by Line Ministries/Agencies 
(Part 6) 
 
The results of the questionnaire in Figure 6.14 confirmed that performance 
information is used to some extent by line ministries/agencies as a supporting tool to 
make budgeting decisions within their ministries/agencies. A large majority of 
respondents (78% or n = 47) strongly agreed/agreed with the statement ‘In allocating 
a budget to each Divisions/Department, my ministry/agency uses performance 
information as a supporting tool to make budgeting decisions for each 
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Division/Department.’ Only one-tenth of respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed 
and the remaining 12% of respondents (n = 7) neither agreed nor disagreed with it. A 
large majority of respondents (80% or n = 48) also strongly agreed/agreed with the 
statement ‘In allocating a budget to each Divisions/Department, my ministry/agency 
uses a combination of several factors such as performance information, the previous 
year’s budget allocations, and the previous year’s budget spending, to decide the 
budget amount of each Division/Department’. Only one-tenth of respondents (n = 6) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed. 
 
Figure 6.14: The Use of Performance Information by Line Ministries/Agencies 
(Part 7) 
 
Overall, the results in Figure 6.13 and 6.14 indicate that a large majority of line 
ministries/agencies had tried to consider performance information in determining 
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budgets within their ministries/agencies. However, past budget allocations and past 
budget spending still played important roles in affecting decisions of government 
practitioners from line ministries/agencies in allocating budgets.  
 
Summarising from their responses to the open question of the questionnaire, fifteen 
line ministries/agencies noted various other factors they used in determining a budget: 
priorities or policies from top management; national priority activities; the number of 
personnel; the fulfillment of the operational budget; the availability of personnel to 
implement the activities; the roles of each division; the budget needs for special cases 
or special activities such as natural disasters and riot countermeasures; and the budget 
for capital asset expenditures. 
 
Turning to the findings from the interviews, five practitioners from different 
ministries/agencies explained how they allocated a budget within their 
ministries/agencies. An official from the Ministry of Education and Culture 
commented that his ministry considered past performance as one of the tools to 
allocate budget within his ministry. However, the category of the past performance 
used for determining a budget was still the past budget spending. Furthermore, he 
explained that the Ministry of Education and Culture should consider the performance 
targets stated in the national five-year plan (RPJMN), the instructions of the 
President, and its responsibilities as regulated in the laws.  Another practitioner from 
the Government Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP) explained that in allocating a 
budget to each division, LKPP considered its past years’ budget spending, 
performance targets, and the direction from its top management. Within the agency, 
they conducted budget discussions with each division regarding the relationship 
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between its performance targets and the proposed-budget. Moreover, they also 
reviewed past performance. One practitioner from the Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform also explained that in allocating a budget, they considered two 
things, past performance and budget spending, prior to a negotiation between the 
Planning Bureau and each division. The process was iterative. However, he 
emphasised that the connection between budget allocations and these two factors are 
indirect. Another practitioner from the Corruption Eradication Commission explained 
that his agency did not use performance evaluation, such as budget spending or output 
achievement, in allocating a budget within the agency. Instead, they allocated a 
budget for every division based on its budget proposal. They evaluated all proposals, 
and then decided budgets for all divisions. Therefore, their focus was performance 
targets of the following budget year. They also would consider the total budget given 
by the government. As the budget given by the government was limited, sometimes 
they have to negotiate with their subordinate divisions informally by looking at the 
past years’ budget spending.    
 
Overall, these results indicate that small majority of line ministries/agency used 
performance information to cut or increase the budget proposed by each 
division/department within their ministry/agency. In addition, performance 
information, along with other factors, was considered by line ministries/agencies in 
the allocation of budgets for their subordinates. However, past budget allocations and 
past budget spending also still played key roles in determining the budgets.  
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6.4.3 The Use of Performance Information for Managerial Purposes   
While the previous two sections discuss findings related to performance information 
in the budgeting process, this section reports findings about the use of performance 
information for managerial purposes within line ministries/agencies. The respondents 
were asked to comment on various statements relating to performance information use 
for different purposes.  
 
Figure 6.15 reports findings related to performance information in the performance 
management system of line ministries/agencies. When asked whether performance 
information in performance budgeting cannot be used for performance management   
in their ministry/agency, just less than two-thirds of respondents (61% or n = 36) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed with it. A quarter of respondents (25% or n = 15) neither 
agreed nor disagreed and 14% of respondents (n = 8) strongly agreed or agreed with 
this statement. Almost two-thirds of respondents (62% or n = 36) strongly 
agreed/agreed with the statement that, ‘performance information in performance 
budgeting has been integrated into the performance management system in their 
ministry/agency.’ However, just less than one-fifth of respondents (19% or n = 11) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed with this. There were also about one-fifth of respondents 
(19% or n = 11) who neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement. When the 
respondents were asked whether their ministry/agency has a separate performance 
managements system that differs from performance budgeting, 41% of respondents (n 
= 23) strongly agreed/agreed with this. However 29% of respondents (n = 16) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed and there were 30% of respondents (n = 17) who neither 
agreed nor disagreed with this statement. From the views of respondents to those 
three statements, a small majority of respondents perceived that performance 
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information in performance budgeting could also be used for performance 
management and it has been integrated into the performance management system in 
the ministry/agency.  
 
Figure 6.15: The Use of Performance Information in the Performance 
Management System 
 
Turning to the use of performance information for accountability and getting support 
from the public, Figure 6.16 reports findings of the questionnaire related to these two 
issues. A large majority of respondents (83% or n = 48) strongly agreed/agreed with 
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reporting purposes to external parties such as the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate 
General of Budget, and the public.’ Only 5% of respondents (n = 3) strongly 
disagreed/disagreed and 12% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with this 
(See Figure 6.16). From their responses, it can be seen that line ministries/agencies 
used performance information for accountability purposes to external parties.  
 
The respondents were also asked whether performance information in performance 
budgeting was used for getting support and convincing the public about the work of 
their ministry/agency (mobilisation purposes), about two-thirds of respondents 
strongly agreed or agreed with this statement. However, around one-fifth of 
respondents (22% or n = 13) neither agreed nor disagreed and one-tenth of 
respondents (n = 6) strongly disagreed or disagreed (See Figure 6.16). It can be 
concluded that a small majority of line ministries had used performance information 
for mobilisation purposes. 
Figure 6.16: The Use of Performance Information For Accountability and 
Mobilisation 
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With regards to the use of performance information for improvement purposes in the 
line ministries/agencies, 70% of the respondents (n = 41) strongly agreed/agreed with 
the statement that managers in their ministry/agency used performance information in 
performance budgeting to understand more about the programmes and activities. Only 
one-tenth of the respondents (n = 6) strongly disagreed/disagreed and one-fifth of the 
respondents (n = 12) neither agreed nor disagreed with it. When asked whether 
performance information in performance budgeting is used for improving 
programmes and activities within their ministry/agency, a large majority of 
respondents (80% or n = 47) strongly agreed/agreed. Only 5% of respondents (n = 3) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed and 15% of respondents (n = 9) neither agreed nor 
disagreed (See Figure 6.17). Therefore it can be inferred that a large majority of 
respondents use performance information for improvement purposes.  
Figure 6.17: The Use of Performance Information For Improvement 
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In summary, these results suggest that government practitioners in line 
ministries/agencies used performance information in performance-based budgeting 
for managerial purposes. Performance information in performance-based budgeting 
could also be used for performance management and it has been integrated into the 
performance management system in line ministries/agencies. The majority of line 
ministries/agencies used performance information for reporting purposes to external 
parties, such as the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the public. 
Performance information was also used to get support and convince the public about 
the work of the ministry/agency. A large majority of line ministries/agencies revealed 
that the managers in their ministries/agencies used performance information to 
understand more about their programmes/activities and they used performance 
information for improvement their programmes/activities. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
This Chapter has discussed findings of the extent of the use of performance 
information by government practitioners in the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate 
General of Budget within the Ministry of Finance, the Parliament, and the line 
ministries/agencies.  
 
It has been found that government practitioners from both the Ministry of Planning 
and the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance initiated the use of 
performance information in the various stages of planning and budgeting. While the 
use of performance information by those authorities did not necessarily affect budget 
decisions, performance information had been used during the various stages of 
planning and budgeting process, such as in RKAKL review meetings and monitoring 
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and evaluation. However, practitioners from both institutions rarely used past 
performance information or RKAKL performance scores in the process. They were 
more interested in future performance or performance targets.   
 
The research has shown that the use of performance information by Members of 
Parliament was limited. While they used performance information in assisting them to 
make decisions in the budgeting process, their decisions were more political than 
technical.  
 
The research has indicated that line ministries/agencies had endeavoured to consider 
performance information in determining budgets within their ministries/agencies. 
However, past budget allocations and past budget spending still played key roles in 
affecting the decisions. As with budget decisions by the Ministry of Planning and the 
Directorate General of Budget, there was no direct link between performance and 
budget allocations within line ministries/agencies. 
 
Regarding the use of performance information within line ministries/agencies for 
other purposes beyond the planning and budgeting process, the research has identified 
that they used performance information in performance based budgeting as part of 
their performance management system. Government practitioners in line 
ministries/agencies also used performance information for accountability, 
mobilisation, and improvement purposes.  
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Overall, the research has identified that use of performance information by 
government practitioners in Indonesia has definitely been initiated but was at an early 
stage of adoption.   
 
In the next chapter the challenges encountered by government practitioners in 
implementing performance based budgeting will be discussed.    
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Chapter 7 - Challenges in Implementing Performance-Based 
Budgeting in Indonesia 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the findings relating to Research Question Number Four, ‘What 
challenges have government practitioners encountered in seeking to implement 
performance-based budgeting?’ The findings are collected from the interviews and 
the questionnaire given to budget officials and other government practitioners. The 
interviews were conducted with 53 government practitioners from the Ministry of 
Planning, the Directorate General of Budget within the Ministry of Finance, Members 
of Parliament, and seven ministries/agencies. The questionnaire was distributed to 
government practitioners from 79 line ministries/agencies that were not selected for 
interviews.  
 
The findings here are organised into three major themes.  The first section reports the 
findings relating to the problems with the measurement system. The second section 
reports findings relating to support for managing performance in all institutions 
involved in the implementation of performance-based budgeting while the third 
section focuses on findings relating to personnel and technical capacity in 
implementing performance-based budgeting.  
 
7.2 Problems with the Measurement System 
This section reports findings relating to the quality of outcomes and outputs, the 
credibility of performance information, the link between performance information and 
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the strategic plan, different performance systems in use by practitioners, disincentives 
to using performance information, lack of evaluation feedback from the Directorate 
General of Budget, and the continuance of incremental budgeting practice. 
 
7.2.1 The Quality of Outcomes and Outputs 
Several interviewees from line ministries/agencies stated that there were difficulties in 
determining and measuring the outcomes and outputs that constitute performance 
measures.  In Indonesian performance based budgeting, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
outcomes are closely associated with programmes and outputs are closely associated 
with activities.  According to a practitioner from an agency, the use of outcomes and 
outputs measures is a significant achievement of the implementation of performance-
based budgeting.  However, a practitioner from the Government Procurement Policy 
Agency (LKPP) stated that they often have difficulty in determining the appropriate 
outputs. In the questionnaire, a practitioner from the Meteorology, Climatology and 
Geophysics Agency (BMKG) also argued that performance information could not be 
used fully in his agency because they were having difficulty with several performance 
indicators.  
 
Turning to the questionnaire, the respondents from ministries/agencies were asked 
about their experiences in measuring the outcomes and outputs of their organisations. 
Of the 60 respondents, only 17 respondents (28%) strongly agreed/agreed with the 
statement ‘the outcomes of our programmes are difficult to measure’, while 31 (52%) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed with the statement. The remaining 12 respondents, 
(20%), neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement (see Figure 7.1).  
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The results were slightly different when respondents were asked whether they agreed 
with the statement,  ‘The outputs of our activities are difficult to measure.’ Only 15% 
(n = 9) of the respondents agreed/strongly agreed that the outputs of their activities 
were difficult to measure. Two-thirds (67% or n = 40) of respondents disagreed/ 
strongly disagreed with this statement. From the viewpoints of respondents to these 
two questions it can be concluded that measuring outcomes was more difficult than 
measuring outputs. Although the majority of respondents disagreed with the view that 
measuring outcomes and outputs is difficult, others still considered that measuring 
these two components was not an easy task. 
 
Figure 7.1: Difficulties in Measuring Outcomes and Outputs
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the problems with the quality of performance indicators. A Head of a Sub Directorate 
at the Directorate of State Apparatus in the Ministry of Planning acknowledged that 
developing performance indicators is not as simple as he had previously imagined. 
The Deputy of Development Funding at the same ministry provided further 
explanation.  He explained that it was difficult to define the right inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes. He argued that currently there are too many outputs in the budget 
documents. Another practitioner, a Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of 
Water and Irrigation in the Ministry of Planning, claimed that performance-based 
budgeting could not cover all performance measurement. He commented as follows:   
Not all performance measurements can be included in performance-based 
budgeting. Sectors such as health and education probably had established 
instruments such as a survey, so determining performance would be relatively 
easy. But in the irrigation sector, the data from the Ministry of Public Works, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Statistics Agency (BPS) are always diverse. 
We solved this problem with discussions with our partners in the line ministry. 
(Head of Sub Directorate at the Directorate of Water and Irrigation, the Ministry 
of Planning, Interview 46). 
 
Similar perspectives were expressed by government practitioners in the Directorate 
General of Budget (DGB). For example, a Head of Section at the Directorate Budget I 
explained that the Directorate General of Budget has been continuing to seek the best 
form of performance based budgeting for Indonesia. He explained the problem he 
found with regard to the quality of performance indicators: 
One problem that I found is how to decide appropriate indicators (outputs) for 
each line ministry. I found that currently there are many ‘intermediate outputs’ 
instead of final outputs for each line ministry. (Head of Section at the 
Directorate Budget I, the Directorate General, Interview 24) 
 
His colleague from the Directorate Budget II also commented that there were too 
many performance indicators (outputs) that are not “the true outputs”. He suggested 
that it was difficult to see the real performance of line ministries. Another official, a 
Head of Section at the Directorate Budget II, noted that the definition of an output 
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was not clear because the budget documents were too detailed and rigid.  As another 
practitioner commented: 
We do not know exactly what performance information is. Do we measure the 
performance of line ministries or every working unit within line ministries? 
(Head of Section, the Directorate Budget I, the Directorate General of Budget, 
Interview 31) 
 
An official from the Directorate of Budgeting System within the Directorate General 
of Budget explained that the implementation of performance budgeting needs time. 
He also argued that in the current situation, there were too many outputs and most of 
them might be not the intended outputs. He suggested taking the following action.  
We have to develop a logical framework that explains the relationship between 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budgeting 
System, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 49) 
 
 
7.2.2 The Credibility of Performance Information 
In the questionnaire, respondents from line ministries/agencies were asked their views 
on the statement, ‘My ministry/agency is finding it difficult to have high quality, 
credible performance information’. Out of 59 respondents, more than a third of 
respondents (37% or n = 22) considered that their ministries/agencies were having 
such difficulties. However, the number of respondents who strongly 
disagreed/disagreed with the statement was not much different (32% or n = 19). The 
remaining respondents (31% or n = 18) neither agreed nor disagreed with it.  
Therefore the results were mixed (See Figure 7.2). 
 
On the question about the necessity to have a credible information system in 
producing performance information, out of 60 respondents from line 
ministries/agencies, most respondents (87% or n = 52) strongly agreed/agreed that a 
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credible information system is needed. Only 3 % (n = 2) strongly disagreed/disagreed 
with it. The other 10% (n = 6) neither agreed nor disagreed. 
 
Figure 7.2: The Credibility of Performance Information 
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Figure 7.3: The Credibility of the Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) 
number 249/PMK.02/2011 as a Measurement System   
 
 
When the respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement that, ‘the 
benefit of using performance information is not clear’, almost half of respondents 
(47% or n= 27) strongly disagreed/disagreed. However, almost one third of 
respondents (29% or n= 17) strongly agreed/agreed that the benefit of using 
performance information is not clear. Almost a quarter of respondents (24% or n= 14) 
neither agreed nor disagreed (See Figure 7.4). 
Figure 7.4: The Agreement of the Statement ‘The Benefit of Using Performance 
Information is Not Clear 
 
19 
29 
11 32% 
49% 
19% 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
Strongly Agree/Agree Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree/
Disagree 
The Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) number 249/PMK.
02/2011 is not really a credible measurement system to evaluate 
the performance of my ministry/agency. 
17 
14 
27 
29% 
24% 
47% 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
Strongly Agree/Agree Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree/
Disagree 
The benefit of using performance information is not clear 
 271 
The respondents were also asked about any challenges they might be experiencing in 
gathering performance information. On the question of whether the use of 
performance information added paperwork and time-consuming data collection and 
reporting, the majority of respondents (62% or n = 37) strongly disagreed/disagreed 
with this statement. Only 15% of respondents (n = 9) strongly agreed/agreed with it. 
Almost a quarter of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. 
Therefore the majority of respondents did not believe that the use of performance 
information added paperwork and time-consuming data collection.   
 
However, with regards to having performance information in a timely manner, 
approximately 40% of respondents (n= 24) strongly agreed/agreed with the statement, 
‘My ministry/agency is finding it difficult to have performance information in a 
timely manner.’ One third of respondents (34% or n= 20) strongly 
disagreed/disagreed with this statement. A quarter of respondents (25% or n= 15) 
neither agreed nor disagreed that they were having difficulty in having performance 
information in time (See Figure. 7.5). 
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Figure 7.5. Challenges in Gathering Performance Information 
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A practitioner from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) acknowledged that 
performance indicators in his ministry probably could not be used to measure the 
roles of his ministry with regard to the aim of the government in improving the 
welfare of society. He suggested that that his office should improve its performance 
indicators. Two government practitioners, one from the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) and the other from the Ministry of Forestry, also stated that it was 
not clear which performance indicators (outcomes and outputs) were appropriate for 
different levels of government, such as outcomes of the President, Minister, or the 
lower units within the government institutions i.e. ministries/agencies. One of these 
practitioners, a Head of Division at the Planning Bureau within KPK claimed that 
performance measured in the budget documents (RKAKLs) was only the performance 
of working units at the Echelon II level such as bureaus or directorates within line 
ministries/agencies.   
 
Rather different results came from the questionnaire that was distributed to line 
ministries/agencies. When the respondents were asked to give their views on the 
statement, ‘Performance information in performance budgeting cannot accurately 
measure the whole performance of an organisation’, 25 out of 59 respondents (42%) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed with it. Only approximately one fifth of respondents 
(22% or n= 13) strongly agreed/agreed with this statement. The remaining 
respondents (36% or n = 21) neither agreed nor disagreed (See Figure 7.6).  
 
However, when respondents were asked to give their views on the statement, ‘My 
ministry/agency faces difficulty in choosing the right performance indicators that fit 
with its missions and functions’, the number of respondents who strongly agreed 
/agreed equalled the number of respondents who strongly disagreed/disagreed  (38% 
 274 
or n = 23). The remaining respondents (23% or n = 14) neither agreed nor disagreed 
(See also Figure 7.6).  Therefore to some extent, performance information was not 
seen to link directly with the strategic plans of organisations.  
 
Figure 7.6: Performance Information and Strategic Plan 
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Statistics Agency (BPS) argued that the government should use performance 
information in an integrated system that includes the vision and mission of the 
President. With the integrated system, he expected that the performance results of    
government-wide’s programmes and activities as well as line ministries/agencies’ 
programmes and activities could be seen and monitored. 
 
7.2.4 Different Performance Measurement Systems in Use by Practitioners 
The interviews with government practitioners revealed that government practitioners 
use different performance measurement and evaluation systems.  In their answers to 
the question of whether they use RKAKL performance scores based on the Minister 
of Finance Regulation 249/2011 (PMK No 249/2011), the responses from the 
Ministry of Planning officials were quite unexpected. Given the legal framework that 
requires its use, it is a little surprising that all ten officials of the Ministry of Planning 
said that they never used performance information based on that regulation for 
planning and budgeting. A senior official from the Office of the Deputy of the 
Development Funding argued that the RKAKL performance scores could not be used 
because the scores only cover financial information and not non-financial 
information. Another official from the same office claimed that the tool focuses more 
on budgeting matters such as budget spending, but it does not focus on what has been 
achieved by programmes. Interestingly, several officials at the Ministry said that they 
had never heard of, or read, the regulation. One official made a comment: “I might 
not be the only one who doesn’t know about it’ (Head of Sub Directorate at the 
Directorate of Religion, Culture, Youth, and Sport, the Ministry of Planning, 
Interview 43).  
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An official from the Office of the Deputy of Performance Evaluation in the Ministry 
of Planning explained that there is no regulation that requires the Ministry of Planning 
officials to use any particular evaluation tool. They are free to use any tools in 
evaluation. He pointed out that they need to reach a common understanding in 
evaluation. An official from the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding argued 
that the Ministry of Planning is trying to offer a tool to be used by both the Ministry 
of Planning and the Ministry of Finance. He also recognised that there are many 
evaluation systems in Indonesia.  
 
Further enquiries revealed that the Ministry of Planning officials use at least four 
different performance report sources: the Government Regulation No. 39/2006, the 
Government Regulation No. 8/2006, their own tool that they have developed to 
produce performance information, and other performance information sources.  
 
In contrast with the lack of knowledge expressed by the Ministry of Planning 
officials, it was perhaps not surprising that all interviewees from the Directorate 
General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) claimed to know about RKAKL 
performance scores - the evaluation tool having been developed by the MOF itself. 
However, the use of the results of evaluation for budget formulation and the budget 
reviews by officials in the Directorate General of Budget are different matters. In the 
Directorate General of Budget, several officials from Directorate Budget I, II, and III 
acknowledged that they did not conduct an evaluation based on the Minister of 
Finance regulation number 249/2011. They felt that it was not their job to do 
performance evaluation. One official pointed out that this kind of evaluation was the 
responsibility of the Directorate Budgeting System. 
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We do not conduct an evaluation based on PMK 249. It is the responsibility of 
the Directorate Budgeting System. However starting this year it would be our 
duty to conduct monitoring and evaluation (Head of Section at the Directorate 
of Budget I, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 25). 
 
Furthermore, one official from the Directorate of Budget II noted that the use of 
RKAKL performance scores was not ideal because the information in it does not 
cover all the aspects of evaluation mandated by the Minister of Finance Regulation 
249/2011. 
We could not use the results of evaluation because there was no logical 
framework that describes the relationship between inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes of programmes. Line ministries didn’t develop it. This evaluation is 
merely a regulation. Currently, the performance scores haven’t covered the 
scores of outcomes’ achievement. (Head of Section at the Directorate of Budget 
II, the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 26) 
 
One official from the Directorate of Budgeting System in the Directorate General of 
Budget explained that there is no mechanism to guarantee that the results of 
evaluation are used in the budgetary process. The Ministry of Finance have not 
developed a procedure that ensures officials in the Directorate General of Budget to 
give feedback of evaluation results to line ministries.   
 
Government practitioners from line ministries/agencies also commented on the 
variety of performance systems used by officials from the Ministry of Planning and 
the Directorate General of Budget as well as the Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform. At least seven practitioners commented that there were too 
many institutions monitoring the performance of ministries/agencies using different 
systems/tools. One practitioner commented as follows. 
There was no good coordination between the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry 
of Finance, and the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. The 
[performance] reports that were requested by them often overlapped. (Head of 
Section, the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), Interview 03) 
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Regarding this situation, an official from the Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform commented as follows. 
We have been trying to reach a perception regarding performance reports from 
the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and our ministry. We have 
finalised the draft of regulation concerning the performance report (Head of 
Division, the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, Interview 
51) 
 
An official from the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding in the Ministry of 
Planning also explained that the Ministry of Planning were trying to offer a tool to be 
used by both the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance.   
We are trying to offer them a tool that we call PAKEM (Self Analysis and 
Assessment of Policies). We are trying to communicate with the Ministry of 
Finance regarding PAKEM and RKAKL performance scores. We have no 
problem with the name because both have the same functions. I hope that this 
can be used in the next RPJMN. I don’t know. It depends on the top 
management. If they say no, it means we cannot use it (PAKEM). (Head of Sub 
Directorate at the Office of the Development Funding, the Ministry of Planning, 
Interview 52) 
  
Regarding the use of performance evaluation based on the Minister of Finance 
regulation No. 249/200 (PMK 249/2011) in line ministries/agencies, the interviews 
showed that there were two practitioners from line ministries that clearly stated that 
they did not use the Minister of Finance regulation No. 249/200 (PMK 249/2011) for 
measuring performance within their offices. Instead of using PMK 249/2011, one 
practitioner stated that his ministry used the Government Regulation No. 39/2006 for 
measuring and evaluating its performance. 
We do not use PMK 249 to evaluate performance within our ministry. We use 
PP 39/2006. (Head of Planning and Performance Management Bureau, the 
Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, Interview 16) 
  
Another practitioner from a line ministry stated that his ministry used a combination 
of performance budgeting with PMK 249/2011 and its own performance management 
system. Another practitioner from the Ministry of Finance used the balanced 
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scorecard to measure its performance. She argued that PMK 249/2011 was not an 
appropriate tool. Another practitioner from the Audit Board of Indonesia commented 
on the variation of the tools used by different institutions for monitoring and 
evaluation. 
The regulations on monitoring and evaluation, which were done by the Ministry 
of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, TEPPA Team, as well as the Ministry of 
State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform, are varied. In fact if we looked at the 
substance of all the reports, they are all the same. This situation is problematic 
for us. (Head of Section, the Audit Board of Indonesia, Interview 03) 
  
However, until recently there has been no consensus reached between three ministries 
(the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform with regard to simplifying performance monitoring and 
evaluation. 
 
7.2.5 Disincentives to Using Performance Information 
The presence of laws and regulations that relate to the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting is one of the factors that provide incentives or 
disincentives to the use of performance information. According to an official from the 
Directorate of Budget II within the Directorate General of Budget, the government is 
committed to implementing performance-based budgeting and has issued regulations 
supporting its implementation although commitment is not universal. 
In practice, we need to compromise because not everyone is ready for this 
(Head of Section at the Directorate Budget II within the Directorate General of 
Budget, Interview 27). 
 
Hence, not all requirements cited in the laws and regulations can be implemented 
easily. One of the government practitioners from the Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform also stated that a law related to performance-based budgeting 
implementation, among other things, was already in place. The law is the State 
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Finance Law 17/2003. However he noted that the Minister of Finance regulations and 
the Directorate General of Budget regulations were too rigid. It affected the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting. Here is his comment. 
If we see the Law 17/2003, it is good. However in performance budgeting 
implementation, if we talk about the Minister of Finance regulations, or even 
the Director General of Budget regulations, all were too rigid. We were back to 
line item budgeting. (Head of Planning and Performance Management Bureau, 
the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, Interview 16) 
 
Another practitioner from the Ministry of Education and Culture also expressed a 
similar perspective.  
The concept was good, but there is no regulation on how to use performance in 
determining budgets. In practice, it is back to line item budgeting as determined 
by the Directorate General of Budget. (Head of Planning Bureau, the Ministry 
of Education and Culture, Interview 04) 
 
From the views of line ministries, the regulations issued by the Directorate General of 
Budget provide disincentives to the implementation of performance-based budgeting. 
They suggested that the budgeting process is similar to line item budgeting. A Head 
of Division from the Government Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP) suggested that 
the Minister of Finance regulation 249/2011 had not supported the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting. 
The Minister of Finance Regulation number 249 needs to be strengthened, 
because the atmosphere [of performance measurement] turned out to be still 
about budget spending. That was not performance budgeting. If the performance 
targets had been achieved but with less spending, that would mean we have 
achieved efficiency and effectiveness. (Head of Division, the Government 
Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP), Interview 13) 
 
Another disincentive is that the performance measurement and evaluation based on 
the Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) 249/2011 has not been used for 
determining the budget. Several practitioners from line ministries confirmed this 
situation. According to a Head of Division from the Ministry of Forestry, the current 
reward and punishment mechanisms did not use performance reports based on PMK 
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249/2011.  Another practitioner from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic 
Reform urged that the government should change its policy.	
I believe we will use performance information in allocating budgets, on one 
condition; we should change our policy by using performance information in 
budget decisions (Head of Planning and Performance Management Bureau, the 
Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, Interview 16). 
 
A Head of Division from the Ministry of Education and Culture mentioned the 
dilemma encountered by his ministry with regard to priority programmes. The budget 
for these priority programmes might not be cut even though their performance might 
be poor. 
There was a dilemma with priority programmes. Although their (output) 
achievements were low/poor, whatever their performance was, they always 
have been given a budget. (Head of Division at the Planning Bureau, the 
Ministry of Education and Culture, Interview 05) 	
Another disincentive that is perceived to some extent hindering the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting is the existance of a legal requirement to provide a 
fixed portion of national budget for certain sectors. This is particularly the case with 
the education sector.  
It was difficult to implement performance-based budgeting within our ministry 
(the Ministry of Education) because the education budget, unlike other budgets, 
has been locked at 20% of the state budget. (Head of Division at the Planning 
Bureau, the Ministry of Education and Culture, Interview 05) 
 
 
7.2.6 Lack of Evaluation Feedback from the Directorate General of Budget 
 
As discussed earlier, according to the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011 all 
line ministries/agencies must submit the performance measurement and evaluation 
report to the Directorate General of Budget and the Ministry of Planning. We asked 
practitioners from line ministries/agencies whether the Directorate General of Budget 
had given feedback on these reports to every line ministry/agency.  
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Eleven practitioners from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), the Ministry of 
Forestry, the Government Procurement Policy Agency, the Ministry of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the 
Ministry of Education and Culture, and the Ministry of Public Work confirmed that 
the Directorate General of Budget never gave them feedback of these performance 
measurement and evaluation reports. The following are comments from two 
practitioners. 
The Ministry of Finance [the Directorate General of Budget] tried to evaluate 
performance of ministries by using the regulation 249/2011, but up until now 
there is no feedback from the evaluation. In addition, the Ministry of Planning 
has a different evaluation mechanism (Head of Sub Directorate, the Audit Board 
of Indonesia (BPK), Interview 01) 
 
The regulation has been implemented. We report our performance based on that 
regulation, and we always get bad scores. There was no particular feedback 
from the Ministry of Finance. We were invited to a meeting to discuss the 
results but they also invited other ministries. So the feedback was only in 
general for all ministries invited (Head of Planning and Performance 
Management, the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, 
Interview 16) 
 
  
As he did not receive feedback from the Directorate General of Budget (DGB), one 
practitioner from the Ministry of Education and Culture was not sure whether the 
DGB had received it. He also did not know if there were mistakes with the reports 
submitted.  A practitioner from the Directorate of Budgeting System within the DGB 
stated that it was true that the Minister of Finance regulation 249/2011 had not been 
implemented with regard to the use of the performance evaluation in formal budget 
cycles. He also acknowledged that there was no formal feedback regarding the results 
of performance evaluation to line ministries. There was no system to do that.   
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7.2.7 The Practice of Incremental Budgeting 
An important finding of the research is that the implementation of performance based 
budgeting in Indonesia, in practice, is still affected by the existence of traditional 
budgeting. One interviewee from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic 
Reform stated that the concept of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia is good 
but there is no regulation explicitly stating that budgets should be determined by 
performance. He made a further comment: 
One component of performance-based budgeting is, “let the managers manage”, 
but in reality it is back to “line item budget,” which is controlled by the 
Directorate General of Budget. (Head of Planning and Performance 
Management Bureau, the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, 
Interview 16) 
 
He continued by stating that, in practice, Indonesia implements performance-based 
budgeting just like the implementation of line item budgeting supplemented by 
performance indicators. Another example of how traditional budgeting still operated 
in practice was remarked on by two practitioners, one from the Ministry of Public 
Works and the other from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. 
They stated that in Indonesian budgeting, there was not enough room for flexibility in 
the budget execution stage. They suggested that line ministries/agencies should be 
given more flexibility on how to use their budget. They added that the Ministry of 
Finance (i.e. the Directorate General of Budget) should focus on how well a ministry 
was achieving its performance targets rather than be too rigid in examining how it 
spent the money. 
 
In connection with the evaluation conducted by the government (i.e. the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance) in determining budget allocation, six 
practitioners from the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Government 
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Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP), the Ministry of Forestry, the Audit Board of 
Indonesia (BPK), the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, and the 
National Standardization Agency (BSN) indicated that the government was still more 
focused on the percentage of budget spending rather than on the achievement of 
performance targets. Two interviewees made the following statements. 
The Directorate General of Budget and the Ministry of Planning have not used 
performance targets as well as performance evaluation results in determining 
budget allocations (Head of Planning Bureau, the Ministry of Forestry, 
Interview 41) 
 
We do not really implement performance-based budgeting, so performance 
information is overlooked. We only look at the previous year’s budget spending 
for measuring performance (Head of Planning and Performance Management 
Bureau, the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, Interview 16). 
 
In discussing budgeting, interviewees commented that rather than performance scores 
and performance targets, previous years’ budgets were considered by the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Planning in determining budget.  Two practitioners from 
the Audit Board of Indonesia commented on this.  One interviewee from the 
Government Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP) commented. 
[RKAKL] Performance scores [based on the Minister of Finance Regulation 
249/2011] have not been an important element in PBB because if our budgeting 
is based on performance, the performance evaluation should affect the 
following year’s budget process. However, up until now, I cannot see there is a 
relationship between performance score and budget (Head of Division, the 
Government Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP), Interview 13). 
 
Commenting on the open question in the questionnaire, one respondent from the State 
Administration Agency (LAN) argued that budget allocation was still determined by 
quota. The larger ministries/agencies would always get a larger budget, and smaller 
ministries/agencies would always get a smaller budget. The respondent also 
commented that as long as performance-based budgeting could not be implemented 
consistently, the use of performance information would be sub-optimal. The 
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respondent also stated that political domination in the budget decision affects the use 
of performance information. 
 
Despite their criticisms of the predominance of traditional budgeting in practice, two 
interviewees from the Audit Board of Indonesia and the Ministry of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform stated that the implementation of performance based 
budgeting in Indonesia has steadily improved. One interviewee from the Audit Board 
of Indonesian commented. 
Performance information was definitely considered by the Directorate General 
of Budget and the Ministry of Planning for allocating budgets, but I think it was 
only a small portion, they very much used the previous year’s budget 
allocations (Head of Section, the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), Interview 
03) 
  
  
7.3 Support For Managing Performance  
Here findings relating to leadership and management support, changing behaviour, 
lack of commitment from line ministries/agencies, and lack of coordination between 
the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget are set out of and 
discussed.   
 
7.3.1 Leadership and Management Support 
Support from Top Management 
The interviews with government officials from the Directorate General of Budget and 
the Ministry of Planning demonstrated a certain amount of support from their leaders 
in implementing performance-based budgeting. A Head of Section from the 
Directorate of Budget II within the Directorate General of Budget argued that the 
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support from the top management could be seen with the issuing of regulations 
relating to performance-based budgeting. 
Support from the top management is reflected by the issuance of regulations 
that support the implementation of performance budgeting. However, in 
practice, we need to compromise because not everyone is ready for this. (A 
Head of Section from the Directorate of Budget II within Directorate General of 
Budget, Interview 27)  
 
Another practitioner from the Directorate of Budgeting System at the same office 
argued that the support from the Minister of Finance (at the time the interview was 
conducted) was insufficient. 
We haven’t got strong support to implement performance-based budgeting. We 
need support from our Minister because performance-based budgeting is not 
mechanical, it is culture. (Head of Section at the Directorate Budgeting System, 
the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 34)  
		
In the Ministry of Planning (MOP), two practitioners stated that the support from their 
leaders was only a formality and never actually required them to use performance 
information in the planning and budgeting process. One Head of Sub Directorate 
agreed.  Another practitioner made the following comment. 
 
I never heard that our top management instructed us to use performance 
information as a basis for budgeting decisions. (Head of Sub Directorate, the 
Ministry of Planning, Interview 20) 
 
However, another Head of Sub Directorate from the Ministry of Planning had a 
different perspective. He stated that the top management within the Ministry of 
Planning had supported the use of performance information. 
The top management had supported the use of information. However this 
support should be supported by a developed system. The development of an 
evaluation system based on PP 39 [the Government Regulation No. 39/2006] 
has recently been introduced (Head of Sub Directorate, the Ministry of 
Planning, Interview 19). 
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Turning to the views of practitioners from line ministries/agencies, Figure 7.7 
presents the views from respondents to the questionnaire with regard to the attention 
of top management within line ministries to performance information.   
 
Figure 7.7: Engaging the Attention of Top Management to Performance 
Information 
 
 
 
Out of 60 respondents, 62% of respondents (n= 37) strongly disagreed/disagreed with 
the statement ‘It is difficult to get the attention from top management in using 
performance information’. Only 17% of respondents (n= 10) strongly agreed/agreed 
with this statement. The rest of the respondents (22% or n = 13) neither agreed nor 
disagreed.  From this finding, it can be seen that the majority of line 
ministries/agencies found little difficulty in getting attention from their top 
management with regard to using performance information. 
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Figure 7.7 also provides evidence from the questionnaire about the concern of top 
management within line ministries/agencies with performance and performance 
information. When the respondents were asked to give their views on the statement, 
‘our top management is very concerned with performance and performance 
information’, They always examine our activities with performance targets and 
performance results’, almost three quarters of respondents (n= 44) strongly 
agreed/agreed with that statement. Only 8% of respondents (n= 5) strongly 
disagreed/disagreed and almost one fifth of respondents (n= 11) neither agreed nor 
disagreed with it. From findings presented in Figure 7.7 it was found that the majority 
of respondents believed that the top management in their ministries/agencies had paid 
enough attention on performance and in using performance information. 
 
 
Turning to the findings from the interviews with government officials from line 
ministries/agencies and the answers from an open question of the questionnaire, there 
were mixed results regarding the support for performance from the leader or top 
management within line ministries/agencies.  
 
Ten government practitioners from various line ministries/agencies stated that their 
leaders supported, or were concerned about performance within their organisations. 
The support from their leaders could be expressed in many and different ways. One 
official from the Ministry of Agriculture gave an example about the support from his 
leader. The leader within his ministry gave his support by issuing a regulation 
regarding the guidelines for performance measurement 2010-2014.  
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Another interviewee from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) provided 
another example of attention from his leaders. He stated that the leaders supported an 
initiative to implement the balanced scorecard as a tool or a system for evaluating 
performance within their organisation. The Ministry of Planning or the Ministry of 
Finance did not require the use of the balanced scorecard. This was an initiative of the 
agency itself. This showed that the leader of this organisation has a desire to measure 
the performance. Another government official from the Government Procurement 
Policy Agency (LKPP) explained how the head of his agency monitored its 
performance.  
Our head of agency is very concerned with performance. We always have 
informal discussions about our performance. Every division is very aware of its 
performance. We are a small agency so that it might be the case that we can talk 
freely and more intensively about our performance (Head of Planning Bureau,  
the Government Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP), Interview 12). 
 
A government official from the same agency (LKPP) argued that support for 
performance was demonstrated by the use of performance information as an initial 
basis for making decisions.  A Head of Sub Division from the Ministry of Public 
Work argued that the support from his leaders was already in the right direction.   
Support from our leaders is already in the right direction. Our minister and 
secretary general have frequently talked about outcomes. (Head of Sub 
Division, the Ministry of Public Work, Interview 44) 
 
Another interviewee from the Ministry of Forestry gave another perspective regarding 
the support from his leader. 
Support from our leaders within our ministry was very good. They were willing 
to spend their time, although not in detailed communication. (Head of Division, 
the Ministry of Forestry, Interview 35) 
 
However, not every leader within a ministry shows the same support or awareness for 
performance. One practitioner from the Ministry of Education and Culture gave his 
views. 
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My secretary general and my minister are very committed to improving 
performance. Reform starts from the top. But among other Directorate Generals, 
there are those who still have an old paradigm, ‘I don’t care. The most 
important thing is that I am secure with my salary, allowances. I am more 
happy. That’s it.’ Other Director Generals have more adrenaline to pursue good 
performance; usually they come from the new generation (Head of Planning 
Bureau, the Ministry of Education and Culture, Interview 04). 
 
Other government practitioners also gave their views regarding the lack of awareness 
and commitment of their executive leaders to use performance information and lack 
of their support for improving performance. From an open question of the 
questionnaire, a government practitioner from the National Nuclear Energy Agency 
(BATAN) wrote that there was lack of awareness and commitment from top 
management to pay attention to performance indicators that must be achieved.  
Another official from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) gave her perspective. 
Our leaders have less commitment to using performance information; 
sometimes they don’t really care about that. (Head of Sub Directorate, the Audit 
Board of Indonesia (BPK), Interview 08) 
 
Another government practitioner from BATAN reported on the questionnaire that 
although this agency had developed an information system that incorporated 
performance information, the use of this system by the leaders was limited.  He stated 
that this lack of awareness and commitment from leaders affects the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the system. From the questionnaire, another respondent from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued very strongly that the understanding and 
awareness of the Minister on performance management is almost zero. 
 
Support From Management 
There were eight practitioners from the Directorate General of Budget (DGB) who 
viewed that to some extent there was lack of support from its management to 
implement performance-based budgeting. Three practitioners gave specific examples 
of how their analysis in determining a budget was little used by the upper 
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management. A Head of Section at Directorate of Budget I stated that in determining 
the indicative budget ceilings, his voice was hardly heard. He only made some kind of 
matrices and estimations and then gave his inputs to upper management. Two other 
practitioners made similar comments. 
Our top management usually does not use our analysis when deciding budget 
allocation. (Head of Section from the Directorate of Budget II, the Directorate 
General of Budget, Interview 28) 
 
Information that we give to the upper management was not used as a basis for 
making budgeting decisions. (Head of Section from the Directorate of Budget I, 
the Directorate General of Budget, Interview 25) 
 
Another practitioner from the Directorate of Budgeting Systems commented strongly 
on the lack of support from management in connection with the use of the Minister of 
Finance Regulation 249/2011.  
We did not use the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011 because firstly, 
there is no willingness and secondly, there is no incentive to use it. (Head of 
Section from the Directorate of Budgeting System, the Directorate General of 
Budget, Interview 34) 
 
 
Two practitioners from the Directorate of Budget I gave another example about the 
lack of support from management, noting that budgeting policy is always changing so 
that it is not easy for them to carry out their tasks. One of them said that although his 
office (the Directorate General of Budget) has made positive improvements with 
regard to the budgeting process and procedures, the procedures have been changed 
every year. As a result, budget practitioners have to learn quickly.   
 
One practitioner from the Directorate of Budget I particularly emphasised a lack of 
support from management. 
We do not have enough support from our management. For example, this year 
when we conducted the baseline review, I proposed to invite spending 
ministries [to come to his office], but the facilities were not given (Head of 
Section from the Directorate of Budget I, the Directorate General of Budget, 
Interview 31). 
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With regards to support from management within line ministries/agencies, the Deputy 
of Development Funding at the Ministry of Planning observed that there was a lack of 
awareness from the top management of line ministries/agencies with regard to the 
importance of performance information. He noted that the budgeting process was still 
considered as only an administrative process that should be conducted by lower level 
staff.  Upper level management did not really pay attention or did not particularly 
involve themselves with the process. One interviewee from the Ministry of Forestry 
agreed that support from top management is a very important factor in implementing 
performance information. He suggested that performance information should also be 
used as one important factor in considering promotion of staff to higher positions. A 
practitioner from the Ministry of Education and Culture agreed with the observation 
from the Deputy of Development Funding. Here is his comment. 
Several top echelons like director generals and head of bureaus/directorates at 
my ministry do not completely understand the process to develop the Annual 
Work and Budget Plan [RKAKL]. Their staffs at Programme and Evaluation 
Division have more understanding about the process (Head of Division from the 
Ministry of Education and Culture, Interview 05). 
 
He and his colleague said that their superiors have a strong commitment to 
implementing performance-based budgeting. However the commitment from other 
top echelons within their ministry was varied. A Head of Sub Division at the Audit 
Board of Indonesia (BPK) also mentioned the lack of support from management. He 
stated that he needed support from his superior to implement performance-based 
budgeting in their institution fully.  
It is difficult [to implement performance based budgeting] if my superior still 
uses the budget trend [in determining budget within their agency] but does not 
use performance targets (Head of Division from the Finance Bureau, the Audit 
Board of Indonesia (BPK), Interview 02). 
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Another practitioner from BPK also noted that her leaders had less commitment in 
using performance information. Sometimes they did not really care about it. From the 
questionnaire, one respondent from the Indonesian Statistics Agency (BPS) argued 
that the involvement of top managers in managing and using performance information 
must be improved. 
 
It is worth noting that support from management in ministries/agencies regarding the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting and the use of performance 
information is still promising. Two interviewees and two respondents gave the 
positive aspects in connection with the support from management. A practitioner from 
the Ministry of Public Works was confident that support from the leaders was already 
in the right direction. His minister and secretary general have frequently talked about 
outcomes that should be and have been achieved by their ministry. Another 
interviewee from the same ministry gave another example of support from 
management. Within the Ministry of Public Works, they have implemented, ‘e-
performance’, which has been developed based on the Ministry of Finance Regulation 
249/2011. A respondent from the Ministry of Finance wrote in the questionnaire that 
the top echelons at the Ministry of Finance use a quarterly reporting mechanism and 
the report was discussed at all levels from lower level management to minister. 
Another respondent from the Ministry of Industry wrote that there were bi-annual 
meetings within the Ministry of Industry to evaluate the performance of working 
units.  
 
 
Turning to the results from the questionnaire, support from management regarding the 
use of performance information within ministries/agencies was positive. This is rather 
different from the interview results. Commenting on the statement, ‘my 
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ministry/agency is very much oriented to performance. We regularly measure our 
performance with performance information used in performance budgeting or our 
own performance management system’, three quarters of respondents (n= 45) strongly 
agreed/agreed with this statement. Only 3% of respondents (n= 2) strongly 
disagreed/disagreed with it. However, one-fifth of the respondents (n= 13) neither 
agreed nor disagreed with this statement (See Figure 7.8). The percentage of 
respondents who strongly agreed/agreed is slightly higher when they were asked to 
give their views on the statement ‘my ministry conducts regular meetings to evaluate 
our performance and to discuss ways to improve performance’ (77% or n = 46). Five 
respondents (8%) strongly disagreed/disagreed with the statement and the remaining 
respondents (15% or n = 9) neither agreed nor disagreed.  
Figure 7.8: Support from Management in the Use of Performance Information 
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7.3.2 Changing Behaviour   
 
The changing behaviour of government practitioners, from top-level management to 
the staff, plays an important role in the implementation of performance-based 
budgeting. From the questionnaire, one of the questions asked respondents whether 
they agreed with the statement, ‘our top management is concerned that the 
performance of our ministry/agency is measured based on the budget spending only.’ 
Out of 60 respondents, 35 respondents (58%) strongly disagreed/disagreed with that 
statement. Just above one fifth of respondents (23% or n = 14) strongly agreed/agreed 
with it. The remaining 11 respondents (18%) neither agreed nor disagreed (see Figure 
7.9). These results were supplemented by answers to another question in the 
questionnaire that asked their views on the statement, ‘Our top management is 
concerned that performance of our ministry/agency is measured based on the 
combination of budget spending and the achievement of Outcomes and Outputs as 
stated in Ministry of Finance Regulation (PMK) number 249/PMK.02/2011.’ Almost 
three quarters of respondents (72% or n = 43) strongly agreed/agreed with this 
statement. Only two respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed.  Another a quarter of 
respondents (n= 15) neither agreed nor disagreed. From these results it can be inferred 
that the majority of top management within ministries/agencies has a positive 
orientation to performance. They were not only concerned with budget spending 
when talking about performance but also performance measures of achievement of 
outcomes and outputs. 
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Figure 7.9 Top Management Understanding of Performance Measurement 
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‘Our top management is rather reluctant to use performance information to measure 
the success or failure of their divisions’, 42 out of 60 respondents (70%) strongly 
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using performance information’. Almost a quarter of respondents (73% or 43) 
strongly agreed/agreed. Only five respondents (8%) strongly disagreed/disagreed and 
the remaining eleven respondents (19%) neither agreed nor disagreed. 
 
In connection with the statement, ‘Our top management uses performance information 
to motivate their subordinates’, two thirds of respondents (40) also strongly 
agreed/agreed with the statement. Only 12% or seven respondents strongly 
disagreed/disagreed with it. Thirteen respondents (22%) neither agreed nor disagreed 
with it (see Figure 7.10). 
 
Figure 7.10 The Use of Performance Information by Top Management 
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Turning to the statement in the questionnaire relating to understanding of employees 
within line ministries/agencies of the use of performance-based budgeting for 
measuring performance of their offices, the respondents were asked to give their 
views on the statement, ‘Most employees in our ministry/agency understand that their 
divisions’ performance is measured by performance budgeting.’ Out of 60 
respondents, 37 respondents (62%) strongly agreed/agreed with that statement. Only 
seven respondents (12%) strongly disagreed/disagreed and the remaining sixteen 
respondents (27%) neither agreed nor disagreed. 
 
Figure 7.11: The Understanding of Employees of Performance-Based Budgeting 
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only on the budget they get, but also to focus on developing appropriate output 
measures. They said that line ministries/agencies have struggled to find appropriate 
output measures.   
 
Respondents from three different ministries agreed that performance culture should be 
initiated by top-level management. One of the respondents from the State 
Administration Agency (LAN) noted that top leaders affect the performance culture. 
The change in leadership would create a different culture. Another respondent from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also noted that the performance culture in his ministry 
was still oriented towards routine activities and the awareness of managing 
performance at any level organisation, particularly at the top management, was 
minimal. A similar comment was also made by a respondent from the Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights, arguing that top managers (minister, vice-minister, 
directorate generals) have not understood about performance information. They have 
not used performance information for decision-making. One interviewee from the 
Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform thought that the challenge facing 
by line ministries/agencies is how to make performance information routinely used by 
them in measuring performance. He suggested the following. 
We should change the mind-set of management and staff regarding their 
awareness about performance and how their performance should be measured 
(Head of Planning and Performance Management Bureau, the Ministry of 
Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, Interview 16). 
 
A practitioner from the Ministry of Forestry acknowledged that it was difficult to 
change the mind-set of personnel toward making performance reports. One 
respondent from the National Narcotics Agency (BNN) noted that there are divisions 
within the agency that have not understood about the importance of performance 
information when preparing budget documents (RKAKL). This situation has affected 
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the performance of the agency. However, a respondent from the Ministry of Industry 
gave the example of performance culture that has been introduced in his ministry.  
We have developed performance culture in our ministry: conducting a 
‘Performance Forum’ every three months, issuing a performance ranking for 
Echelon I and II units for every six months, ‘naming and shaming’ for the best-
three units and the worst-three units, monitoring and assisting units that have 
poor performance, and others (A practitioner from the Ministry of Industry). 
 
7.3.3 Lack of Commitment From Line Ministries/Agencies 
 
Performance-based budgeting can be implemented effectively if all stakeholders 
involved are committed to carry out their responsibilities. With regard to gathering 
performance information, three officials from the Ministry of Planning argued that 
gathering performance information from line ministries/agencies was difficult. An 
official from the Directorate of Religion, Culture, and Sport commented that the 
Ministry of Planning had difficulties in making decisions if there was inadequate 
information from ministries/agencies. Two of them stated that there was lack of 
compliance from line ministries/agencies in submitting performance reports. One 
official argued as follows.  
There was lack of compliance of line ministries/agencies to submit performance 
reports. Our communication with them was less intense. I feel that they didn’t 
need other institutions. (Head of Directorate at the Directorate of Water and 
Irrigation, the Ministry of Planning, 46). 
 
 
Three officials from the Directorate General of Budget pointed out the lack of 
commitment from line ministries/agencies to implement performance-based 
budgeting. An official from the Directorate of Budget I argued that if line ministries 
/agencies have a commitment to implement it therefore line ministries/agencies 
should propose their budget based on performance information. Two of them pointed 
out that the awareness of line ministries/agencies needs to be improved. Line 
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ministries/agencies should understand that performance-based budgeting could only 
achieve its aims if there is a desire from line ministries/agencies to implement it. They 
argued that performance-based budgeting was implemented for the benefit of 
ministries/agencies, not for the benefit of the Ministry of Finance or the Directorate 
General of Budget.   
 
 
7.3.4 Lack of Coordination Between the Ministry of Planning and the 
Directorate General of Budget 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two government institutions in Indonesia that 
have responsibility in managing the planning and budgeting process: the Ministry of 
Planning and the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, 
good coordination between these two institutions is important to ensure that 
performance-based budgeting is implemented in the planning and budgeting process. 
Government practitioners were asked their views regarding the coordination between 
the two institutions in the planning and budgeting process.  
 
An official from the Directorate of Transportation in the Ministry of Planning 
commented that he almost never communicated with officials from the Directorate 
General of Budget. They only met during trilateral meetings and budget meetings, 
three times maximum in a year. When asked whether there were discussions between 
officials from the two institutions during the preparation of the indicative budget 
ceilings of ministries/agencies, one interviewee from the Directorate of Religion, 
Culture, Youth, and Sport in the Ministry of Planning argued that officials from both 
institutions never discussed that matter. In the Ministry of Planning, the Office of the 
Deputy of Development Funding is the only office that carried out discussions with 
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officials from the Directorate General of Budget in determining the indicative budget 
ceilings of all line ministries/agencies. Another interviewee from the Directorate of 
Forestry complained that officials of the Directorate General of Budget were less 
concerned with the forestry sector.   
I feel that officials of the Directorate General of Budget considered that our 
sector was not really important.  Their Director has never attended the trilateral 
meetings. The officer attended that meeting was only Echelon III or IV [lower 
managers]. We invited them for a certain meeting, but only their Echelon IV 
would come (Head of Sub Directorate, the Directorate of Forestry, the Ministry 
of Planning, Interview 15). 
 
To improve the planning and budgeting process, three practitioners from the Ministry 
of Planning suggested that the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of 
Budget should be merged into one institution. One of them commented as follows. 
Ideally the planning function and the budgeting function should be combined in 
one institution. If not, the responsibilities of the two separate institutions should 
be made clearer (Head of Sub Directorate, the Directorate of State Apparatus, 
the Ministry of Planning, Interview 19). 
 
Turning to the views of officials from the Directorate General of Budget, one 
interviewee from the Directorate of Budget I acknowledged that both institutions, the 
Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget, do not have intensive 
coordination. He commented that in a particular budget year, the officials from both 
offices might meet only two or three times. Another interviewee from the same 
division believed that the two institutions should improve their coordination. He felt 
that officials of the Ministry of Planning thought their job was done after they had 
issued the indicative budget ceilings. They did not really pay attention to the next 
stages of budgeting process. When asked whether the two institutions should be 
merged, he made the following comment. 
I think the Directorate General of Budget and the Ministry of Planning should 
be combined into one institution. It will improve our function and eliminate 
“ego” between two institutions (Head Section at the Directorate of Budget I, the 
Directorate General of Budget, Interview 25). 
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However, three officials from the Directorate of Budget II and III argued that there is 
no problem with the separation of the Directorate General of Budget and the Ministry 
of Planning. They believed each institution could carry out its duty with the current 
arrangement. 
 
There were varied views from government practitioners of line ministries/agencies 
regarding coordination between officials of the Ministry of Planning and the 
Directorate General of Budget. Five practitioners from different ministries/agencies 
argued that coordination between officials from the two institutions should be 
improved. Two practitioners from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic 
Reform and the Audit Board of Indonesia argued that in the current situation, the 
Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance has more power than the 
Ministry of Planning because the Ministry of Finance is the one that has the money 
and determines the budgets. One of them, an official of the Ministry of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform, suggested that to improve their functions, both institutions 
should be merged. Another practitioner from the Audit Board of Indonesia suggested 
that before budget meetings, the officials from both offices should meet first and 
make an agreement on how they will review budget proposals (the work plan and 
budget documents, or RKAKL). One practitioner from the Ministry of Education and 
Culture expected that the Ministry of Planning would have more power in the 
performance-based budgeting process. Currently, after issuing the indicative budget 
ceilings, it hands over the next processes to the Directorate General of Budget. 
 
In contrast to their colleagues, five practitioners from various line ministries/agencies 
argued that the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of Budget had good 
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coordination. One practitioner from the Audit Board of Indonesia argued that while in 
other functions both offices had a good coordination, in the monitoring and evaluation 
process they still worked separately. Another practitioner from the Ministry of Public 
Works also commented that both institutions had a good coordination particularly in 
preparing the Government Work Plan (RKP). However, he could barely recognise the 
roles of the officials from the Ministry of Planning during the work plan and budget 
(RKAKL) review meetings. He argued that their roles in RKAKL review meetings 
were less effective.  One practitioner from the Corruption Eradication Commission 
argued that both institutions had good coordination. They had decided their function 
and responsibilities so that their functions were not overlapped. A practitioner from 
the Ministry of Public Works particularly commented that the coordination between 
both offices was adequate stating that the Ministry of Planning was concerned on 
performance targets, while the Ministry of Finance focused on inputs or budgets. 
However, he suggested that the planning and budgeting functions could be integrated 
in one institution to improve the effectiveness of budgeting process.  
 
 
7.4 Personnel and Technical Capacity  
This section reports findings relating to staff capacity, information system capacity, 
and time constraints in reviewing performance and budget proposals. 
7.4.1 Personnel Capacity 
Practitioners from various line ministries/agencies remarked on the challenge they 
have with regard to the capacity of personnel or staff in implementing performance-
based budgeting. One practitioner from the Ministry of Forestry stated that the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting really depended on the human 
resources that implement the system. Another practitioner from the Ministry of 
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Education and Culture commented that one problem within his ministry was that most 
of the time staff, starting from lower level staff, lower-level managers until top-level 
managers, did not do their jobs. He stated strongly that it was common that top-level 
managers within his ministry did not understand what they should do.  He then 
suggested the following. 
The implementation of performance-based budgeting should be followed by 
reforms in other sectors such the autonomy to recruit staff and the change of 
remuneration system (Head of Planning Bureau, the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, Interview 04). 
 
Another practitioner from the same ministry commented that his office did not have 
enough staff to review budget proposals. From the open question on the 
questionnaire, lack of quality and capacity of staff was also mentioned by a 
practitioner from the Ministry of Cooperative and Small Medium Enterprise. He 
argued that the lack of quality and capacity of civil servants affected the use of 
performance information in their office.  
  
7.4.2 Information System Capacity  
 
The use of performance information could be more effective if government 
institutions had an appropriate information system to assist practitioners in collecting 
and analysing performance information. The lack of information system capacity in 
the Ministry of Planning was acknowledged by the Deputy of the Development 
Funding. He explained that they have not collected performance information of every 
ministry/agency systematically. Another official from the Directorate of State 
Apparatus in the Ministry of Planning also argued that the support from top 
management in using performance information should be followed by the 
establishment of appropriate information system. He explained that the development 
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of an evaluation system based on the Government Regulation No. 39/2006 had 
recently been introduced.   
 
The lack of information system capacity was also revealed by practitioners from   line 
ministries/agencies. A practitioner from the Ministry of Forestry commented that his 
office does not have a web-based performance management system that could be used 
to monitor performance of the ministry. A respondent to the questionnaire from the 
National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) stated a similar view, explaining that 
because BNPT had just been formed in 2011, it has just started developing a 
performance information system. Another respondent from the Ministry of Law and 
Human Rights suggested that it is necessary for the Ministry of Bureaucratic Reform 
and the Ministry of Planning to coordinate in creating an integrated system that covers 
a range of aspects such as planning, budgeting, performance targets, and performance 
results. This is very useful for pursuing follow up actions if there are activities that 
could not achieve their targets. 
 
7.4.3 Lack of Time in Reviewing Budget Proposals and Performance 
 
Lack of time in reviewing budget proposals (the annual work plan and budget or 
RKAKL) was noted by three budget officials from the Directorate General of Budget. 
One of them, from the Directorate of Budget II, explained that before the budgeting 
process for budget year 2014, budget officials just focused in evaluating inputs in 
budget proposals. Since budget year 2014, they focused in reviewing budget 
proposals with regard to how activities stating in the proposals would achieve 
performance targets. However, they could not do it effectively because they did not 
have sufficient time to carry out the review process. Three practitioners from line 
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ministries/agencies also commented on the lack of time faced by officials from the 
Directorate General of Budget in reviewing RKAKLs. One of them, from the 
Ministry of Forestry, argued that the officials of the Directorate General of Budget 
had not sufficient time to review performance targets in budget proposals (RKAKLs) 
because they just began reviewing the proposals at the time when they received those 
documents in the budget meetings with line ministries/agencies. One practitioner from 
the Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) argued that the 
budgeting process has a limited time frame, so government officials from the Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of Planning have no opportunity to review performance 
information. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has discussed findings on the challenges faced by government 
practitioners in implementing performance-based budgeting. The evidence has 
provided insights on the problems with the quality of performance information. The 
interviews also revealed that there were different performance systems used by 
government officials in the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General of 
Budget, and lack of evaluation feedback from budget officials. The presence of 
incremental budgeting practice also affected the implementation of performance-
based budgeting in Indonesia.  
  
This chapter also set out findings related to support and the behaviour of government 
officials in managing performance. Despite some encouraging evidence, the problems 
with leadership support, changing behaviour of management and practitioners still 
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troubled the planning and budgeting process. The lack of coordination between 
authorities also affected the process.  
 
Overall, the evidence suggested that government officials and practitioners had 
supported the concept of performance-based budgeting and had made much effort to 
implement it. However, there were some gaps in practical implementation and it is not 
surprising that there is still a good deal of heritage from the old behavior and system 
that hindered the implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the summary of this thesis, the contribution of the study, 
and policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
8.1 Summary of the Thesis 
Ever since the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the political transition in Indonesia 
of 1998 Indonesia has made a substantial effort to implement performance-based 
budgeting. Indeed, in 2003 a key set of laws and regulations were put in place to 
guide the planning and budgeting process and to facilitate the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting. Since then, the government has taken out a series of 
further measures designed to support its implementation, including, in 2009, the 
restructuring of spending programmes and activities in line ministries/agencies, and 
the development of performance indicators to strengthen performance measurement 
and evaluation within the planning and budgeting process. Such initiatives have also 
been refined and subject to further gradual development since 2011.  
 
Against such a background, this thesis has sought to assess the effectiveness and 
impact of these efforts over the period 2011 to 2014 through its focus on the 
following four research questions: 
1. Is there evidence that performance results/scores are used in determining budget 
allocations? 
2. Is there evidence that incremental budgeting practices still exist in the planning 
and budgeting process? 
3. How, in practice, do government practitioners use performance information in the 
planning and budgeting process?   
4. What challenges have government practitioners encountered in seeking to 
implement performance-based budgeting? 
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From the findings of the empirical research undertaken for this thesis, the answers to 
these questions can be summarised as follows:  
 
RQ 1. Is there evidence that performance results/scores are used in determining 
budget allocations? 
A strong conclusion from the research is that the most important budget allocation 
decisions made by the government are the setting of indicative budget ceilings. The 
findings suggest, in the period under examination, the aggregate budget change from 
the indicative budget ceilings to the succeeding budget decision stage was minimal. 
Moreover, it was noted that such changes in the indicative budget ceilings often occur 
in the latter budget-making stages when they more likely reflect necessary 
adjustments, in response, for example, to changes in macroeconomic forecasts and 
assumptions, new initiatives proposed by line ministries/agencies, new directions 
from the President, the policy of the government to increase salaries of civil servants, 
the agreement reached between line ministries/agencies and the Parliament, and/or 
budget optimisation requested by the Parliament. However, such changes are 
generally minor. In the indicative budget ceilings stage, the influence of the 
Parliament was also found to be limited or non-existent.  Here, Parliamentary 
influence on the budget allocation decisions would only be felt in the later budget 
stages: i.e. in setting the budget ceilings and determining the budget allocation. 
Accordingly it was concluded that the roles of the Ministry of Planning and of the 
Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of Finance were the key factors in 
deciding the indicative budget ceilings for line ministries/agencies, and hence in 
deciding the final budget.  
 
 311 
The findings highlighted how government officials at ‘sector directorates’ in the 
Ministry of Planning had indeed sought to use the performance information of line 
ministries/agencies by considering past performance and forecasting the current 
year’s achievements as a basis for formulating the indicative budget ceilings. 
However, the Office of the Deputy of Development Funding did not make use of the 
proposals from sector directorates because the proposals were not considered 
sufficiently reliable. The indicative budget ceilings were determined with the aim of 
achieving the goals and priorities of the government as set out in its work plan (RKP). 
The Office of the Deputy of Development Funding had then to consider how much 
money the government had (the resource envelope), and all budget rigidities. The 
Ministry of Finance would set out the resource envelope based on the fiscal policies 
of the government, while the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning, would be to 
balance all government priorities. The Office of the Deputy of Development Funding 
acknowledged that there were no recognised formulae for determining the budget and 
that using performance information in determining the budget was “a very difficult 
task”. Generally, the use of performance information for determining the budget was 
found to be only weakly structured.  Indeed, the Office of the Development of 
Funding in the Ministry of Planning did not use the RKAKL performance scores 
based on the Minister of Finance regulation 249/2011 (PMK 249/2011) because they 
were regarded as being largely financial in nature rather than reflecting evaluation of 
other aspects. Another reason that was identified as accounting for the lack of use of 
performance information was that the Ministry of Planning did not have in place a 
good system for gathering all the necessary information together.  
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The findings also suggested that the use of performance information by government 
officials from the Directorate of Budget I, II, and III at the Directorate General of 
Budget in the Ministry of Finance was very limited. Here the focus was mainly on 
determining the operational budget and using the previous years’ budget allocations 
and spending of line ministries/agencies to formulate the indicative budget ceilings. It 
was also recognised that the role of the budget officials here in determining budgets 
was hardly effective because of the heavy reliance placed on the size of the available  
resource envelope. The results of the interviews also indicated the existence of      
budget rigidities or budget constraints that meant operational budgets and mandatory 
budgets were prioritised ahead of budget allocations for other activities. 
 
In the statistical analysis of the relationship between total RKAKL performance 
scores and percentage changes in the indicative budget ceilings we were unable to 
reject the null hypothsis of no relation between RKAKL performance scores and 
budget allocations. Although not a strong result, this finding was consistent with our 
findings from the interviews with government officials from the Ministry of Planning, 
the Ministry of Finance, and line ministries/agencies of no effect of performance 
scores on budget changes. 
  
RQ 2. Is there evidence that incremental budgeting practices still exist in the 
planning and budgeting process? 
The findings revealed many factors affecting budget allocation decisions. The 
examination of the letters/decrees of the Minister of Planning and the Minister of 
Finance related to the issuance of the indicative budget ceilings, the budget ceilings, 
and the budget allocation for the budget years of 2011-2014 revealed that their 
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ministries determined the indicative budget ceilings for each line ministry/agency 
based on the following factors: the policies of the President; the agreement in the 
cabinet meetings; the budget priorities; budget proposals for new initiatives from line 
ministries/agencies; the forward estimates as reported by all line ministries/agencies 
in their previous year’s budget documents; the estimation of the previous year’s 
budget spending.   
 
With regard to the factors affecting the budget ceilings and the budget allocations, the 
research revealed that there were at least five factors that affected budget changes 
from the indicative budget ceilings to the budget ceilings and the budget allocations. 
These factors were: the reallocation from other budgets to a particular 
ministry/agency; budget adjustments to cover activities funded by non-tax 
revenue/loan/grant; budget adjustment to add education budgets as required by law; 
other budget adjustments; and budget adjustments for the salaries and allowances of 
personnel.  
 
According to the evidence from the Ministry of Planning, the five most important 
factors affecting the indicative budget ceilings were: (1) the annual policies of the 
President; (2) the previous year(s) budget allocations; (3) the budget projection stated 
in Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2010-2014; (4) the results of 
trilateral meetings; and (5) the previous year(s) budget spending. Performance 
information (i.e. in the form of performance targets and RKAKL performance scores) 
was a notable absentee from this list of the five most important factors affecting 
budget allocations. However, performance targets in line ministries/agencies’ work 
plan (RENSTRA-KL) and RKAKL documents are ranked 6 as a factor affecting 
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budget allocations. As the Ministry of Planning is only responsible for issuing the 
indicative budget ceilings, it was interesting to note that its government officials did 
consider performance targets when exercising their responsibility in this respect.   
 
Turning to the evidence from the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of 
Finance officials, the five most important factors affecting budget ceilings were: (1) 
the annual policies of the President; (2) the previous year(s) budget spending; (3) the 
previous year(s) budget allocations; (4) budget proposals for new initiatives from line 
ministries/agencies; and (5) the annual baseline adjustments by line 
ministries/agencies. Again, similar to evidence from the Ministry of Planning, 
performance information (i.e. in the form of performance targets and RKAKL 
performance scores) was not included in the five most important factors affecting 
budget allocations. Performance targets in line ministries/agencies’ work plan 
(RENSTRA-KL) and RKAKL documents, and the RKAKL performance score based 
on the Minister of Finance Regulation 249/2011 were only ranked in positions 11 and 
12 respectively. Therefore, as the Directorate General of Budget in the Ministry of 
Finance is responsible for determining the three resource allocations (the indicative 
budget ceilings, the budget ceilings, as well as the budget allocations), performance 
information (both performance targets and performance scores) was found to have 
been given least consideration by the officials in that ministry for determining budgets 
of line ministries/agencies.  
 
Overall, according to the evidence from the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance, the previous years’ budget allocations were the second and the third most 
important factors respectively used in their determination of budget allocations. This 
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evidence indicated that incremental budgeting still plays a significant role in the 
Indonesian planning and budgeting process. 
 
The key finding from the statistical analysis, using the magnitude of change in budget 
allocations and the incremental trend model, indicated that the incremental practices 
in budgetary allocation decisions continue to persist in Indonesia. We found there was 
a significant correlation between successive years’ budgets. Although this simple 
correlation model lacks statistical sophistication, this finding, which corresponds with 
the findings from the interviews, suggest that the previous year’s budget allocations 
still drive the budget decisions for the following year to a significant degree or, put 
another way, the previous year’s allocations still shape the indicative budget ceiling 
decisions. 
 
RQ3. ‘How, in practice, do government practitioners use performance 
information in the planning and budgeting process?’ 
Here the research provided insights on the use of performance information by 
government officials/practitioners from four key institutions: the Ministry of 
Planning, the Ministry of Finance, Members of Parliament, and line 
ministries/agencies. 
 
Generally, government officials from the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of 
Finance had initiated use of performance information in the planning and budgeting 
process. It was found that performance information is available not only for the 
fulfilment of formal requirements in the planning and budgeting process, with   
government officials from both ministries using performance targets for examining 
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budget proposals from line ministries/agencies. However, the Ministry of Planning 
and the Ministry Finance was found not to use performance information to make 
budget cuts or in increasing budgets for line ministries/agencies.  
 
Government practitioners from the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate General 
of Budget also make some use of performance information in the various stages of 
planning and budgeting. In trilateral meetings, government officials from the Ministry 
of Planning are responsible for ensuring that particular performance targets regarded 
as national priorities are included in the annual work plan of line ministries/agencies 
(RENJA). On the other hand, the role of government officials from the Directorate 
General of Budget is to ensure that the budget amount proposed by line 
ministries/agencies follows the budget amount stated in the circular letter concerning 
the indicative budget ceilings. Government officials from the Directorate General of 
Budget appeared from the research to be more focused on the specific type of budget, 
such as personnel expenditures or other operational expenditures, than on reviewing 
performance targets proposed by line ministries/agencies.  
 
In budget reviews or RKAKL review meetings, it was found that the officials from 
the Ministry of Planning had only limited involvement in the process.  Indeed, several 
officials from the Ministry of Planning indicated their reluctance to be involved in the 
meetings, feeling that the regulation that instructed them to do so was inappropriate 
(the Minister of Finance being the one who issued the regulation, not the Minister of 
Planning). It appears from the research here that an institutional problem exists and 
needs to be resolved before government practitioners can do their jobs as intended. 
Therefore, the role of government officials from the Ministry of Planning in the 
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RKAKL review meetings currently seems more about fulfilling formal obligations 
than anything more significant. It was noted that while the officials from the 
Directorate General of Budget are expected to have more control in these meetings in 
practice the findings suggest a more varied pattern of influence. Some government 
officials from line ministries/agencies argued that officials from the Directorate 
General of Budget still focus on the inputs or the costs of the activities being planned 
rather than examining the performance indicators/targets proposed by line 
ministries/agencies. Moreover, some other practitioners from line ministries/agencies 
and the Directorate General of Budget suggested that the Directorate General of 
Budget was likely to review performance targets in budget documents (RKAKLs). It 
was also noteworthy that past performance/performance results had, it was said, never 
been discussed in the meetings. In addition, officials from the Directorate General of 
Budget pointed that they had no authority to increase or to cut budgets if there was no 
connection between the performance targets and the proposed-budget by line 
ministries/agencies.   
 
With regard to monitoring and evaluation, the majority of officials from the Ministry 
of Planning commented that they undertook such tasks by checking the achievement 
of performance targets as set out in the national medium term development plan 
(RPJMN). However, they indicated that they found it difficult to monitor more 
routinely because line ministries/agencies sometimes did not always submit the data 
as required. In general, government officials from the Directorate General of Budget 
only monitored the budget spending of line ministries/agencies. Although they 
claimed to have a system to monitor the performance of line ministries, it was 
acknowledged that line ministries did not update their progress regularly enough. 
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Officials of the Directorate General of Budget also generally failed to execute an 
evaluation process, in their case because there was no guidance for them on how to 
conduct such evaluations. It was generally recognised that they were all still in the 
learning stages of monitoring and evaluation.  
 
Turning to the use of performance information by Members of Parliament, it was 
revealed that, in general, Members of Parliament did not use performance information 
in budgeting decisions, being more concerned with their broader political interests 
and with the kind of issues raised by individual constituents than with specific 
performance information. Members of Parliament indicated that they still tended to 
use the overall percentages of budget spending as a measure by which to assess the 
government’s performance and were often more concerned with the availability of 
fiscal space in allocating budgets for ministries/agencies. One Member of Parliament, 
for example, commented that the implementation of performance-based budgeting by 
Members of Parliament was largely ineffective because it mostly depended on the 
policy of each party in the Parliament. He suggested that line ministries/agencies 
followed a pattern of increasing their budget proposals by approximately 10% every 
budget year. He further mentioned that a key problem for Members of Parliament in 
seeking to use of performance information was that it was provided too infrequently 
by the government. 	
 
With regard to the use of performance information in line ministries/agencies, it was 
revealed that the majority of line ministries/agencies used performance information in 
preparing budget proposals and budget documents (RKAKLs) to be submitted to the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance. They also used performance 
 319 
information to try and convince budget examiners from those ministries as to the 
justification for the proposed spending. Performance information was also presented 
in Parliament during budget meetings to seek Parliamentary support for particular 
programmes/activities. 
  
It was also found that a small majority of line ministries/agencies used performance 
information to cut or increase the budgets proposed by each division/department 
within their ministry/agency. In addition, it was used, along with other factors, by line 
ministries/agencies in considering the allocation of budgets for their subordinates. 
However, once again it was clear that past budget allocations and past budget 
spending still played the key roles in determining the new budgets.  
 
The research also identified how government practitioners in line ministries/agencies 
used performance information for more routine managerial purposes. Indeed, 
performance information has generally become well integrated into the performance 
management systems of most line ministries/agencies. The majority of line 
ministries/agencies also use performance information for reporting purposes to 
external parties, such as the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and for 
external reporting to the public. In this latter respect, it was found that performance 
information is often used to garner public support and to persuade communities about 
the good work of the ministries/agencies. A large majority of line ministries/agencies 
also indicated that their managers used performance information to understand more 
about their programmes/activities and to help improve their programmes/activities. 
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Overall, the findings from the research reveal that budget actors from the Ministries 
of Planning and of Finance, Members of Parliament, and line ministries/agencies have 
taken steps to use performance information, but that they are still in the early stages of 
doing so to inform budgetary decisions. The findings also reveal the continuing 
dominance of the practice of incremental budgeting based on past budget allocations, 
in proposing new budgets to Parliament.  
 
RQ4. ‘What challenges have government practitioners encountered in seeking to 
implement performance-based budgeting?’   
The empirical research for this thesis has revealed a number of challenges 
encountered by government practitioners in implementing performance-based 
budgeting. These can be divided into three major categories: challenges with the 
measurement system; challenges in winning support for managing performance; and 
challenges relating to capacity – both personnel and technical - in implementing 
performance-based budgeting.  
 
The analysis particularly highlighted the difficulties involved in determining and 
measuring the appropriate outputs and outcomes for each line ministry/agency.  Some 
officials from the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance also argued that 
there were too many outputs in the budget documents and that most of them might not 
be the most appropriate outputs in any case. Some officials from the Directorate 
General of Budget also suggested that often the data related to “intermediate outputs” 
rather than the intended ones and the frequently the definitions of outputs were 
insufficiently clear because the budget documents (RKAKLs) were too formulaic and 
rigid. It was also often unclear whether the budget authorities were measuring 
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outputs/outcomes of the line ministries/agencies or of all 
bureaux/directorates/divisions within each line ministry/agency.  The findings also 
highlighted how a performance measurement system based on the Minister of Finance 
Regulation 249/2011 was hardly a credible one for measuring the performance of line 
ministries/agencies. Line ministries/agencies also emphasised the difficulties 
encountered in receiving performance information in a timely manner. In addition, the 
findings showed little or no connection between outputs/outcomes in the budget 
documents and the national outcomes in reality. It was often unclear which 
performance indicators (outcomes and outputs) were appropriate for different levels 
of government, such as outcomes of interest to the President, to Ministers, or to the 
lower ranks within the government institutions i.e. line ministries/agencies. It was 
suggested that performance, as measured in the budget documents (RKAKLs) 
represented only the performance of working units at the Echelon II level, such as 
bureaux/directorates, within line ministries/agencies.   
 
Another key finding was that government officials/practitioners use different 
performance measurement and evaluation systems from one another. Government 
officials from the Ministry of Planning, for example, stated that they had never heard 
of or used performance information based on the Minister of Finance Regulation 
249/2011 (PMK No 249/2011). The Ministry of Planning officials, on the other hand, 
claimed to use at least four different performance report sources: the Government 
Regulation No. 39/2006, the Government Regulation No. 8/2006, a tool that they 
themselves had developed to produce performance information, and various other 
performance information sources. In contrast, although government officials from the 
Directorate General of Budget were familiar with PMK No 249/2011, they were 
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doubtful about the idea of using measures associated with this regulation for budget 
formulation and budget reviews. Indeed, they acknowledged that they were not in the 
habit of conducting evaluations based on this regulation. It was also found that the use 
such data was less than ideal because the results did not cover all the aspects of 
evaluation mandated by the regulation. At least until the time of the fieldwork for this 
thesis, there had been little or no consensus reached between three ministries - the 
Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform - with regard to simplifying the system of performance 
monitoring and evaluation. It was also found that the Directorate General of Budget 
rarely, if ever, provided line ministries/agencies with formal feedback on the 
performance measurement and evaluation reports and the results within them. 
Moreover, the Directorate General of Budget did not have a system for giving such 
feedback.     
 
As already indicated, an important finding from the research was of the continuance 
of traditional and incremental budgeting – this perhaps reflecting the fact that no 
existing regulation explicitly states that budgets should be determined by 
performance. Also, performance-based budgeting in Indonesia has been implemented 
in much the same ways as the implementation of line-item budgeting, albeit 
supplemented by performance indicators. Another example of how traditional and 
incremental budgeting still operates in practice was evident in the comments made 
about insufficient flexibility in the budget execution stage.  The Ministry of Finance, 
it was suggested, should focus on how well a ministry/agency achieves its 
performance targets rather than be too rigidly preoccupied with examining exactly 
how it spent the money. In monitoring the performance of line ministries/agencies, 
the government was said to be still focused more on the percentages of budget 
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spending, rather than on the achievement of performance targets. The Ministries of 
Finance and of Planning were, it was asserted, more usually focused on the previous 
year’s budgets for budget allocation decisions than with performance results and 
performance targets.   
  
The research also identified some problems with leadership and management support 
for performance budgeting. In the Ministry of Planning, for instance, it appeared that 
leaders were offering only tacit support and indeed never actually required 
government officials to use performance information in the planning and budgeting 
process. Similarly, in the Directorate General of Budget, while several government 
officials claimed that had made suggestions in relation to the determination of 
indicative budget ceilings, their voices were rarely heard or ideas given serious 
consideration by their leadership. Certainly, their input was never carried forward into 
budget-making decisions. Moreover, it was suggested that there was little or no 
support for the use of performance measurement data at top management level. In line 
ministries/agencies, senior managers were viewed as being insufficiently appreciative 
of the potential value of performance information and the planning and budgeting 
process was still widely seen as only an administrative process and one to be 
conducted by lower level staff.  Upper level management simply did not pay much 
attention or become particularly involved in the process. In this respect it was argued 
that top-level management needed to initiate behaviour change with regard to 
performance and to lead the development of a stronger performance culture with their 
organisations.     
 
Another key finding of the research concerned the lack of coordination between the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance in the planning and budgeting 
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process. Good coordination between these two key institutions would obviously be 
important in ensuring the successful implementation of performance-based budgeting 
in the planning and budgeting process. However, it was found that government 
officials from both ministries did not maintain particularly good communication with 
one another, meeting only two or three times a year during trilateral meetings and 
budget meetings. Moreover, the research highlighted the lack of discussions between 
officials from the two institutions during the preparation of the indicative budget 
ceilings. In the Ministry of Planning, the Office of the Deputy of Development 
Funding was found to be the only unit carrying out discussions with officials from the 
Directorate General of Budget in determining the indicative budget ceilings of all line 
ministries/agencies. Furthermore, government officials from the Directorate General 
of Budget in the Ministry of Finance felt that officials of the Ministry of Planning 
considered their job to be done as soon as they had issued the indicative budget 
ceilings; failing to pay attention to the subsequent stages of the budgeting process. In 
practice, the Ministry of Finance was found in the research to be exercising more 
power and influence than the Ministry of Planning, largely because it was the keeper 
of the money and had the responsibility for determining the budgets.   
 
Overall then, the research evidence suggests that, while government officials and 
practitioners mostly support the concept of performance-based budgeting and have 
made much effort to implement it, there remain some key problems and gaps in its 
practical implementation.  Above all, and perhaps not surprisingly, there remains a 
good deal of heritage from the old ways of working and traditional practices that have 
hindered the full implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia. 
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8.2 Contributions of the Study 
The research for this thesis has generated much new evidence about the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting and particularly within a developing 
country context like Indonesia. The findings help to fill an important gap in 
knowledge, as represented in the published literature. In this respect a key outcome of 
the research is a better understanding of some of the key challenges in resource 
allocation decision-making  – of building performance assessments into budget 
preparation and of engaging all relevant parties and expertise, including within as well 
as between different institutions, departments and their divisions. This research 
provides fresh insights on the vital role of the central budget offices, in the Indonesian 
case, the Ministries of Planning and of Finance, in determining budgets of line 
ministries/agencies. It was found that, at the stage of setting indicative budget 
ceilings, these offices exercise much more influence in deciding the budgets of line 
ministries/agencies than the Parliament. Indeed, the influence of the Parliament on 
budget allocation decisions is largely constrained to the final budget-making stages: 
the determination of budget ceilings and of the budget allocations. This was evident 
from the finding of minimal change being made between the initial setting of 
indicative budget ceilings and final decisions about allocations. Making fuller use of 
performance information in the process, the research has concluded, would make a 
significant positive difference in this.   
 
The research also provides insights on the practice of ‘dual budgeting’ between the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance in the planning and budgeting 
process. In the context of performance-based budgeting, the research highlights the 
complexity of the challenge of coordinating two key, but separately functioning, 
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central government institutions, and also line ministries/agencies and the Parliament, 
in the budgetary decision-making process. Furthermore, the research throws light on 
the nature of incremental budgeting practices that have been much discussed in the 
literature in past decades and which, from this research at least, are shown still to 
persist and to represent a particular obstacle to the embedding of performance-based 
budgeting.  
 
In addition, this research contributes to the institutional framework analysis that was 
drawn from old institutional economics as suggested by Burns and Scapens (2000).   
The process of performance-based budgeting can be seen as a set of new rules that has 
been enacted but is yet to become a set of office routines and potentially to be 
institutionalised in Indonesia. It is evident that the process of routinisation of 
performance-based budgeting in Indonesia was complex and hindered by the existing 
routines, i.e. incremental budgeting practices. Since the implementation of 
performance-based budgeting challenges the existing routines of incremental 
budgeting practices, the process of change takes time, is evolutionary, and it is not 
going to be easy to get to a stage where performance-based budgeting practices can be 
said to be institutionalised and widely accepted.   
 
Importantly, the research serves to enhance knowledge and understanding not only in 
scholarly terms, but also for the practice of public sector management and 
administration, and not only in the context of Indonesia. In this regard the thesis 
highlights not only the potential benefits to be gained through implementing 
performance-based budgeting but also the key challenges to be confronted in so 
doing; many of which are of an institutional nature and certainly not confined to 
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Indonesia. Moreover, in identifying and highlighting such challenges, the research 
inevitably draws attentions towards the kinds of strategies, cultural adjustments and 
managerial behaviours that are likely to be necessary to overcome the obstacles and 
inertia that hinder realization of the many benefits of budget decision-making 
processes that reflect and respond more firmly and fairly to the achievements and 
disappointments in performance.  
 
8.3 Policy Recommendation 
Having summarized the main findings and reflected on the contribution of the study 
as a whole, it is appropriate to consider the implications and make recommendations 
for policy and practice – first and foremost in Indonesia, but also in the wider context 
of developing and advanced economies as well. In this respect four particular 
recommendations are made and discussed below, in turn. 
 
8.3.1 Recommendation 1: Using Performance Information in Decision-Making 
About Indicative Budget Ceilings 
Since the indicative budget ceilings stage is undoubtedly the key one in resource 
allocation decision-making, it is necessary for the central ministries (in Indonesia, the 
Ministries of Planning and of Finance) to use performance information both in the 
form of data on recent achievements and in comparison with targets, explicitly at this 
stage to determine budgets of line ministries/agencies. If line ministries/agencies and 
the Parliament are well prepared to use performance information at this stage, the 
central budget authorities can expect to receive positive support from them.   
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That said, there also needs to be agreement regarding the kinds of performance 
information that is to be used for determining budgets from all the institutions and 
agencies involved in the process. Up to date performance information needs to be 
available on time, and to this end the support of line ministries/agencies in providing 
the data is vital. In the Indonesian context, such performance data might best be 
gathered and evaluated by ‘sector directorate’ officials in the Ministry of Planning 
and by officials from the Directorate I-III at the Directorate General of Budget in the 
Ministry of Finance who manage the planning and budgeting process routinely and 
who have a good understanding of the programmes/activities of line 
ministries/agencies under their responsibility. Moreover, it will be important that 
these officials are suitably skilled and trained for the analytical role that is needed for 
determining budgets of line ministries/agencies and for evaluating performance 
information for use within budgetary decision-making. 
 
To minimise reliance on the previous year’s budget decisions (i.e. the incremental 
approach of using the previous year’s budget allocation in determining the new 
indicative budget), it will be important gradually to introduce expenditure reviews of 
programmes/activities of line ministries/agencies. Such reviews might be performed 
annually for different programme/activities and may prevent unnecessary budget 
being allocated to particular ministries/agencies and enable the saving so made to be 
reallocated to other more deserving programmes/activities. 
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8.3.2 Recommendation 2: Improving Coordination Between the Ministry of 
Planning and the Ministry of Finance 
The research has highlighted the lack of coordination between government officials in 
the Ministry of Planning and their counterparts in the Ministry of Finance in 
Indonesia and it is necessary for this problem to be addressed and for communication 
from both institutions to improve, particularly with regard to the preparation of the 
indicative budget ceilings stage. The officials who have most understanding of the 
programmes/activities of line ministries/agencies need to be given more responsibility 
and be trusted to provide analyses of how much budget should be given for particular 
ministries/agencies under their responsibility.  
 
Furthermore, the Ministries of Planning and of Finance need to harmonise their roles 
in determining budgets, managing the trilateral meetings, and undertaking the 
RKAKL review meetings. To this end the Indonesian Government should issue a 
regulation that specifies the roles of both ministries specifically in the planning and 
budgeting process in order to address the misunderstandings and communication 
problems that have been highlighted in the current situation.  
 
Both ministries also need to find agreement on the kinds of performance information 
to be included in any planning and budget documents and on how they will use it for 
decision-making because, according to the findings of this research, there are too 
many outputs in the budget documents and many of these outputs were inappropriate.  
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8.3.3 Recommendation 3: Establishing a Single Performance Measurement 
System 
The Ministries of Planning and of Finance, together with other ministries such as the 
Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, need to establish a single 
performance measurement system that can be used to monitor and measure 
performance of line ministries/agencies. Such a standardised measurement system 
could then be used by all concerned ministries for different purposes depending on 
their needs. The system could also be used for improving accountability to the 
Parliament and to the public in general. Currently there are at least three regulations 
for a performance measurement system: the Government Regulation No. 39/2006, the 
Government Regulation No. 8/2006, and the Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) 
249/2011. With a single performance system, each ministry could have the same 
information about the performance of line ministries/agencies. They could then 
evaluate performance of line ministries/agencies in a more consistent manner using 
the same performance data. 
 
In addition, the Ministries of Planning and of Finance need to evaluate the results of 
performance measurement activity in line ministries/agencies and use them in the 
planning and budgeting process, including for budget allocation decisions. It is also 
necessary to give feedback on the results of evaluation to line ministries/agencies. The 
government should encourage line ministries/agencies to use the results of 
performance measurement for budget meetings with the Parliament. If the Members 
of Parliament recognised the benefits of a single measurement system and found it 
useful, it would surely encourage them to use the performance data themselves in 
informing the budgetary decisions. The government could also usefully encourage the 
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external auditor to use the same data gathered from performance measurement system 
to undertake performance auditing. 
 
8.3.4 Recommendation 4: Getting Continuous Support from the Parliament and 
Line Ministries/Agencies 
Getting support from the Members of Parliament, ministers and head of agencies is 
also necessary to encourage them in the use of performance information not only for 
the planning and budgeting process, but also for broader managerial purposes. If all 
leaders understand and appreciate the importance of performance information to the 
improvement of their own organisation’s performance, this would naturally help 
develop a stringer performance culture within their organisations. Support from all 
leaders can perhaps make the difference with regard to implementing performance-
based budgeting and the achievement of its aims and realisation of its potential.  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
Finally, it is worth a reminder that this research has used a mixed methods approach 
in setting out to examine the implementation of performance-based budgeting in 
Indonesia. The main finding has been that Indonesia had made a substantial effort to 
implement performance-based budgeting and to use performance information in the 
planning and budgeting process. The Ministry of Planning, the Ministries of Finance, 
and line ministries/agencies have all been much involved in such implementation. 
However, the evidence gathered through the research has also shown that the use of 
performance information in resource allocation decisions is still quite limited. The 
review of literature and of other available evidence suggests quite clearly that 
Indonesia is no different from most countries in this respect. Although there are 
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positive signs from the research that performance information is increasingly being 
used for managerial purposes in line ministries/agencies, the problems of ensuring 
coordination and the various challenges and difficulties surrounding the performance 
measurement system, the quality of leadership and capability of management support, 
continue to hinder the implementation of performance-based budgeting and hold back 
realization of its benefits. Indonesia has been moving in the right track, but 
continuous improvement is much needed to achieve the intended objectives of 
implementing performance-based budgeting. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I Sources of Budgetary and Performance Scores Data  
 
 
The study used the budgetary and performance scores data from the following 
sources:   
No Data Budgetary Data 
at Ministry/Agency Level 
Budgetary Data  
at Programme Level 
1. The 
Indicative 
Budget 
Ceilings of 
2011 
The circular letter of the 
Minister of Planning number 
0181/M.PPN/04/2010 and the 
circular letter of Minister of 
Finance Number SE-
120/MK/2010 regarding 
Indicative Budget Ceilings and 
The Initial Draft of the 
Government Work Plan. 
 
The indicative budget ceilings of all 
Programmes for fiscal year 2011 
were taken from the Minister of 
Finance Circular Letter Number 
SE-294/MK.02/2010 regarding the 
budget ceilings of fiscal year 2011. 
The indicative budget ceilings data 
were not obtained from the circular 
letter of the Minister of Planning 
number 0181/M.PPN/04/2010 and 
the circular letter of the Minister of 
Finance Number SE-120/MK/2010 
because the indicative budget 
ceilings in this letter was only 
broken down at ministry/agency 
level. It was not broken down at 
programme level. Therefore, this 
study assumed that each line 
ministry/agency has an authority to 
divide its indicate budget ceilings 
into programme level and then the 
results were submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance.   
 
2 The Budget 
Ceilings of 
2011. 
The Minister of Finance 
Circular Letter number SE-
294/MK.02/2010 regarding the 
Budget Ceilings of fiscal year 
2011.  
 
The Minister of Finance letter 
number SE-676/MK.02/2010 
regarding the Budget Allocations of 
Fiscal Year 2011.   
 
3 The Budget 
Allocations 
of 2011 
The Minister of Finance letter 
number SE-676/MK.02/2010 
regarding the Budget 
Allocations of Fiscal Year 2011.   
 
The budget allocations of fiscal year 
2011 were collected electronically 
from the Directorate of Budgeting 
System’s official. The data were 
received by an email on 10 
September 2013. The official 
explained that the data were 
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No Data Budgetary Data 
at Ministry/Agency Level 
Budgetary Data  
at Programme Level 
summarised from the President 
Regulation Number 26 Year 2010 
regarding The Details of Central 
Government Budget of Fiscal Year 
2011.   
 
4 The Budget 
Spending of 
2011 
The Central Government 
Financial Report (Audited by 
The Audit Board of Indonesia) 
2011. 
Not available 
5 The 
Indicative 
Budget 
Ceilings of 
2012 
The letter of the Minister of 
Planning number 
0091/M.PPN/03/2011 and the 
Minister of Finance letter 
number SE-189.1/MK.02/2011 
regarding the Indicative Budget 
Ceilings and the Initial Draft of 
the Government Work Plan for 
Fiscal Year 2012.   
 
The letter of the Minister of 
National Planning number 
0091/M.PPN/03/2011 and the 
Minister of finance letter number 
SE-189.1/MK.02/2011 regarding 
the Indicative Budget Ceilings and 
the Initial Draft of the Government 
Work Plan for Fiscal Year 2012.   
 
6. The Budget 
Ceiling of 
2012 
The Minister of Finance 
regulation number 
215/KMK.02/2011 regarding 
the Budget Ceilings of fiscal 
year 2012.  
 
The circular letter of the Minister of 
Finance number SE-01/MK.2/2011 
regarding the Budget Allocations of 
Line Ministries/Agencies for Fiscal 
Year 2012.   
 
7. The Budget 
Allocations 
of 2012 
The circular letter of the 
Minister of Finance number SE-
01/MK.2/2011 regarding the 
Budget Allocations of Line 
Ministries/Agencies for Fiscal 
Year 2012.   
 
The budget allocations of 2012 
were collected electronically from 
the Directorate of Budgeting 
System’s official. The data were 
received by an email on 10 
September 2013. The official 
explained that the data were 
summarised from the President 
Regulation Number 32 Year 2011 
regarding the Details of Central 
Government Budget of Fiscal Year 
2012.   
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No Data Budgetary Data 
at Ministry/Agency Level 
Budgetary Data  
at Programme Level 
8 
The Budget 
Spending of 
2012 
The Central Government 
Financial Report (Audited by 
The Audit Board of Indonesia) 
2012 
Not available 
9 
The 
Indicative 
Budget 
Ceilings of 
2013 
The letter of the Minister of   
Planning number 
0096/M.PPN/03/2012 and the 
Minister of Finance letter 
number SE-214/MK.02/2012 
regarding the Indicative Budget 
Ceilings and the Initial Draft of 
the Government Work Plan for 
Fiscal Year 2013.   
 
The letter of the Minister of 
National Planning number 
0096/M.PPN/03/2012 and the 
Minister of Finance letter number 
SE-214/MK.02/2012 regarding the 
Indicative Budget Ceilings and the 
Initial Draft of the Government 
Work Plan for Fiscal Year 2013.   
 
10 
The Budget 
Ceilings of 
2013 
The Minister of Finance 
regulation number 
229/KMK.02/2012 regarding 
the Budget Ceilings of fiscal 
year 2013.  
 
The circular letter of Ministry of 
Finance number S-769/MK.02/2012 
regarding the Budget Allocations of 
Line Ministries/Agencies for Fiscal 
Year 2013.   
 
11 
Budget 
Allocations 
2013 
The circular letter of Ministry of 
Finance number S-
769/MK.02/2012 regarding the 
Budget Allocations of Line 
Ministries/Agencies for Fiscal 
Year 2013.   
 
The budget allocations of 2013 
were collected electronically from 
the Directorate of Budgeting 
System’s Official.  The data were 
received by an email on 10 
September 2013. The official 
explained that the data were 
summarised from the President 
Regulation Number 37 Year 2012 
regarding The Details of the Central 
Government Budget of Fiscal Year 
2013.   
 
12 
The Budget 
Spending 
2013 
The Central Government 
Financial Report (Audited by 
The Audit Board of Indonesia) 
2013 
Not available 
13 The 
Indicative 
Budget 
Ceilings of 
2014 
The letter of the Minister of   
Planning number 
1949/M.PPN/04/2013 and the 
Minister of Finance letter 
number SE-279/MK.02/2013 
regarding the Indicative Budget 
Ceilings and the Initial Draft of 
the Government Work Plan for 
Fiscal Year 2014.   
 
The letter of the Minister of   
Planning number 
1949/M.PPN/04/2013 and the 
Minister of Finance letter number 
SE-279/MK.02/2013 regarding the 
Indicative Budget Ceilings and the 
Initial Draft of the Government 
Work Plan for Fiscal Year 2014.   
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No Data Budgetary Data 
at Ministry/Agency Level 
Budgetary Data  
at Programme Level 
14 
Budget 
Ceilings 
2014 
Appendix I of the Minister of 
Finance Letter number S-
760/MK.02/2013 
The Appendix II of the Minister of 
Finance Letter number S-
760/MK.02/2013 
15 
Budget 
Allocations 
2014 
The Appendix I of the Minister 
of Finance Letter number S-
760/MK.02/2013 
The appendix I President 
Regulation Number 29 Year 2013 
regarding the Details of the Central 
Government Budget of Fiscal Year 
2014.   
16 
The Budget 
Spending 
2014 
The Central Government 
Financial Report (Audited by 
The Audit Board of Indonesia) 
2014 
Not available 
17 
Performance 
Scores of 
2011 
The data were collected 
electronically from the 
Directorate of Budgeting 
System’s Official.  The data 
were received by an email on 24 
July 2013.   
The data were collected 
electronically from the Directorate 
of Budgeting System’s Official.  
The data were received by an email 
on 27 August 2013.   
18 
Performance 
Scores of 
2012 
The data were collected 
electronically from the 
Directorate of Budgeting 
System’s Official.  The data 
were received by an email on 24 
July 2013.   
The data were collected 
electronically from the Directorate 
of Budgeting System’s Official.  
The data were received by an email 
on 27 August 2013.   
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Appendix II Interview Guide 
No. Question 
A. General questions 
1. Name of organisation 
2. Name of participant 
3. Position/Division/Bureau:  
4. Number of years employed in this division 
5. Please describe your roles in the planning and budgeting process. 
B. Performance-based budgeting in Indonesia 
1. Based on your experience, please describe what do you know about the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting in Indonesia 
2. Do you agree that performance information (performance indicators and performance 
scores/evaluation) is the main element of performance-based budgeting? Please 
explain 
C. The use of performance information in determining budget allocations 
1. How useful is performance information in determining budget allocations?  
2. Does performance information directly affects budget allocation? Please explain. 
3. Please explain why performance information does or does not directly affect budget 
allocations? 
4. Please rank the twelve factors that affect budget allocations (I will give the list of factors 
below) 
5. Based on your ranking of factors, please explain why some factors give much influence 
on budget allocations than performance information?   
6. Based on the position of performance information in the ranking of factors, is it possible 
that performance information, directly and indirectly, influences budget allocation? 
Please explain 
7. What are the requirements needed to ensure that performance information could be 
used on budget allocation? 
D. The use of performance information by budget actors outside the office of the 
interviewee (the Ministry of Planning/the Directorate General of 
Budget/Ministry/Agency) 
1. Could you describe how do you, or your Directorate, use performance information in 
budgeting process?  (for interviewees from the Ministry of Planning or the Directorate 
General of Budget only) 
2. Could you explain about the use of performance information by the Ministry of 
Planning/the Ministry of Finance/line ministries/agencies?      
3. Could you explain about the use of performance information by Members of 
Parliament?  
4. Please describe the working relationship between Directorate-General for Budget and 
the Ministry of Planning in terms of reviewing budget, budget decision and evaluating 
performance 
5. Please explain the use of performance scores that produced based on the Minister of 
Finance Regulation 249/KMK.02/2011 by those actors. 
6. Please describe the challenges faced in using performance information 
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No. Question 
7. Please describe the top management and employees support in using performance 
information and performance cultures for budgeting process? 
E. The use of performance information by budget actors within Ministry/Agency (this 
section only for interviewees from line ministries/agencies). 
1. Please describe the use of performance information in budgeting process within 
Ministry/Agency   
2. Please describe the use of performance information for management, performance 
management system within ministry/agency, reporting and other purposes 
3. Please describe the challenges faced in using performance information 
4. Please describe the top management and employees support in using performance 
information and performance cultures within your organisation. 
 
Twelve possible factors affect budget allocation (for interview question number 
C.4) 
 
Variables Ranked 
The previous year(s) budget spending  
The previous year(s) budget allocations.  
The annual Policies of the President.    
The annual baseline adjustment by line ministries/agencies  
The informal discussions and negotiations between line 
ministries/agencies officials and the Ministry of Planning and/or the 
Ministry of Finance officials before the issuance of budget allocations 
 
The informal negotiations between line ministries/agencies officials 
and Member(s) of Parliament before the issuance of budget allocations 
 
Budget proposals for new initiatives from line ministries/agencies  
The budget projection stated in Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) 2010-2014 
 
The results of the work plan and budget documents (RKAKL) review 
meetings 
 
The agreement between line ministries/agencies and the Parliament in 
budget meetings 
 
The performance targets in line ministries/agencies’ work plan 
(RENSTRA-KL) and RKAKL documents 
 
RKAKL performance scores based on the Minister of Finance 
Regulation 249/2011. 
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Interview Guide in Indonesian 
 
No. Pertanyaan 
A. Pertanyaan umum 
1. Nama instansi: 
2. Nama responden: 
3. Posisi/Jabatan responden di Biro/Divisi terkait: 
4. Lama bekerja di Biro/Divisi terkait: 
5. Peran responden dalam proses penganggaran: 
B. Penganggaran Berbasis Kinerja (PBK) di Indonesia 
1. Berdasarkan pengalaman Bapak/Ibu, mohon penjelasan apa yang Bapak/Ibu 
pahami tentang penerapan PBK di Indonesia. 
2. Menurut Bapak/Ibu, apakah informasi kinerja (indikator kinerja dan hasil 
evaluasi kinerja) merupakan elemen utama dari PBK? Mohon jelaskan.   
C. Pemanfaatan informasi kinerja dalam penentuan alokasi anggaran   
1. Selama ini, seberapa jauh manfaat informasi kinerja dalam penentuan alokasi 
anggaran di   K/L Bapak/Ibu oleh Kementerian Perencanaan/Kementerian 
Keuangan?    
 2. Apakah informasi kinerja yang disampaikan K/L Bapak/Ibu kepada 
Kementerian Perencanaan dan Kementerian Keuangan kemudian secara 
langsung berpengaruh pada alokasi anggaran K/L? 
3. Mohon penjelasan mengapa hasil evaluasi/nilai kinerja berpengaruh/tidak 
berpengaruh secara langsung terhadap alokasi anggaran K/L Bapak/Ibu? 
4. Berdasarkan pengalaman selama ini, mohon bantuan Bapak/Ibu untuk membuat 
urutan kedua belas faktor berikut yang dianggap mempengaruhi alokasi 
anggaran K/L Bapak/Ibu dari yang paling mempengaruhi sampai dengan yang 
paling kurang mempengaruhi alokasi anggaran (Daftar kedua belas faktor 
terlampir) 
5. Berdasarkan urutan yang telah disampaikan, mohon penjelasan mengapa 
beberapa faktor tersebut lebih berpengaruh terhadap alokasi anggaran daripada 
informasi kinerja?  
6. Berdasarkan posisi informasi kinerja dalam urutan faktor-faktor tersebut, 
apakah mungkin di kemudian hari informasi kinerja dapat berpengaruh 
langsung dalam penentuan alokasi anggaran? 
7. Menurut Bapak/Ibu, apa saja persyaratan yang diperlukan agar informasi 
kinerja dapat digunakan dalam penentuan alokasi anggaran? 
D. Pemanfaatan informasi kinerja oleh para pelaku anggaran di luar K/L 
interviewee 
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No. Pertanyaan 
1. Berdasarkan pengalaman Bapak/Ibu, mohon penjelasan mengenai penggunaan 
informasi kinerja oleh pihak Ditjen Anggaran dalam proses penganggaran.    
2. Berdasarkan pengalaman Bapak/Ibu, mohon penjelasan mengenai penggunaan 
informasi kinerja oleh pihak Bappenas dalam proses penganggaran.    
3. Berdasarkan pengalaman Bapak/Ibu, mohon penjelasan mengenai penggunaan 
informasi kinerja oleh pihak DPR/Komisi terkait dalam proses penganggaran.   
4. Berdasarkan pengalaman Bapak/Ibu, mohon penjelasan mengenai hubungan 
kerja/koordinasi antara pihak Ditjen Anggaran dan Bappenas dalam mereviu 
usulan anggaran (Renja, RKA-K/L), pengalokasian anggaran dan evaluasi 
kinerja. 
5. Menurut Bapak/Ibu, bagaimana manfaat pengukuran kinerja RKA-K/L yang 
diamanatkan PMK No. 249/KMK.02/2011 oleh para pelaku anggaran tersebut. 
 
E. Pemanfaatan informasi kinerja di dalam K/L Bapak/Ibu (khusus untuk 
interviewee dari Kementerian/Lembaga) 
1. Mohon penjelasan mengenai penggunaan informasi kinerja dalam proses 
pengalokasian anggaran di dalam K/L Bapak/Ibu sendiri.     
2. Mohon penjelasan mengenai penggunaan informasi kinerja hasil dari PBK 
dalam proses manajemen di K/L Bapak/Ibu termasuk dalam sistem manajemen 
kinerja dan penggunaan lainnya.   
3. Mohon penjelasan tantangan yang dihadapi dalam pemanfaatan informasi 
kinerja.  
4. Mohon penjelasan bagaimana dukungan Pimpinan dan pegawai dalam 
penggunaan informasi kinerja serta budaya kinerja di K/L Bapak/Ibu.   
Dua belas faktor yang mungkin mempengaruhi besarnya anggaran 
Kementerian/Lembaga (terkait pertanyaan nomor C.4) 
Faktor yang mempengaruhi besarnya anggaran K/L Peringkat 
Penyerapan anggaran K/L tahun-tahun sebelumnya  
Alokasi anggaran K/L tahun-tahun sebelumnya  
Kebijakan Tahunan Presiden/Kebijakan Prioritas Nasional pada Rencana 
Kerja Pemerintah (RKP) 
 
Penyesuaian baseline dari K/L yang disampaikan kepada Ditjen 
Anggaran 
 
Diskusi dan negosiasi informal Sekjen/Sestama/Sesmen/Pejabat Biro 
Perencanaan K/L kepada pihak di Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran 
sebelum pagu terbit. 
 
Negosiasi Pejabat K/L kepada Komisi/Banggar DPR  
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Faktor yang mempengaruhi besarnya anggaran K/L Peringkat 
Usulan anggaran Inisiatif Baru kepada Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran  
Perkiraan jumlah anggaran tahunan yang tercantum pada Kerangka 
Pengeluaran Jangka Menengah (KPJM) 2010-2014 
 
Hasil penelaahan RKA-K/L oleh Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran  
Hasil kesepakatan K/L dengan DPR  
Target Kinerja yang disampaikan kepada Bappenas dan Kementerian 
K/L pada dokumen Renja K/L dan RKA-K/L 
 
Hasil evaluasi kinerja tahun-tahun sebelumnya yang diukur berdasarkan 
PMK No. 249/KMK.02/2011 
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Appendix III Survey Questionnaire 
 
Survey of the Use of Performance Information 
 in Performance-Based Budgeting of Indonesia       
 
 
Background 
In mid-2009, the Indonesian government initiated to reform its planning and 
budgeting process. The reform has been gradually implemented since fiscal year 
2011. Government regulation number 90/2010 specifies that the annual work plans 
and budget documents of line ministries/agencies (RKAKL) are prepared using three 
approaches: medium term expenditure framework (MTEF), unified budgeting and 
performance-based budgeting. 
 
Performance information, which includes performance indicators/targets and 
performance evaluation, is an important element in performance-based budgeting. 
Government regulation 90/2010 specifies that performance information must be used 
in budget proposals or RKAKL. According to the regulation, there are three 
instruments applied for preparing the RKAKL: performance indicators, cost 
standards, and performance evaluation. In order to evaluate performance evaluation, 
the Ministry of Finance issued a guideline for line ministries/agencies in evaluating 
their RKAKLs to produce RKAKL performance scores.   
 
This survey is conducted as part of my research with the objective to explore how 
budget actors use performance information in budgeting process as well as in 
performance management. The scope of this survey is the planning and budgeting 
over the period of 2011-2014.   
 
Survey participants 
This survey is distributed to all line ministries/agencies that receive budget 
allocations from the government. This survey should be filled in by Head of Planning 
Bureau or a senior manager, as a representative of each line ministry/agency, who is 
responsible to manage the planning and budgeting process in her/his 
ministry/agency.   
 
This survey is asking about the opinions and experience of each respondent in using 
performance information for the planning and the budgeting process and managerial 
activities. There is no true of false answers for this survey. Every answer will be 
valuable for this research. 
 
Performance information that is defined in this survey covers performance 
indicators/targets that stated in planning and budget documents and RKAKL 
performance scores based on the Minister of Finance regulation 249/PMK.02/2011. 
 
Confidentiality of Survey 
 
I declare that all information are collected from this survey will only be used for my 
research and publications that related with my thesis. All personal information will be 
treated as confidential.   
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How to send the result of Survey     
 
The result of survey can be sent to:  
1.  using provided stamp-enveloped; or 
2. The result can be scanned and send by email to:  or 
3. The researcher can directly collect the result. For collection arrangement please 
call at  
Further information 
 
If you need further information regarding this survey, you can contact the researcher. 
Thank you for your cooperation and participation.   
  
Teguh Widodo 
Postgraduate Doctoral Researcher   
University of Birmingham, UK 
 
  
  
 
The Questions 
 
A. General Information 
 
1. Name of Ministry/Agency  : ……………………………………………. 
2. Participant as the representative of ministry/agency:   
a. Name    : ……………………………………………. 
b. Division/Bureau/Department : …………………………………………….  
c. Position    : ……………………………………………. 
 
B. The questions in this section are asking about your opinions and 
experiences in budget allocations process for the period of 2011 to 
2014.   
 
For questions number 1 to 3, please tick (✔) one appropriate answer for each 
question.   
 
No. Statements   Strongly Agree 
  
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. The Ministry of Planning uses my 
ministry’s performance targets as 
the main consideration to decide the 
Indicative Budget Ceilings of my 
ministry.   
     
2. The Directorate-General for Budget 
uses performance targets as the 
main consideration to decide the 
Indicative Budget Ceilings, the 
Budget Ceilings, and the Budget 
Allocations of my ministry.    
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No. Statements   Strongly Agree 
  
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
3. The Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance use performance 
scores as the main consideration to 
decide the Indicative Budget 
Ceilings, the Budget Ceilings, and 
the Budget Allocations of my 
ministry.    
     
 
4. There are at least twelve variables that could affect the budget amount of 
a ministry/agency. Based on your experiences in budgeting process, 
please ranked these factors from 1 to 12 with number 1 as a variable that 
has the most significant effect to budget amount and number 12 as the 
least significant.  
 
 
Variables Ranked 
The previous year(s) budget spending  
The previous year(s) budget allocations.  
The annual Policies of the President.    
The annual baseline adjustment by line ministries/agencies  
The informal discussions and negotiations between line ministries/agencies 
officials and the Ministry of Planning and/or the Ministry of Finance officials 
before the issuance of budget allocations 
 
The informal negotiations between line ministries/agencies officials and 
Member(s) of Parliament before the issuance of budget allocations 
 
Budget proposals for new initiatives from line ministries/agencies  
The budget projection stated in Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) 2010-2014 
 
The results of the work plan and budget documents (RKAKL) review 
meetings 
 
The agreement between line ministries/agencies and the Parliament in 
budget meetings 
 
The performance targets in line ministries/agencies’ work plan (RENSTRA-
KL) and RKAKL documents 
 
RKAKL performance scores based on the Minister of Finance Regulation 
249/2011. 
 
 
 
Please specify here if there are other variables that affect budget 
allocations of your ministry/agency: 
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C. The questions in this section are asking about your opinions and 
experiences in using performance information for the planning and 
budgeting process.   
 
 Please tick (✔) one appropriate answer for each question.   
 
1. The use of performance information by your ministry in the budgeting 
process that related to the Ministry of Planning, the Directorate General of 
Budget (DG Budget), and the Parliament.   
 
My Ministry/Agency uses performance 
information to:  
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fulfil formal requirements as requested by 
the Ministry of Panning and DG Budget.    
     
Decide the budget amount proposed to the 
Ministry of Planning, DG Budget and 
Parliament. My ministry/agency has been 
adjusted its budget proposal with 
performance targets before it was 
submitted to them.      
     
Decide the budget amount proposed to the 
Ministry of Planning, DG Budget and 
Parliament. My ministry/agency has been 
adjusted its budget proposal with the results 
of performance evaluation or performance 
scores before it was submitted to them.         
     
Convince budget examiners from the 
Ministry of Planning and DG Budget in 
budget meetings in relation with the 
proposed budget amount.     
     
Present in budget meetings in the 
Parliament. The objective is to convince 
Parliament regarding the budget proposed.        
 
Please specify here, if any, the other ways of using performance 
information by your ministry/agency in budgeting process.    
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2. The use of performance information by your ministry/agency in budgeting 
process within your own ministry/agency.   
   
In allocating budget to each 
Divisions/Departments, my 
ministry/agency:  
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Only uses performance information to 
fulfil formal requirements as requested 
by the Ministry of Planning and DB 
Budget in budget documents.   
     
Uses performance information to cut or 
add budget proposed by each 
Division/Department.        
Uses previous year’s budget allocation 
as a basis to decide the budget amount 
of each Division/Department without 
really care with performance 
information.  
     
Uses previous year’s budget spending 
as a basis to decide the budget amount 
of each Division/Department without 
really care with performance 
information.     
     
Uses the combination of previous year’s 
budget allocation and previous year’s 
budget spending to decide the budget 
amount of each Division/Department 
without really care with performance 
information.       
     
Uses performance information as a 
supporting tool to make budgeting 
decisions for each Division/Department.        
Uses the combination of several factors 
such as performance information, 
previous year’s budget allocations, and 
previous year’s budget spending to 
decide the budget amount of each 
Division/Department.    
     
 
Please specify here, if any, the other ways of using performance 
information by your ministry/agency and or any consideration used in 
allocating budget within your ministry/agency.    
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D. The questions in this section are asking your opinions and 
experiences about the use of performance information by your 
ministry/agency as part of performance management system and 
management activities. 
 
Statements Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 (1) (2) (2) (3) (4) 
Performance information in 
performance budgeting has been 
integrated in performance 
management system in my 
ministry/agency.   
     
Performance information in 
performance budgeting cannot be 
used for performance management 
system in my ministry/agency.   
     
My ministry/agency has a separate 
performance management system 
that differs from performance 
budgeting.   
     
Performance information in 
performance budgeting is used for 
reporting purposes to external parties 
such as the Ministry of Planning, 
Directorate General of Budget, and 
the public. 
     
Performance information in 
performance budgeting is used for 
improving programmes and activities 
within my ministry/agency. 
     
Performance information in 
performance budgeting is used for 
getting support and convincing the 
public about the works of my 
ministry/agency. 
     
Managers in my ministry/agency use 
performance information in 
performance budgeting to 
understand more about the programs 
and activities. 
     
Our internal auditors regularly review 
and evaluate our activities using the 
performance information used in 
performance budgeting. 
     
 
Please specify here, if any, the other ways of using performance 
information in performance budgeting to support management activities 
within you ministry/agency:   
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E. The questions in this section are asking your opinions and 
experiences about the use of performance information by budget 
actors in the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and 
Parliament in using performance information for budgeting process. 
 
Please tick (✔) one appropriate answer for each question.   
 
1. The use of performance information by Ministry of Planning.   
 
Budget officials in the Ministry of 
Planning actively use:  
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Diasgree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
To review and examine the 
relationship between the budgets 
proposed by my ministry/agency and 
the performance targets planned by 
my ministry/agency.   
     
To review the relationship between 
the budget proposed by my 
ministry/agency and the performance 
scores/results of my ministry/agency.   
     
To make budget cuts and budget 
increases, as proposed by my 
ministry/agency.      
To fulfil formal requirements in 
planning and budgeting process. In 
reviewing the budget proposed by 
ministry/agency, the Ministry of 
Planning more focused on the 
aggregate amount of the budget 
(costs as inputs) than focused on 
performance targets. 
     
As a basis to conduct regular reviews 
of the ministry’s performance using 
performance evaluation results.      
 
Please specify here, if any, the other ways of using performance 
information by the Ministry of Planning:   
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2. The use of performance information by the Ministry of Finance.   
 
Budget examiners in the Ministry of 
Finance actively use performance 
information:  
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
To review and examine the relationship 
between the budget proposed by my 
ministry/agency and the performance 
targets planned by my ministry/agency. 
     
To review the relationship between the 
budget proposed by my ministry/agency 
and the performance scores/results of my 
ministry/agency. 
     
To make budget cuts and budget 
increases, as proposed by my 
ministry/agency.      
To fulfil formal requirements in planning 
and budgeting process. In reviewing the 
budget proposed by ministry/agency, 
Directorate-General of  Budget more 
focused on the aggregate amount of the 
budget (costs as inputs) than focused on 
performance targets. 
     
As a basis to conduct regular reviews of 
ministry’s performance using performance 
evaluation results.      
 
Please specify here, if any, the other ways of using performance 
information by the Ministry of Finance in budgeting process:   
 
 
 
3. The use of performance information by Parliament. 
 
Members of Parliament use 
performance information:   
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor  
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
To make approvals of budget cuts or 
budget increases in Budget Meetings.      
To inform them in making budget 
decisions but they are not necessarily 
related to budget cuts or budget 
increases. 
     
To assist them in making decisions in 
non-budgeting meetings which discuss a 
programme/activity of the ministry/agency.      
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Please specify here, if any, the other ways of using performance 
information by Parliament in budgeting process:   
 
 
 
 
F. The questions in this section are asking your opinions and 
experiences about support from top management in using 
performance information and performance cultures within your 
ministry/agency.     
 
Statements Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
My ministry/agency is very much oriented to 
performance. We regularly measure our 
performance by performance information 
used in performance budgeting or our own 
performance management system. 
     
My ministry conducts regular meetings to 
evaluate our performance and to discuss 
the ways to improve performance.      
Our top management is very concerned 
with performance and performance 
information. They always examine our 
activities with performance targets and 
performance results. 
     
Our top management is concern that 
performance of our ministry/agency is 
measured based on the budget spending 
only. 
     
Our top management is concerned that 
performance of our ministry/agency is 
measured based on the combination of 
budget spending and the achievement 
Outcomes and Outputs as stated in the 
Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) 
number 249/PMK.02/2011. 
     
Our top management is rather reluctant to 
use performance information to measure 
the success or the failure of their divisions.      
Our top management measures the 
success or the failure of their subordinates 
using performance information.      
Our top management uses performance 
information to motivate their subordinates.      
Most employees in our ministry/agency 
understand that their divisions’ performance 
is measured by performance budgeting.      
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G. The questions in this section are asking your opinions and 
experiences about the challenges faced by your ministry/agency in 
using performance information.  
 
Statements Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Performance information in performance 
budgeting cannot accurately measure the 
whole performance of an organisation.        
Performance information in performance 
budgeting cannot accurately measure the 
whole performance of an organisation.      
My ministry/agency faces difficulty in 
choosing the right performance indicators 
that fit with its missions and functions.      
The outcomes of our Programmes are 
difficult to measure.      
The outputs of our Activities are difficult to 
measure. 
     
It is difficult to get the attention from top 
management in using performance 
information.      
The use of performance information adds 
paper-work and time-consuming data 
collection and reporting.      
The benefit of using performance 
information is not clear.      
A credible information system is needed 
to produce performance information 
     
My ministry/agency is finding it difficult to 
have good quality and credible 
performance information.      
My ministry/agency is finding it difficult to 
have   performance information in a  
timely manner.      
The Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) 
number 249/PMK.02/2011 is not really 
credible measurement system to evaluate 
the performance of my ministry/agency. 
     
 
Please specify here, if any, the other the challenges faced by your 
ministry/agency in using performance information.  
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Thank you   
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Survey Questionnaire in Indonesian 
 
Survei Pemanfaatan Informasi Kinerja 
 dalam Penganggaran Berbasis Kinerja (PBK) Kementerian/Lembaga 
 di Indonesia     
 
Latar Belakang dan Tujuan Survei 
Pada pertengahan tahun 2009 Indonesia melakukan reformasi perencanaan dan 
penganggaran yang secara bertahap mulai diberlakukan pada proses dan dokumen 
penganggaran tahun anggaran 2011. Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 90 Tahun 2010 
menyebutkan bahwa Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Kementerian/Lembaga (RKA-
K/L) disusun dengan tiga pendekatan: Kerangka Pengeluaran Jangka Menengah 
(KPJM), penganggaran terpadu, dan penganggaran berbasis kinerja (PBK).  
 
Informasi kinerja, yang meliputi indikator/target kinerja dan evaluasi kinerja, 
merupakan bagian yang sangat penting dalam proses penganggaran. PP Nomor 90 
Tahun 2010 menyatakan bahwa informasi kinerja digunakan dalam penyusunan 
usulan anggaran. Instrumen yang digunakan dalam penyusunan RKA-K/L adalah 
indikator kinerja, standar biaya, dan evaluasi kinerja. Untuk melakukan evaluasi 
kinerja, Kementerian Keuangan menerbitkan PMK No. 249/PMK.02/2011 sebagai 
pedoman bagi setiap Kementerian/Lembaga (K/L) dalam melakukan evaluasi 
terhadap RKA-K/L secara self-assessment untuk menghasilkan nilai kinerja.  
 
Survei ini dilaksanakan sebagai bagian dari penelitian yang kami lakukan dalam 
rangka penyusunan tesis program PhD di Institute of Local Government Studies, 
University of Birmingham, Inggris. Tujuan penelitian adalah untuk mengetahui sejauh 
mana informasi kinerja secara nyata dimanfaatkan oleh K/L baik pada proses 
penganggaran maupun sebagai bagian dari manajemen kinerja K/L secara 
keseluruhan. Cakupan survei ini adalah proses penganggaran tahun anggaran 2011 
s.d. 2014. 
 
Siapa yang mengisi survei dan sifat survei 
Survei ini disampaikan kepada setiap K/L sebagai pengguna anggaran. Survei ini 
mohon diisi oleh Kepala Biro Perencanaan atau Pejabat Senior yang memahami 
proses perencanaan, penganggaran dan manajemen kinerja pada Biro Perencanaan 
atau Unit Organisasi Eselon II sejenis di masing-masing K/L sebagai wakil resmi dari 
setiap K/L. Partisipasi Bapak/Ibu dalam dalam survei ini bersifat suka rela dan 
pengiriman jawaban survei merupakan bukti kesediaan Bapak/Ibu untuk 
berpartisipasi. 
 
Survei ini menanyakan pendapat dan pengalaman  setiap K/L dalam pemanfaatan 
informasi kinerja di lingkungan K/L masing-masing dan bagaimana informasi kinerja 
digunakan dalam proses penganggaran dan manajemen kinerja.  
 
Informasi kinerja yang dimaksud pada survei ini meliputi Indikator Kinerja/target 
kinerja yang tercantum pada berbagai bentuk dokumen perencanaan dan 
penganggaran dan hasil evaluasi kinerja dan skor kinerja berdasarkan PMK Nomor 
249/PMK.02/2011. 
 
Kami mohon agar survei ini dapat dijawab sesuai dengan kondisi yang senyatanya. 
Setiap jawaban survei menjadi informasi yang berharga untuk penelitian ini. 
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Kerahasiaan Jawaban Survei 
 
Kami menyatakan bahwa informasi yang didapatkan dari survei ini hanya akan 
digunakan untuk keperluan penelitian dan publikasi yang terkait dengan tesis 
peneliti. Informasi pribadi yang disampaikan dalam jawaban survei akan kami jaga 
kerahasiaannya.    
Cara dan Batas Waktu Pengiriman Jawaban Survei 
 
Survei yang telah berisi jawaban dikirim paling lambat 14 Februari 2014 kepada 
kami dengan tiga alternatif: 
5. Jawaban survei dimasukkan dalam amplop berperangko yang sudah disediakan 
dan dikirimkan ke alamat: ; atau 
6. Survei yang sudah diisi dapat di-scan dalam bentuk PDF dan dikirimkan ke 
alamat email ; atau 
7. Jawaban survei dapat diambil langsung oleh peneliti. Kami dapat dihubungi di 
nomor 1. 
 
Informasi Lebih Lanjut 
 
Terima kasih atas partisipasi dan kerja sama Bapak/Ibu. Untuk informasi lebih lanjut 
mengenai survei ini, Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi:  
 
Teguh Widodo 
Peneliti    
PNS pada BPK yang sedang tugas belajar pada Program PhD di Institute of Local 
Government Studies, University of Birmingham, Inggris 
Nomor telepon:  +62 815 86 21 20 21 (Indonesia), +44 7933403884 (UK) 
Email: teguhwidodo@gmail.com, txw244@bham.ac.uk  
  
Pertanyaan Survei 
 
Definisi Informasi Kinerja: 
Informasi kinerja yang dimaksud pada survei ini meliputi indikator kinerja/target 
kinerja (Keluaran dan Hasil) yang tercantum pada berbagai bentuk dokumen 
perencanaan dan penganggaran K/L (Renja, RKA-K/L, DIPA) dan hasil evaluasi 
kinerja/skor kinerja berdasarkan PMK Nomor 249/PMK.02/2011. 
 
 
 
H. Informasi Umum   
 
3. Nama Kementerian/Lembaga  : 
……………………………………………. 
4. Informasi pengisi jawaban survei  :   
d. Nama     : 
……………………………………………. 
e. Nama Unit Organisasi Eselon II/Biro : 
…………………………………………….  
f. Jabatan     : 
……………………………………………. 
g. Mohon jelaskan secara singkat peran Bapak/Ibu dalam proses 
penganggaran:  
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h. Berapa lama Bapak/Ibu telah bekerja di Unit Eselon II ini? (mohon pilih 
salah satu jawaban): 
 
Kurang dari 2 tahun        
Antara 2 s.d. 4 tahun    
Lebih dari 4 tahun    
 
I. Bagian ini berisi pertanyaan tentang pendapat dan pengalaman anda 
dalam penentuan alokasi anggaran K/L pada periode TA 2011 s.d. 
2014. 
 
Untuk pertanyaan nomor 1 s.d. 3, mohon pilih salah satu jawaban pada 
masing-masing pertanyaan dengan memberi tanda (X). Silahkan dikosongkan 
jika anda tidak tahu jawabannya. 
 
No. Pernyataan 
Sangat 
Setuju 
Setuj
u Netral 
Tidak 
Setuj
u 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Bappenas dan Kementerian Keuangan 
menggunakan target kinerja sebagai faktor 
utama yang secara langsung mempengaruhi 
jumlah Pagu Indikatif K/L. 
     
2. Kementerian Keuangan menggunakan target 
kinerja sebagai faktor utama yang secara 
langsung mempengaruhi jumlah Pagu Anggaran 
dan Alokasi Anggaran K/L. 
     
3. Bappenas dan Kementerian Keuangan 
menggunakan nilai evaluasi kinerja sebagai 
faktor utama yang secara langsung 
mempengaruhi jumlah Pagu Indikatif, Pagu 
Anggaran, dana Alokasi Anggaran K/L.   
     
 
8. Dua belas faktor berikut merupakan faktor-faktor yang menentukan 
besarnya anggaran suatu K/L. Berdasarkan pengalaman anda dalam 
mengikuti proses penganggaran, mohon urutkan faktor-faktor berikut 
mulai dari 1 s.d. 12 pada kolom Peringkat, dengan nomor 1 adalah faktor 
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yang paling menentukan s.d. nomor 12 sebagai faktor yang paling kurang 
menentukan besarnya anggaran. 
 
 
 
 
No. Faktor yang mempengaruhi besarnya anggaran K/L Peringkat 
a. Penyerapan anggaran K/L tahun-tahun sebelumnya  
b. Alokasi anggaran K/L tahun-tahun sebelumnya  
c. Kebijakan Tahunan Presiden/Kebijakan Prioritas Nasional pada Rencana Kerja Pemerintah 
(RKP) 
 
d. Penyesuaian baseline dari K/L yang disampaikan kepada Ditjen Anggaran  
e. Diskusi dan negosiasi informal Sekjen/Sestama/Sesmen/Pejabat Biro Perencanaan K/L 
kepada pihak di Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran sebelum pagu terbit. 
 
f. Negosiasi Pejabat K/L kepada Komisi/Banggar DPR  
g. Usulan anggaran Inisiatif Baru kepada Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran  
h. Perkiraan jumlah anggaran tahunan yang tercantum pada Kerangka Pengeluaran Jangka 
Menengah (KPJM) 2010-2014 
 
i. Hasil penelaahan RKA-K/L oleh Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran  
j. Hasil kesepakatan K/L dengan DPR  
k. Target Kinerja yang disampaikan kepada Bappenas dan Kementerian K/L pada dokumen 
Renja K/L dan RKA-K/L 
 
l. Hasil evaluasi kinerja tahun-tahun sebelumnya yang diukur berdasarkan PMK No. 
249/KMK.02/2011 
 
 
Jika ada, mohon sebutkan faktor lainnya yang mempengaruhi besarnya 
anggaran K/L anda: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
J. Bagian ini menanyakan pendapat dan pengalaman anda tentang 
pemanfaatan informasi kinerja untuk proses penganggaran di 
lingkungan K/L anda. 
 
Untuk setiap pertanyaan pada bagian ini, mohon pilih salah satu jawaban 
pada masing-masing pertanyaan dengan memberi tanda (X).  Silahkan 
dikosongkan jika anda tidak tahu jawabannya. 
 
3. Pemanfaatan informasi kinerja oleh K/L anda dalam proses 
penganggaran di Bappenas, Ditjen Anggaran dan DPR.   
 
K/L kami menggunakan informasi kinerja untuk: 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Memenuhi persyaratan formal proses perencanaan 
dan penganggaran yang diminta Bappenas dan 
Ditjen Anggaran.       
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K/L kami menggunakan informasi kinerja untuk: 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Menentukan besarnya anggaran yang diajukan 
kepada Bappenas, Ditjen Anggaran dan DPR.  
Selama ini, K/L kami secara sadar menyesuaikan 
besarnya anggaran yang diajukan dengan Target 
Kinerja yang direncanakan.       
     
Menentukan besarnya anggaran yang diajukan 
kepada Bappenas, Ditjen Anggaran dan DPR.  
Selama ini, K/L kami secara sadar menyesuaikan 
besarnya anggaran yang diajukan dengan Hasil 
Kinerja yang dicapai pada tahun sebelumnya.       
     
Alat pendukung dalam meyakinkan para Penelaah di 
Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran dalam diskusi terkait 
anggaran yang diajukan dengan target kinerja yang 
direncanakan.   
     
Alat pendukung dalam meyakinkan para Penelaah di 
Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran dalam diskusi terkait 
anggaran yang diajukan dengan kinerja yang telah 
dihasilkan pada tahun-tahun sebelumnya.     
     
Disampaikan/dipresentasikan dalam Rapat Dengar 
Pendapat dengan DPR dalam rangka meyakinkan 
DPR terhadap anggaran yang diajukan.      
 
Jika ada, mohon jelaskan hal lain tentang bagaimana K/L anda 
menggunakan informasi kinerja dalam proses penganggaran: 
 
  
 
 
4. Pemanfaatan informasi kinerja oleh K/L anda dalam proses 
penganggaran di lingkungan internal K/L. 
   
Dalam mengalokasikan anggaran kepada 
setiap Satuan Kerja (Satker), K/L kami: 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hanya menggunakan informasi kinerja untuk 
memenuhi persyaratan formal proses 
perencanaan dan penganggaran yang diminta 
Bappenas dan Ditjen Anggaran. 
     
Menggunakan informasi kinerja sebagai dasar 
melakukan pemotongan atau pengurangan 
anggaran yang diajukan K/L.      
Masih berpedoman pada jumlah anggaran Satker 
tahun-tahun sebelumnya daripada informasi 
kinerja dalam menentukan alokasi anggaran 
Satker.  
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Dalam mengalokasikan anggaran kepada 
setiap Satuan Kerja (Satker), K/L kami: 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Masih berpatokan pada besarnya realisasi 
anggaran Satker tahun-tahun sebelumnya 
daripada informasi kinerja dalam menentukan 
alokasi anggaran Satker.  
     
Berpatokan pada kombinasi antara besarnya 
alokasi anggaran dan realisasi anggaran Satker 
tahun-tahun sebelumnya daripada informasi 
kinerja dalam menentukan alokasi anggaran 
Satker.  
     
Menggunakan informasi kinerja sebagai alat 
pendukung dalam membuat keputusan besarnya 
jumlah anggaran setiap Satker.      
Menggunakan kombinasi beberapa faktor seperti 
informasi kinerja, alokasi anggaran tahun-tahun 
sebelumnya, realisasi anggaran tahun-tahun 
sebelumnya dalam menentukan alokasi anggaran 
Satker.      
     
 
Jika ada, mohon jelaskan hal lain tentang bagaimana K/L anda  
menggunakan informasi kinerja atau pertimbangan-pertimbangan lain 
yang digunakan dalam proses alokasi anggaran di lingkungan internal: 
 
  
 
 
K. Bagian ini menanyakan pendapat dan pengalaman anda tentang 
pemanfaatan informasi kinerja sebagai bagian sistem manajemen 
kinerja di K/L anda. 
 
Untuk setiap pertanyaan pada bagian ini, mohon pilih salah satu jawaban 
pada masing-masing pertanyaan dengan memberi tanda (X). Silahkan 
dikosongkan jika anda tidak tahu jawabannya. 
 
Pernyataan 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Informasi Kinerja yang digunakan dalam 
Penganggaran Berbasis Kinerja (PBK) sudah 
terintegrasi ke dalam sistem manajemen kinerja 
di K/L kami. 
     
Informasi kinerja dalam PBK tidak dapat 
digunakan dalam sistem manajemen kinerja di 
K/L kami.       
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Pernyataan 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
K/L kami mempunyai sistem manajemen kinerja 
tersendiri selain penggunaan PBK. 
     
Informasi kinerja yang ada PBK digunakan 
untuk menyusun berbagai Laporan Kinerja 
kepada Bappenas, Kementerian Keuangan dan 
pihak-pihak lainnya. 
     
K/L kami menggunakan informasi kinerja untuk 
membuat perbaikan yang diperlukan guna 
meningkatkan kinerja dan kualitas kegiatan atau 
program.      
     
K/L kami menggunakan informasi kinerja untuk 
mendapat dukungan publik terhdap kegiatan 
yang kami kerjakan.        
Para manajer di K/L kami menggunakan 
informasi kinerja untuk lebih memahami 
kegiatan dan program yang sedang mereka 
kerjakan, yang kemudian dapat digunakan untuk 
perbaikan dan peningkatan kinerja.   
     
Aparat Pengawas Internal di K/L kami secara 
berkala melakukan reviu dan evaluasi kinerja 
Satker dengan menggunakan informasi kinerja 
yang digunakan pada PBK.   
     
 
Jika ada, mohon jelaskan hal lain tentang bagaimana K/L anda  
menggunakan informasi kinerja dalam PBK sebagai bagian dari sistem 
manajemen kinerja di lingkungan internal: 
 
  
 
 
L. Bagian ini menanyakan pendapat dan pengalaman anda tentang 
pemanfaatan informasi kinerja oleh para pelaku anggaran dalam 
proses penganggaran. 
 
Untuk setiap pertanyaan pada bagian ini, mohon pilih salah satu jawaban 
pada masing-masing pertanyaan dengan memberi tanda (X).  Silahkan 
dikosongkan jika anda tidak tahu jawabannya. 
 
4. Pemanfaatan informasi kinerja oleh Bappenas.   
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Bappenas menggunakan informasi kinerja 
untuk: 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Menelaah hubungan antara besarnya 
anggaran yang diajukan K/L dengan target 
kinerja yang direncanakan.      
Menelaah hubungan antara besarnya 
anggaran yang diajukan dengan hasil kinerja 
K/L pada tahun-tahun sebelumnya.      
Melakukan pemotongan atau pengurangan 
anggaran yang diajukan K/L. 
     
Memenuhi persyaratan formal proses 
perencanaan dan penganggaran saja.    
Dalam menelaah anggaran, Bappenas lebih 
fokus pada nilai anggaran (Masukan) dan 
jumlah anggaran secara agregat, bukan 
Kinerja (Keluaran dan Hasil) yang 
ditargetkan. 
     
Sebagai pedoman dalam melakukan reviu 
secara berkala terhadap kinerja K/L dengan 
menggunakan hasil evaluasi kinerja.      
 
Jika ada, mohon jelaskan hal lain tentang bagaimana Bappenas 
menggunakan informasi kinerja dalam proses penganggaran: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Pemanfaatan informasi kinerja oleh Direktorat Jenderal Anggaran.   
 
Para Penelaah RKA-K/L di Ditjen Anggaran 
menggunakan informasi kinerja untuk: 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Menelaah hubungan antara besarnya anggaran 
yang diajukan K/L dengan target kinerja yang 
direncanakan.      
Menelaah hubungan antara besarnya anggaran 
yang diajukan dengan hasil kinerja K/L pada 
tahun-tahun sebelumnya      
Melakukan pemotongan atau pengurangan 
anggaran yang diajukan K/L. 
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Para Penelaah RKA-K/L di Ditjen Anggaran 
menggunakan informasi kinerja untuk: 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Memenuhi persyaratan formal proses 
perencanaan dan penganggaran saja.   Dalam 
menelaah anggaran, Penelaah lebih fokus pada 
nilai anggaran (Masukan), bukan Kinerja 
(Keluaran dan Hasil) yang ditargetkan. 
     
Melakukan reviu secara berkala terhadap kinerja 
K/L dengan menggunakan hasil evaluasi kinerja. 
     
 
Jika ada, mohon jelaskan hal lain tentang bagaimana Ditjen Anggaran 
menggunakan informasi kinerja dalam proses penganggaran: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Pemanfaatan Informasi Kinerja oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). 
 
Para Anggota DPR menggunakan informasi 
kinerja untuk: 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Menyetujui penambahan atau pengurangan 
anggaran dalam Rapat Dengar Pendapat 
     
Membantu mereka sebagai masukan dalam  
membuat keputusan yang terkait dengan   
anggaran tetapi tidak langsung berakibat pada 
penambahan atau pengurangan anggaran. 
     
Membantu mereka sebagai masukan dalam   
keputusan pada rapat atau pembahasan  
program/kegiatan K/L  yang tidak terkait dengan 
proses penganggaran. 
     
 
Jika ada, mohon jelaskan hal lain tentang bagaimana DPR menggunakan 
informasi kinerja baik dalam proses penganggaran maupun dalam diskusi 
atau pembahasan kegiatan K/L lainnya di DPR: 
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M. Bagian ini menanyakan pendapat dan pengalaman anda tentang 
budaya kinerja dan dukungan dari Pimpinan K/L dalam pemanfaatan 
informasi kinerja. 
 
Untuk setiap pertanyaan pada bagian ini, mohon pilih salah satu jawaban 
pada masing-masing pertanyaan dengan memberi tanda (X).  Silahkan 
dikosongkan jika anda tidak tahu jawabannya. 
 
Pernyataan 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
K/L kami berorientasi kinerja. Kami selalu 
mengukur kinerja dengan informasi kinerja yang 
dihasilkan oleh PBK atau sistem manajemen 
kinerja yang ada pada K/L kami. 
     
K/L kami melaksanakan pertemuan rutin untuk 
mengevaluasi kinerja dan mendiskusikan 
bagaimana cara meningkatkan kinerja.        
Jajaran Pimpinan (Menteri/Kepala, Pejabat 
setingkat Menteri di jajaran eselon I) di K/L kami 
sangat memperhatikan informasi kinerja. 
Mereka selalu mengkaitkan kegiatan yang kami 
lakukan dengan informasi kinerja (target kinerja 
yang direncanakan dan hasil yang telah 
dicapai).  
     
Jajaran Pimpinan (Menteri/Kepala, Pejabat 
setingkat Menteri di jajaran eselon I) di K/L kami 
hanya memahami bahwa kinerja K/L diukur dari 
penyerapan anggaran. 
     
Jajaran Pimpinan (Menteri/Kepala, Pejabat 
setingkat Menteri di jajaran eselon I) dan 
pegawai di K/L memahami bahwa kinerja K/L 
diukur dari kombinasi antara penyerapan 
anggaran dan pencapaian Keluaran dan Hasil 
seperti yang dimaksud dalam PMK No. 
249/PMK.02/2011. 
     
Jajaran Pimpinan (Menteri/Kepala, Pejabat 
setingkat Menteri di jajaran eselon I) di K/L kami 
enggan menggunakan informasi kinerja untuk 
menilai keberhasilan Satkernya. 
     
Jajaran Pimpinan (Menteri/Kepala, Pejabat 
setingkat Menteri di jajaran eselon I) di K/L kami 
mengukur keberhasilan suatu Satker atau 
bawahannya berdasarkan Hasil Kinerja yang 
dihasilkan oleh PBK atau sistem manajemen 
kinerja yang ada di K/L kami.    
     
Jajaran Pimpinan (Menteri/Kepala, Pejabat 
setingkat Menteri di jajaran eselon I) di K/L saya 
selalu memotivasi bawahannya dengan 
menggunakan informasi kinerja.      
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Pernyataan 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sebagian besar pegawai di K/L saya sudah 
memahami bahwa kinerja Satker mereka   
dievaluasi melalui proses Penganggaran 
Berbasis Kinerja selain dengan sistem 
manajemen kinerja lainnya. 
     
 
Jika ada, mohon jelaskan hal lain terkait budaya kinerja di K/L anda:   
 
  
 
N. Bagian ini menanyakan pendapat dan pengalaman mengenai 
tantangan dalam penggunaan informasi kinerja. 
 
Untuk setiap pertanyaan pada bagian ini, mohon pilih salah satu jawaban 
pada masing-masing pertanyaan dengan memberi tanda (X).  Silahkan 
dikosongkan jika anda tidak tahu jawabannya. 
 
Pernyataan 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Informasi kinerja dalam PBK kurang akurat 
untuk menilai keberhasilan suatu K/L atau 
Satker.      
K/L kami kesulitan dalam menentukan indikator 
kinerja (Keluaran dan Hasil) yang tepat dan 
dapat menggambarkan misi dan tugas fungsi 
organisasi. 
     
Outcome/Hasil dari Program-program yang ada 
pada K/L kami sulit diukur. 
     
Output/Keluaran dari Kegiatan-Kegiatan yang 
ada pada K/L kami sulit diukur. 
     
Kami kesulitan mendapatkan perhatian dari 
Pimpinan mengenai penggunaan informasi 
kinerja      
Penggunaan informasi kinerja menambah beban 
kerja dan menguras waktu yang terkait dengan 
pengumpulan data dan penyusunan laporan.      
Manfaat dari penggunaan informasi kinerja 
sampai saat ini belum terlihat dengan jelas. 
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Pernyataan 
Sangat 
Setuju Setuju Netral 
Tidak 
Setuju 
Sangat 
Tidak 
Setuju 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Untuk memproduksi informasi kinerja 
membutuhkan bantuan sistem informasi yang 
andal.      
K/L kami kesulitan untuk mempunyai informasi 
kinerja yang kualitasnya bagus dan kredibel.   
     
K/L kami kesulitan untuk mendapatkan informasi 
kinerja yang tepat waktu sesuai kebutuhan.   
     
PMK No. 249/PMK.02/2011 belum merupakan 
sistem penilaian kinerja yang dapat diandalkan 
untuk dapat mengevaluasi kinerja K/L.        
 
Jika ada, mohon jelaskan tantangan lain yang dihadapi K/L anda dalam 
penggunaan informasi kinerja.   
 
  
 
O. Jika ada, mohon disampaikan hal-hal lain tentang penggunaan 
informasi kinerja di K/L anda.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terima kasih 
 
 
 
 
